Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

1973

Euro-Dollars and United States Monetary Policy.
Cort Burk Schlichting
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
Schlichting, Cort Burk, "Euro-Dollars and United States Monetary Policy." (1973). LSU Historical
Dissertations and Theses. 2425.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/2425

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While
the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document
have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original
submitted.
The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand
markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.
I.T h e sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document
photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing
page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages.
This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent
pages to insure you complete continuity.
. 2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it
is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have
moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a
good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being
photographed the photographer followed a definite method in
"sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper
left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to
right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is
continued again — beginning below die first row and continuing on until
complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value,
however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from
"photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver
prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing
the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and
specific pages you wish reproduced.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as
received.

Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

..........

3

73-27,867

j

SCHLICHTING, Cort Burk,1942EURO-DOLLARS AND U.S. MONETARY POLICY.

|

)
:i
3

The Louisiana State University and Agricultural
and Mechanical College, Ph.D., 1973
Economics, general

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

\

\

Euro-Dollars and U.S. Monatary Policy

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Economics

by
Cort Burk Schlichting
B . A . , College of William and Mary, 1964
M . A . , Duke University, 1966
May, 1973

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The research for this study was undertaken while
the author was a graduate teaching assistant at Louisiana
State University.

In addition, support in the form of a

summer graduate fellowship in 1971 allowed the substantial
completion of the study.

Appreciation for their support

and encouragement must be extended to the Louisiana State
University Economics Department and to the Departmental
Graduate Coordinator, Dr. J. P. Payne.
For the basic impetus to study this problem, credit
must be given to Dr. D. B. Johnson.

Dr. J. W. Duggar, com

mittee chairman, spent many hours reading the original
drafts, making extensive suggestions, and generally driving
the writer to completion.

Dr. T. R. Beard, Dr. R. A.

Flammang, and Dr. R. E. Chardon also contributed their
time to committee duties.

Their encouragement was

essential to the completion of this paper.
Finally, the moral and financial support of my wife,
to whom the author attempted an explanation of long-run
profit maximization, is both acknowledged and cheerfully
accepted.
In spite of the vigilance of the committee members,
there is a high probability that errors remain in this
study.

For these, unfortunately, the author alone must

accept responsibility.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S .........................................

Page
ii

LIST OF T A B L E S ..................................................................................................................................
ABSTRACT
Chapter
I.

V

.........................................
INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY . . . .

vi
1

Introduction
Purpose of the Study
II.

DEVELOPMENT AND MECHANISMS OF THE
EURO-DOLLAR S Y S T E M ............................

6

Introduction
Definitions and Distinctions
Development of the System
Mechanisms of the System
III.

SUPPLY AND D E M A N D ...............................

64

Introduction
Demand in the Euro-dollar Market
Sources of Supply
IV.

EMPIRICAL DETERMINATION OF THE DEMAND
F O R EURO-DOLLARS BY U.S. B A N K S ................. 104
Introduction
Hypotheses
Estimating Procedure and Sources of
Data
Empirical Results and Implications

V.

CREDIT CREATION AND MONETARY P O L I C Y ............146
Introduction
Credit Creation

Chapter
VI.

Page
EURO-DOLLAR BORROWING AND U.S.
MONETARY POLICY ...............................

203

Introduction
Reserves, Credit Creation, and Euro
dollar Borrowing
Average Reserves and Euro-dollars
Euro-dollar Borrowing and U.S.
Interest Rates
The Money Supply
Foreign Exchange, Balance of Payments,
and Gold Policies
Equity Among Banks
Summary
VII.

CONCLUSIONS

. . ............................. 257

Recapitulation
Conclusions
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................

267

V I T A ..............................

282

LIST OF TABLES
Table
11.1.

Euro-dollar Creation ............................

Page
35

11.2.

Central Bank Generated Euro-dollar Deposit . .

11.3.

Euro-dollar Intermediation ......................

39

II. 4.

U.S. Bank Branch B o r r o w i n g ......................

51

II. 5.

U.S. Bank Euro-dollar Borrowing-System
E f f e c t s ..................................

53

II. 6 . Euro-dollar Creation .............................
111.1.
111.2.

Foreign Branches of U.S. Federal Reserve
Member Banks ..................................

58
75

Euro-dollar Deposits Outstanding (Net) and
Comparison with U.S. Bank Liabilities to
Their B r a n c h e s ............................

77

IV.1.

Regression Results - Stocks and Flows . . . .

IV.2.

Variables Tested and Theoretically
Expected Coefficient Signs ...................

V . 1.

36

T-Accounts and Calculations

127

...................

130
155

VI. 1.

The Effect of Euro-dollar B o r r o w i n g ........... 208

VI. 2.

The Effect of a Loss of Time Deposits........... 210

V I . 3.

The Effect of Changed Composition of
Deposits . . .
...............................211

VI.4.

The Effect of a 20% Marginal Reserve
R e q u i r e m e n t ................................... 213

VI. 5. Average Required Reserves E q u a t i o n s ........... 221

v

ABSTRACT
Euro-dollars are dollar denominated bank deposits
in non-U.S. banks.

These deposits are located primarily

in European commercial banks and are owned by a wide
variety of individuals, corporations, and governmental
bodies.

A Euro-dollar deposit comes into existence when

a holder of dollars exchanges them for a Euro-dollar
deposit.

The issuing bank then becomes the owner of the

dollars which normally take the form of claims on U.S.
bank demand deposits.
This dissertaion is concerned with this process
of conversion from dollars to Euro-dollars and with the
effects the existence of Euro-dollars may have on domestic
monetary policies and on international financial relations.
It is especially concenned with the practice of U.S. banks
of borrowing Euro-dollars during times of tight money in
the United States and the effects such borrowings have on
the efficiency and impact of U.S. monetary policy.
The dissertation describes the development and
mechanisms of the Euro-dollar monetary system.

It shows

that Euro-dollars are money and that this money may be
created by the Eurobanks.

Further, it presents estimates

of the amount of money that has been created.

A money

multiplier is developed and illustrations of its operation
vi

are given.

Of greatest importance to the operation of

this multiplier is the existence of large leakages out of
the Euro-dollar system.
One of the major leakages, and that with which this
study primarily deals, occurs when
dollars from the Eurobanks.

U.S. banks borrow Euro

The decline in Euro-dollar

system reserves that results from this U.S. bank borrowing
restricts credit creation in the Euro-dollar system.
Further, the claims on U.S. banks that U.S. Euro-dollar
borrowers obtain allows the borrowing banks to increase
their reserves and thus their lending.

It also allows the

entire U.S. banking system to increase loans outstanding.
The money supply and total reserves, however, remain
generally unaffected by Euro-dollar borrowing.

Thus,

while deposit levels remain constant, total assets and
liabilities of the U.S. banking system increase.
The increase in loans
loans)

(or the lack of decline in

is a leakage in the efficiency of U.S. monetary

policy to the extent that one of the Federal Reserve's
goals during tight money periods is a reduction in lending
by the commercial banks.

Further, Euro-dollar borrowing

has added an additional destabilizing factor that com
plicates monetary policy.

It increases the variability

of impact of a given policy action and makes more difficult
precise monetary adjustments.

The imposition of reserve

requirements on Euro-dollar borrowings has reduced this
uncertainty and loss of efficiency.

The study also analyzes the effects of European
central bank interference in the Euro-dollar system,
concluding that the recycling of dollars obtained in
foreign exchange operations back into the Euro-dollar
system drastically reduced the leakages from the system
and increased the credit creating abilities of the system.
It is noted that a form of open market operation could
be undertaken by these central banks to control the
amount of Euro-dollars in existence.

This may be desirable

in order to reduce the impact of the system on interest
rate levels and liquidity in the various domestic monetary
systems.
The dissertation concludes that, with the present
reserve requirements on Euro-dollar borrowing in the U.S.,
such borrowing should not greatly influence the efficiency
of U.S. monetary policy in the future.

However, it can

still abet currency speculation and can influence liquidity
levels in various European countries.

Thus, unless it is

controlled, the Euro-dollar system will continue to present
a destabilizing influence in European money markets.

EURO-DOLLARS AND U.S. MONETARY POLICY
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OP THE STUDY
I.

Introduction

Euro-dollars are dollar deposits in European banks.
To persons unfamiliar with the areas of monetary economics
and international finance, these deposits may not seem
particularly exceptional.

However, as will be shown in

this dissertation, the existence of such deposits is
indeed an unusual situation.

It derives, generally, from

the world-wide acceptability of the dollar (its vehicle
currency status, in technical terms).
To illustrate the exceptional nature of such deposits,
it is only necessary to draw a parallel to this type of
deposit in an American bank.

That is, it would be a strange

phenomenon to the average American to be offered the
opportunity of having his checking account denominated in
Dutch Guilders or Italian Lira.

Further, to borrow such

Actually, dollar deposits in any non-American bank
are termed Euro-dollars.
However, the bulk of such deposits
are in Western European banks.

1
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funds and have them credited to his account in terms of
Guilders or Lira and to then be able to write checks
acceptable to another American in Lira would be a radical
change from the norm.

Thus, this simple idea, dollar de

nominated deposits in European banks owned by Europeans
(or anyone else, for that matter), contains within it
some rather unusual consequences and some challenges to
both domestic and international monetary authorities.
Euro-dollar deposits are not only accepted by
Eurobanks, so called, but are also created by such banks in
a manner quite similar to the creation of dollar deposits
by U.S. banks.

The point is, the Eurobanks are creating

dollar deposits, not their home currency deposits.

The

reserves for these deposits are kept in U.S. banks.
Indeed, the reserves are Eurobank demand deposits in U.S.
commercial banks.

Again,

this is analogous to a U.S. bank

creating Lira deposits and keeping reserves on these de
posits in Italian commercial banks.
To conclude this catalog of unusual situations, it
must be noted that U.S. banks have borrowed Euro-dollars
from the Eurobanks.

That is, they have borrowed dollars

owned by the Eurobanks and kept as reserves on dollar
denominated deposits owned by Europeans.
are demand deposits in U.S. banks.

These reserves

U.S. banks therefore

borrow ownership of other U.S. bank demand deposits from
European banks.

Of course, if these Eurobanks do not have

3

sufficient dollar demand deposits to lend, they may
borrow them from other Eurobanks who do or from private
citizens and corporations.

They may also take domestic

currency assets and convert them into dollars in the
foreign exchange markets in their countries.

This brings

into the picture the various central banks of these
countries.
As may be obvious from the foregoing, the study of
Euro-dollars involves accepting a state of affairs somewhat
different from that which normally exists in the realm of
monetary and international economics.

Further, it involves

the analysis of what is an entirely new monetary system,
one that is supranational in scope and based on one
country's currency.

The data available for the study is

not particularly voluminous nor is it organized in any
systematic fashion.

Further, many previous Euro-dollar

studies have been heavily institutional in nature.

These

have lacked much real analysis of the ramifications of the
existence of the Euro-dollar system.-*

Quantitative Framework for the Euro-Dollar System,
Princeton Studies in International Finance No. 26.
(Princeton:
International Finance Section, 1970) , p. 1.
3
As Fred Hirsh is reported to have said in "The MoneyMachine Magic of Eurodollars," Business Week, No. 2112
(February 21, 1970), p. 114, ". ... interpretations of the
Eurodollar market have become almost de rigueur for monetary
economists.
If one common thread can be found in their
varied offerings it would be:
'In the Eurodollar market,
things are not what they seem' ; to which is often added the

4

II.

Purpose of the Study

The limitations of previous Euro-dollar studies
noted above have left a fertile area of investigation with
which this dissertation proposes to deal.

That is, a de

tailed analysis of the effects the existence of the Euro
dollar market has had upon the implementation and effi
ciency of U.S. nuonetary policy is the main purpose of this
study.

Further, to the extent that the creation of Euro

dollars by Eurobanks may occur and influence U.S. monetary
aggregates, an analysis of the possibility of such creation
and its impact on U.S. monetary policy will be undertaken.
Since U.S. bank Euro-dollar borrowing has played such an
important role in these banks 1 attempts to evade Federal
Reserve tight money policies in the past decade, these
activities and their resultant influences upon U.S.
monetary policy will comprise a major portion of the study.
A second purpose of this dissertation is to show
quantitatively, through the use of regression analysis,
the various relationships that exist between U.S. bank
Euro-dollar borrowing and domestic monetary aggregates.
The monetary statistics now available for the latter half
addendum: 'Nor as they are written in articles preceding
this one.'"
This dissertation may be de rigueur but it is
not intended as a castigation of others' writings.
The
concern here is with areas of analysis generally overlooked
by other writers rather than with the correction of
possible errors in previous writers' analyses.

of the 1960's make possible a quantitative explanation of
U.S. bank Euro-dollar borrowing and the effect such
borrowing had on the U.S. monetary system.
Third, since Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks
has aided the transmission of U.S. monetary policy in
fluences to European money markets and has, it is postu
lated,

affected the uniformity and speed with which U.S.

monetary policy affects the U.S. banking system, an
analysis of the expected and actual impact of Euro
dollar borrowing on these factors wili be presented.
The Euro-dollar market may also be responsible for
a heightened competition between U.S. banks and European
banks and between various European banks themselves.

This

possibility will be explored in some detail, as will the
effects the existence of the Euro-dollar market have had
upon the vehicle currency role of the dollar.
Finally,

it is the general purpose of this study to

add to the understanding of the operation of the Euro
dollar system.

To this end, the basic mechanisms and

structure of the system will be presented in detail.

CHAPTER II
DEVELOPMENT AND MECHANISMS OF THE EURO-DOLLAR SYSTEM
I.

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to briefly describe
the development of the Euro-dollar system and to outline
the basic mechanics of the system's operation.

In

addition, a short preliminary discussion defining several
of the more important concepts pertaining to the Euro
dollar system will be presented.
II.
A.

Definitions and Distinctions

Deposit Characteristics
Euro-dollars are dollar denominated deposits in

foreign commercial banks.^

These deposits may be owned by

Non-U.S. domiciled banks that accept dollar de
nominated deposits are today located not only in Europe
but in many other parts of the world as well.
Originally,
only a few European banks accepted such deposits but as
the market for such funds developed, major banks through
out the world (including branches of U.S. bank? abroad)
began to accept and relend dollar denominated deposits.
Fritz Machlup, in a recent article, "The Magicians and
Their Rabbits," Morgan Guaranty Survey (May, 1971), p.
4n, insists that only dollar denominated deposits in
European banks should be called Euro-dollars.
Similarly
denominated deposits in banks in other parts of the
world outside the U.S. should not, according to Machlup,
6
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foreign or U.S. citizens and corporations.
characteristic

The distinctive

of these Euro-dollar deposits is their

location in banks outside the United States.

Further,

these deposits, like dollar deposits in the U.S.,

are the

be called Euro-dollars.
Call them " . . . external dollars,
gypsy dollars, or expatriate dollars, but not Euro-dollars
except if they are Euro-dollars."
(p. 4n)
In spite of
Machlup, who is being perhaps a bit too semantic, all
dollar denominated deposits in foreign banks will here be
called Euro-dollars both for convenience and because it
serves no particularly useful purpose to draw such a
sharp distinction between European based Euro-dollars and
non-European based Euro-dollars. They are all part of the
same system and should all be called the same thing.
Recently, for instance, an Asia-dollar market
located in Singapore has developed.
This is a market in
dollar-denominated deposits in Singapore banks and
foreign branches located there. As will be evident from
later chapters, these deposits are exactly the same as
Euro-dollar deposits except that they are located in Asia
rather than in Europe. See S.A. Pandit, "The Asian Dollar
and Free Gold Markets in Singapore, " International Mone
tary Fund Finance and Development, Vol. 8 , No. 2 (June,
1971), pp. 32-36.
Finally, recent discussion concerning controls on
the Euro-dollar market to be instituted b y European central
banks has brought the comment that, "If they start regu
lating the Euro-dollar market, we'll just open a branch in
Kinshasa and call them Congo dollars." 'Central Banks
Ponder Measures to Restrain Eurodollar Activities," Wall
Street Journal (June 11, 1971), pp. 1, 13.
All this indicates that the subject is not European
dollar deposits as Machlup would insist, but rather, dollar
deposits located anywhere in the world.
Perhaps another
name is required, but it is an international money that is
the concern, not a specifically located deposit.
The
only requirements are location outside the U.S. and no
exchange controls to hinder the movement o*f this money.
Far the purposes of this paper, Euro-dollars and Europe
/

8

primary money of a distinct monetary

s y s te m .^

However,

unlike the system prevailing in the United States, Euro
dollar deposits do not have as their basis reserves at an
official institution.

Rather, Euro-dollar issuing banks

maintain reserves at U.S. commercial banks in the form of
dollar deposits

(either demand or time).

Euro-dollar

deposits, therefore, are "backed" not by reserve balances
at the central bank within the monetary system, but rather
are "backed" by balances kept at commercial banks of an
other monetary system.^

The amount and proportion of

reserves held are determined by the commercial bank
issuing the Euro-dollar liability.

will be used for convenience but Euro-dollars are all
such deposits located anywhere outside the United States.
^As will be detailed below, the Euro-dollar system
appears to be a separate monetary system, external to that
of the U.S. or to that of any European country.
It may be
argued, however, that the Euro-dollar deposit is merely a
further manifestation of the adaptability of the U.S.
monetary system and is, therefore, merely an extension of
the U.S. system.
^There is a similarity between this situation and
the international monetary system in which some countries
maintain their currencies' reserves in the currency of
another country.
The difference, however, is that the
Euro-dollar system is composed of commercial banks within
certain countries.
They have no national sovereignty.

9

Since the Euro-dollar deposit reserves are composed of
U.S. commercial bank deposits and are held at the discretion
of the Euro-dollar issuing bank, the creation of additional
Euro-dollar deposits by these Eurobanks is both possible
and highly likely.

The multiple expansion of deposit

liabilities with little control by the Eurobanks' host
countries may have far reaching implications for the
efficiency of European monetary policy.

Further, U.S. bank

borrowing of Euro-dollar deposits may have pronounced effects
on the impact of U.S. monetary policy.

These questions are

the primary concern of this dissertation and will be dealt
with in detail in Chapters 5 and

6

.

Finally, the uses to which Euro-dollar deposits are
put are somewhat different or, at least, more restricted
than those to which domestic currencies are put.

While

national currencies are used in all types of transactions,
Euro-dollar deposits are used primarily for the payment of
large international debts.

Since they serve principally

as a payments medium for trade, speculation, and financial
transactions,

the possibility of the conversion of the

Euro-dollar deposit into another currency is always present.
This introduces into the Euro-dollar system an element of
instability, that is not present,

for the most part, in the

10

U.S. system.

The leakages that conversion causes have a

major impact on the multiple expansion of Euro-dollar
deposits and, ceterus paribus, will tend to inhibit the
growth of Euro-dollar system liabilities.
B.

Moneyness
The basic function of any money is its acceptance and

use as a medium of exchange.

Some types of money are not

completely acceptable as payment of a debt (checks drawn on
out-of-state banks,

for example), but if a substantial

segment of a society accepts a particular vehicle as a
medium of exchange, that vehicle may be said to be money.
While Euro-dollars are not used in most ordinary transactions
they may still be considered money.

They are accepted by

sellers and borrowers in payment of debts in much of the
world, especially by international traders, financial
institutions, and the like.

In addition, Euro-dollars are

borrowed by numerous groups for use in payment for goods and
services.

Therefore, while Euro-dollars are not an

acceptable medium of exchange in every instance, they serve
that function in a sufficient number of cases to be called
money.
C.

Monetary and Payments Systems
The moneyness of Euro-dollars may also be illustrated

b y distinguishing between monetary and payments systems.

11

A monetary system may be defined as a system made up of
institutions that create a unique money, usually within
given political boundaries.

The dollar monetary system,

for instance, consists of those financial institutions in
the United States that create dollars,
of currency or deposits.

either in the form

A payments system, on the other

hand, is composed of the users of a certain money
monies).

(or

It may be coincident in coverage with a monetary

system or it may be broader in coverage than a monetary
system.

Thus, all the users o f U.S. dollars, including

financial institutions both within and without the U.S.,
comprise the dollar payments system.

This system is broader

in extent than the dollar monetary system since it in
cludes transactors who do not live under the dollar monetary
system or institutions that can not create the currency of
the system.

A monetary system implies money creation; a

payments system, money usage.
None of the institutions that utilize dollars but
exist outside the United States may create U.S. dollars
(i.e., they do not belong to the U.S. monetary system).
However, some of these institutions have developed a sub
stitute for the dollar that they can create.

The return of

convertibility to the major European currencies in 1958
and the reduction of most barriers to the movement of

12

money between countries allowed these banks

(Eurobanks)

to develop a monetary system based on the dollar and de
nominated in dollar units.

The Euro-dollar deposits that

the banks create may be used in place of U.S. dollar demand
deposits within the dollar payments system, broadly defined.
Since they are "backed" by U.S. dollars, the Euro-dollars
are acceptable substitutes for U.S. dollars and may be used
interchangeably with dollars outside the U.S.
The Eurobanks are members of more than one monetary
system and create, for instance, both pounds and Euro-dollars.
Their participation in more than one monetary system means
that they may be able to avoid, at least partly,
trol of the domestic monetary authorities.

the con

Further, they

tend to transmit to their domestic money markets influences
felt in the Euro-dollar market.

As will be shown in later

chapters, the Euro-dollar monetary system has become a
mechanism for the transmission of assorted monetary pressures
between national systems, and, indeed, a bypass of the
various national monetary and capital restrictions imposed
by these systems.
To conclude, Euro-dollars are created in the Euro
dollar monetary system.

This system is supranational and

controllable only with some difficulty since the basis of
the credit creation is to be found in the money of another

monetary system over which the various national authorities
have little power.

The Euro-dollar payment system is also

supranational in scope.

However, while the Euro-dollar

monetary system is unique in that it is the only supra
national system that can create money,^ the scope of the
Euro-dollar payment system is not unique.

Rather, the

Euro-dollar payments system may be viewed either as a
part of the dollar payments system or as one of several
payments systems that are international in scope.
D.

Euro-dollar Money and Credit
Fritz Machlup has approached the problem of the

moneyness of Euro-dollars in a fashion somewhat similar to
that above . 5

After drawing a distinction between loans and

money, Machlup sets the criterion of moneyness as "immediate
availability without loss for use in (the) discharge of
de b t . " 6

Euro-dollar deposits meet this criterion for in

dividuals and nonbank corporations.

The transactions de

mand for these balances derives from the need to undertake

4The only apparent exception is the IMF's creation of
Special Drawing Rights.
5Fritz Machlup, "Euro-Dollar Creation: A Mystery
Story," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly, Review. No. 94
(September, 1970), pp. 219-260.

g

Ibid., p. 225.
pp. 224-227.

The following derives from Ibid.,

14

payments in dollars,

the asset demand derives from the

level of interest paid on these deposits, and the specu
lative demand arises from diverse elements including
especially exchange rate fluctuations.

The demand for

Euro-dollar deposits is a demand for money to hold and
n

not, as some have implied, a supply of Euro-dollar loans.
That is, individuals and nonbank corporations do not lend
dollars to banks but rather purchase or convert these
dollars into Euro-dollar deposit money.

This process

parallels that which occurs in the United States.
Individuals do not lend dollars to a bank but rather con
vert them into deposits.
Some Euro-dollar deposits may merely evidence inter
bank transactions, however, and as such are considered
loans.

These are the deposits that result when banks with

in the system lend Euro-dollar funds to each other and .
record the transaction as a Euro-dollar deposit.

These

7
Paul Einzig, The Euro-Dollar System, 4th ed.
(London: Macmillan and Company, 1970), p. 11; E. Wayne
Clendenning, The Euro-Dollar Market (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1970), pp. 8-9 both imply that this demand is in
reality Euro-dollar lending.
Deposits are seen by them
as merely evidences of debt rather than money per s e .

15

interbank deposits are netted out of the total Euro-dollars
outstanding so that an overstatement of the Euro-dollar
money supply does not occur.
E.

Euro-dollars and Dollar Denominated Deposits
Dollar denominated deposits in foreign banks is the

standard definition of Euro-dollars.
International Settlements

However, the Bank for

(BIS) and several writers have

added qualifications to this definition.

8

For them, a

dollar deposit becomes a Euro-dollar only when the pro
ceeds of such a deposit

(a claim on U.S. bank deposit) are

used either as reserves subject to relending or as a basis
for (Euro-) dollar deposit creation.
This distinction is drawn so that account may be taken
of dollar denominated deposits that existed prior to the
1958 return to convertibility by the major European coun
tries.

Many U.S. firms and others kept dollar deposits in

foreign banks for various purposes.

The dollar claims

gained by the foreign banks were generally used to purchase

8 39th

Annual Report (Basle: Bank for International
Settlements, June, 1969), p. 148; Clendenning, o p . c it., pp.
21-22; Ira Scott, The Euro-Dollar Market and Its Public
Policy Implications, Economic Policies and Practises, Pa
per No. 12, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Com
mittee Print, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 1970, p. 3; and
Einzig.op. c i t ., p. 4.
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money market instruments in the U.S. or were held for
working balances purposes by these banks .9
So long as the deposit holders viewed their deposit
as a non-money asset similar to a Treasury Bill and the
foreign banks employed the proceeds in the U.S., these
writers have felt that true Euro-dollars did not exist.
However, once the dollar denominated deposits became
acceptable as a means of payment and once the banks began
to view the U.S. bank deposits they gained as reserves
(upon which they could build additional deposit liabilities
or which they could lend to other banks), then the Euro
dollar money supply and a Euro-dollar monetary system
became reasonable concepts.
For these reasons the BIS measures the net size of
i

the Euro-dollar market by deducting from gross dollar de
posit liabilities of non-U.S. banks both interbank trans
actions and an estimate of the magnitude of these dollar
denominated deposits that were held as non-monetary assets.

9

39th Annual Report, loc. c it.; Scott, o£. cit.,

pp. 6-7.
1 9 39th Annual Report, lo c . c i t .
The logic behind the
distinction between dollar denominated deposits and Euro
dollar deposits is not completely sound. Nor is the pro
cedure by which the BIS measures the size of the Euro-dollar
money supply.
When the Euro-dollar system was beginning to
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F.

Systems and Markets
The prevailing designation of the activities

associated with Euro-dollars is the Euro-dollar mar k e t .
Fritz Machlup has noted,
necessarily physical)

As

"A market is a meeting (not

of people who offer something for sale,

hire, or rent, with people who are interested in buying.

develop and Euro-dollar investment vehicles were not
numerous, certainly many of the dollar funds gained by the
Eurobanks when they accepted dollar deposits were used in
the U.S. money market.
However, to assume that the port
folio choices made by the banks have remained at the same
level to the present day, with the proliferation of European
uses of these dollar funds and instruments to convey them,
is a tenuous reed upon which to base the deduction of
certain amounts from Euro-dollar deposits outstanding.
Further, the effects of the banks' using the funds
gained to purchase assets in the U.S. money market and of
lending to U.S. bank branches are the same.
That is, an
outflow of reserves of the Euro-dollar system results in
either case.
To treat the former use as a deduction from
the total deposits in the Euro-dollar system and include
the latter as part of the total is inconsistent.
There is
no reason why the dollar deposit that is finally lent to a
U.S. bank should b e treated any differently from the dollar
deposit that is used as purchasing power in the U.S. money
market.
Distinguishing between uses of dollar reserves gained
when Eurobanks accept dollar denominated deposits would be
valuable, certainly, in determining leakages from the
system, but such distinctions are difficult to verify and
are no more logical in determining the stock of money in
the Euro-dollar system than excluding hand-to-hand currency
in the U.S. from the U.S. money supply on the grounds that
it is not used to purchase U.S. financial assets.
Finally, excluding a flat amount as an estimate of
the funds used in the U.S. money markets is simplistic to say
the least.
For these reasons, there appears to be little
value in adjusting the deposits in the Euro-dollar system
for this supposed difference between Euro-dollar deposits
and dollar deposits.

18

hiring, or r e n t i n g . H o w e v e r ,

while this type of activity

does occur in Euro-dollars, there is much more to the Euro
dollar system than a market per s e .

There exists, parallel

to the money market in the U.S., a market in Europe for
loans denominated in Euro-dollars.

This credit market

function is only part of the total activity referred to as
the Euro-dollar market, however.

In addition, there are

loans outstanding, assets held, deposit liabilities, the
creation, velocity, conversion and destruction of this
money, various demands for this money and innumerable other
things that have little to do with markets as such.
Therefore, measurements of the net size of the Euro
dollar market are highly misleading since in many cases
these measurements refer to the stock of or the outstanding
amount of Euro-dollar deposit liabilities as of a certain
date, exclusive of interbank transactions.

As Machlup

n o t e s , "Would anybody use the total value of shares of
stock held . . .

as a measure of the size of the stock

market . . . (or) use the sum of deposit claims against
American banks as (a measure of) the size of the American

^Mach l u p , "Euro-Dollar Creation...," op. c it.,
p. 221.
The following two paragraphs derive~"from this
essay, pp. 221-223.
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money market ?"-1-2

This illustrates the inconsistency in

using the term "market" to denote the various activities
associated with Euro-dollars.
monetary (i.e., U.S. dollar)

One refers to the American
system, not the U.S. dollar

market when reference is made to the complex of activities
involved with dollar deposit creation, loans, and the like.
In the same way, a less misleading way of referring to the
complex of activities involving Euro-dollars is to use
the term "Euro-dollar system."
While there are constant reminders that there is a
market aspect to the Euro-dollar system, usage of market
to refer to the entire Euro-dollar structure is misleading.
There is much more than the operation of a market inherent
in the Euro-dollar phenomena.
III.
A.

Development of the System

Origins
Several excellent delineations of the development and

growth of the Euro-dollar system have been published.
institutional aspects of the system are probably best

1 2 Ibid. ,

pp.

2 2 1 -2 2 2 .

The
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understood and thus their documentation has been a rela
tively straight-forward affair.

a

comparatively brief

survey of the development of the system will be under
taken in this section in order to provide the background
necessary to an understanding of the credit creation
possibilities and monetary policy problems discussed later.
European banks have accepted foreign currency de
posits for many years.

Prior to World War II, for instance,

British pound balances were commonly held in European banks
for the purpose of facilitating international trade trans
actions which were then undertaken primarily in terms of
pounds.

After World War II, the dollar became the main

international currency.

However, due to rather strict

exchange controls instituted by the majority of European
countries,

few dollar balances were held in European banks.

Nonetheless,

some dollar deposits were made primarily by

communist bloc countries.

These countries wished to hold

1 O

See, for instance, Einzig, o p . c i t ., pp. 1-17; Clendenning, op. c i t ., pp. 5-35 especially; Scott, op. c i t ., pp.
3-4; Eric Williams, The Eurodollar Mar k e t , Economic Papers
(Cleveland:
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, June, 1970),
pp. 8-12; Joseph Kvasnicka, "Eurodollars-An Important Source
of Funds for American Banks," Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago Business Conditions (June, 1969), pp. 10-13; Jane
Little, "The Euro-Dollar Market:
Its Nature and Impact,"
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dollar balances for a variety of reasons but feared that
should these balances be held in the U.S. they might be
attached by the U.S. government in retaliation for the
expropriation of American-owned property in these
countries.

For this reason, they deposited their dollar

balances in Western European b a n k s .1 4
The term Euro-dollar is said to be directly derived
from the placement of these funds with European banks.
The branch of the Soviet state bank in Paris was quite
active in placing these dollar deposits.

Its cable code

name was Eurobank and cable drafts on this bank bore the
bank code name.

Thus, dollar drafts on Eurobank came to

be called Euro(bank)-dollars.

Even after other suppliers

of such funds entered the market and displaced this bank as

Federal Reserve Bank of Boston New England Economic Review
(May/June, 1969), pp. 2-7? Oscar Altman, "Euro-Dollars:
Some Further Comments," International Monetary Fund Staff
Papers, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March, 1965), pp. 1-16? Philip
Saunders, "American Banks in Londons Eurodollar Market,"
National Banking Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (September, 1966),
pp. 21-25.
14See Einzig, o p . c i t ., pp. 30-31.
This is probably
the primary source for subsequent writers, all of whom re
port the same origins of the system. Werner Makowski,
"Tflie Euro-Dollar M a r k e t : Methods and Prospects,” The
Challenge of International Finance, Guenter Reimann and
Edwin Wiggles, eds. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966) ,
pp. 165-167 also contains a good review of the early Soviet
influences on the system.

J
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the primary source of funds, this appellation remained.
Whether this is merely a folk tale or has some basis in
fact is now probably impossible to determine.

Certainly,

the term is sufficiently descriptive of the situation and
the explanation of its derivation is logical enough.

No

matter what its derivation, the term "Euro-dollar" is well
suited to describe the funds under discussion.

They are,

in the main, Euro(pean) dollars and make up the deposits
of a monetary system based primarily in Europe.
B.

Growth Factors
While supply considerations were the main deter

minants of the original development of the system, changes
in the foreign exchange structure in Europe and market
interferences in the United States in 1957 and 1958 gave
major impetus to the growth of the system.

In 1957, the com

bination of Regulation Q ceilings of 1% on time certificates
of less than 90 days maturity-1-*’ and the sterling crisis of

ISReported by Kvasnicka, 0 £. cit., p. 10 and subse
quently rereported, based on this article, by Williams, o p .
c it., p. 9 and by others as well.
IGciendenning, oj>. cit. , p. 23 and his Appendix A,
pp. 186-187.
The following four paragraphs rely primarily
on Clendennings's account of the developments that affected
the growth of the system, as given on pp. 22-24 and upon
Kvasnicka, l o c . cit. It was not until the end of 1964 that
Regulation Q restrictions were modified to allow higher
payments on short-term time deposits in U.S. banks.
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the same year

(which brought about restrictions on the use

of sterling in foreign trade financing) generated an in
creased demand and supply for Euro-dollar deposits and
loans.

British banks attempted to circumvent the re

strictions on the use of pounds in trade financing by
utilizing U.S. dollars as an alternative currency.

The com

bination of low interest yields in the U.S. and an
awakened demand for dollar deposits in Europe brought
about a rapid growth in the system.
In addition, the general return to convertibility in
1958 augmented the supply of dollars flowing into the mar
ket.

As exchange controls were relaxed, European dollar

holders retained dollar balances which they had previously
been required to sell upon receipt to their central bank.
These retained balances found an investment outlet or a
temporary repository in interest earning dollar denominated
deposits issued by many European banks.

Also,

the return

to convertibility allowed banks and others to move out of
their own currencies and into dollars and, in opposite
fashion, gain dollar loans for conversion into their re
spective currencies.

Thus, the increased supply and demand

worked together to bring about the development of the system.
Among the other factors that may be cited as giving
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impetus to the growth of the market for dollar deposits is
the variance in the economic growth rates of the United
States and Europe in the 1950's.

While the U.S. stagnated

economically, Europe experienced an economic boom.

High

interest rates reflected the great demand for funds in
Europe and dollars flowed to Europe in large quantities.
Some of these dollars eventually wound up in dollar denom
inated bank deposits.
Another factor impelling the development of the
system was the poorly developed European money markets and
lack of investment instruments that were liquid, riskless,
and produced a respectable yield.
ment met many European investors'
other instrument.

The Euro-dollar instru
requirements as had no

Finally, Euro-dollar loans met the need

for short-term trade financing.
By the early 1 9 6 0 's, a fairly well developed market
for dollar denominated deposits existed.

It should be

noted however, that the intermediary aspects of the Euro
dollar system developed before, and gave impetus to, the
growth of the whole complex of activities that may more
properly be called the Euro-dollar monetary system.

Euro

banks first served as conduits for dollar funds rather than
as creators of such funds.

Their actions may be compared

to those of savings and loan associations in the United
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States.

When the Euro-dollar system was small, leakages

from it were of such magnitude that money creation by the
Eurobanks was not possible.

These leakages derived both

from the uses the Eurobanks made of the funds gained and,
when lent rather than invested, the uses the borrowers
made of the f unds.

Both the banks and the borrowers viewed

the claims on U.S. banks that they obtained as usable
primarily in the United States or as liquidity that could
be converted into domestic currency.

It was the reserves

or backing of the Euro-dollar deposits that the banks and
borrowers used in purchasing goods or assets.

The deposit

itself was viewed merely as a means to an end.
Eurobanks tended to use the dollar deposits they
gained to purchase assets in the United States.

Borrowers

of Euro-dollars converted them into domestic or third
currencies or used the U.S. dollars that the Euro-dollar
deposits represented.

When central banks gained title to

these Euro-dollar funds as a result o f their operations
in the exchange markets, they frequently utilized the dollar
deposits they represented in the United States.

Only in

later years did the central banks begin to recycle within
the Euro-dollar system the funds obtained, thereby reducing
one of the leakages from the system that had previously
halted money creation.
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C.

U.S. Banks in the System
In the early 1960's American bank branches in Europe

began to accept dollar denominated deposits in some volume
and entered into the market for redeposits from other banks.
But generally these branches were not a significant factor
in the market because they could not or would not operate
on the thin interest differentials that satisfied the
European banks.

There were, however, some depositors in

this period who utilized American bank branches for the
deposit of dollars.

This business was generated in spite

of the generally lower rates paid by these branches.

The

reason for the apparent irrational behavior of these de
positors

(i.e., non-profit maximizing) may be found in their

attitude that the American banks were both safer reposito
ries of dollar funds and the logical place for such
deposits

(since dollars were the business of U.S. banks)

7

In any case, the dollar deposits at branches of U.S. banks
were less than $2 billion at the beginning of 1964,

less

than 25% of the total of such deposits in Europe, as reported
IQ

by the BIS.

17

18

Saunders, o p . c i t ., p. 22.
39th Annual Report, o p . ci t ., p. 141.
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T i g h t money in the U.S.

in 1966 and again in 1969 and

the discovery by U.S. banks that the Euro-dollar market was
an excellent source of supplemental funds with which some
of the reserve stringencies instituted by the Federal
Reserve could be offset, brought about a dramatic increase
in outstanding Euro-dollar deposits.

This occurred because

American banks were willing to pay high interest rates in
order to gain access to dollar funds.

They instructed

their branches to bid aggressively for Euro-dollar deposits
(which the branches had previously not done) and transfer to
the home office these claims on other U.S. banks.

The real

value of these funds and the source of the b a n k s ' willingness
to pay high interest rates, was that there were no reserve
requirements on these resulting liabilities to foreign
branches.

Further, these funds were valuable because they

allowed increased lending and offset, to some extent, the
higher average required reserve levels induced by
Federal Reserve actions.

The development and growth of the

market in the mid-1960's is, therefore, largely attributable
to U.S. bank activities which were, in large measure,
responses to governmental and Federal Reserve money market
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interventions .1 9

Their demand for funds caused interest

rates to rise, pulled additional funds into the system and
sparked a phenomenal growth in outstanding Euro-dollar
deposits.
Additional factors that may be cited as providing
impetus to the development of the system include the
increased use made of the Euro-dollar market by multi
national corporations based in the United States.

These

firms entered the market in response to balance of payments
restrictions imposed by the U.S. government in the 1960's.
These restrictions forced the firms to borrow in non-U.S.
money markets, among them the Euro-dollar m a r k e t .2 0
Finally, the Viet Nam war and the consequent aggrevation of the U.S. balance of payments deficit pumped

l^This view is widespread and may be found in, among
others, "Euro-dollars: A Changing Market," Federal Reserve
Bulletin, Vol. 55, No. 10 (October, 1969), pp. 765-766;
Kvasnicka, op,. c i t ., pp. 10-13; and Williams, op. c i t ., pp.
8-13.
20The restrictions do not appear to have hampered the
growth of the multinational firms. Servan-Schreiber has
noted in The American Challenge (New York: Avon Books, 1969),
p. 43, that the restrictions merely rechanneled the borrowing
of U.S. corporations. Americans borrowed funds from Euro
peans (including Euro-dollars) in order to purchase European
firms. As he says, "We pay them to buy u s . 11 (p. 43, emphasis
in original text. Nine-tenths of American investment in
Europe in 1965 was financed by European sources (pp. 42-43).
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additional funds into the market.

The uncertain status of

the international monetary system and the questionable par
values of several European countries also had an effect on
the size of the Euro-dollar system.

Movement into Euro

dollar deposits was encouraged by these uncertainties and
central bank practices of recycling dollar funds gained in
foreign exchange dealings resulted in further growth of the
system.

Nonetheless,

it was American bank demand for these

funds that was the primary inducement to the growth of the
market.
D.

Recent Developments
In 1970-1971, as U.S. monetary policy became less re

strictive, U.S. banks repaid much of their massive borrowings
of Euro-dollars.

They undertook this action in spite of

Federal Reserve attempts to slow these reflows of funds to
\

Europe.

Euro-dollars had become a very expensive method of

obtaining funds for U.S. banks and they therefore paid at
maturity great amounts of these borrowings.

(The amount of

borrowings outstanding declined from about $14 billion in
late 1969 to about $3 billion in May, 1971.2*)

Interest rates

on Euro-dollar instruments fell drastically as demand

2-L,,Recent Monetary and Bank Credit Developments,"
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Monthly Review, Vol. 53,
No. 5 (May, 1971), pp. 101-102.
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collapsed and supply expanded.

The decline in rates tended

to pull down other European money market rates as well.
These rate declines occurred despite efforts by several
European central banks to maintain higher interest rate
levels.

Speculative flights from the dollar in the spring

of 1971

further expanded the supply of Euro-dollars.

Some

offset to this did occur, however, since demand for Euro
dollar loans increased at the same time.

This demand was,

in reality, for loans of any kind and the funds gained were
immediately converted into "stronger 11 European

c u r r e n c i e s .

^2

Restrictive actions of various kinds were taken or
considered by the European central banks.

These actions

w e r e designed to moderate Euro-dollar flows,

thereby

reducing the system's effect on domestic monetary structures.
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Various articles in current periodicals such as the
Wall Street Journal and Business Week have chronicled these
developments.
See for instance, "A Step to Slow Eurodollar
Flows," Business W e e k , No. 2175 (May 15, 1971), pp. 110-114;
"The Future of the Dollar,"
First National City Bank
Monthly Economic Letter (November, 1970), pp. 125-126; "The
Uneven Retreat in World Interest Rates," First National City
Bank Monthly Economic Letter (March, 1971), pp. 12-15;
"Eurodollar Banking:
Entering a New Phase?" First National
City Bank Monthly Economic Letter (July, 1971), pp. 11-15.
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Various monetary control procedures similar to open market
operations were instituted .2 3

By mid-1971, the Euro-dollar

system had a much reduced stock of dollar denominated de
posits to work with and had to contend with a reduced will
ingness

by investors to remain in dollars.

The value

of the dollar as a vehicle currency was thus at least tem
porarily reduced as confidence in its stability declined .2 4

23see, for instance, "Drive for Eurodollar Curbs
Aided, Split on Rates Widened at Munich Parley," Wall Street
Journal (June 1, 1971), p. 6 ; "European Bankers Planning to
Manipulate Dollar Supplies; Washington Seen Uneasy," Wall
Street Journal (April 7, 1971), p. 4; "Continuing Payments
Deficits Could Stir Dollar Troubles, New York Reserve Warns,"
Wall Street Journal (March 1, 1971), p. 5. See also Chapters
5 & 6 ; "Eurodollar Banking:...?" loc. c it.; "Central Banks
P o n d e r ...," l o c . c i t .; "Common Market Panel Adopts Plan to
Control Plow of Eurodollars," Wall Street Journal (June 25,
1971), p. 12; "Europe's Central Banks Agree to Withdraw
Funds in Bid to Control Eurodollar Market," Wall Street
Journal (June 15, 1971), p. 5.
2^see Swoboda, op,, ci t ., pp. 5-11, 15-19, and 23-29
for an especially lucid and theoretically rigorous explan
ation of vehicle currencies in general and the effects of
the use of the dollar as such a currency in particular. A
recent Bank for International Settlements Annual Report
notes, as reported in "Eurodollar Banking:...?" o p . c i t .,
pp. 1 1 - 1 2 , that one of the most striking features of the
Euro-dollar market today is the slowdown in its growth.
A second feature is that Euro-dollar demand again primarily
originates in Europe rather than, as in the last several
years, in the U.S. Further, " . . . the demand for Euro
dollars in Europe has been so strong that the market has
not only found outlets for the funds returned to it from
the United States but has actually increased its total
lending substantially."
(emphasis added) (p. 1 2 )
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In summary, the development and growth of the Euro
dollar system derives from several factors.

These include

the Cold War and Soviet bloc attempts to protect its dollar
assets, the growth of international trade, the return to
convertibility and the dismantling of exchange controls in
Europe, money market interferences by the Federal Reserve,
tight money in the U.S., the discovery and subsequent heavy
usage of the system by U.S. banks, exchange rate speculation
and disequilibriums, and money market imperfections in
Europe.

IV.
A.

Mechanisms of the System

Introduction
This section contains a fairly concise explanation of

the basic mechanics of the Euro-dollar system.

The working

of the transfer of funds among banks and individuals will be
discussed, the reserve basis of the resultant deposits noted,
and the dependence of the system on fixed exchange rates,
convertibility and foreign exchange markets reviewed.

The

mechanics of credit creation in the Euro-dollar system and
the effects of U.S. bank borrowing on this creation will be
outlined.

Finally, a comparison to the U.S. monetary system

will be included.
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B.

The Origination of Euro-dollar Deposits 2 5
The simplest transaction that gives rise to the

creation of a Euro-dollar deposit is the payment of a debt
by a U.S. citizen or corporation to a European citizen or
corporation.

The payment of this debt can be undertaken

in a number of ways.

For instance, the U.S. debtor can

purchase foreign exchange and pay in this form, he can
borrow the foreign currency and then transfer the funds, or he can pay in dollars.

25

It is the payment of dollars that

As might be expected several publications explain
these transactions.
Among the best are: Ernest Bloch,
"Eurodollars: A n Emerging International Money Market,"
C. J. Devine Institute of Finance, New York University
The Bulletin, No. 39 (April, 1966), pp. 6-19; Little, o p .
c i t ., pp. 12-18; Machlup, "Euro-Dollar Creation...," o p .
c i t ., pp. 234-242; Machlup, "The Magicians...," op. c i t .,
pp. 3-9; Scott, op,. c i t .. pp. 7-12; Williams, op. c i t ., pp.
13-18; Clendenning, op,, c i t .. pp. 8-20; Fred Klopstock,
"Money Creation in the Euro-Dollar Market - A Note O n Pro
fessor Friedman's Views," Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Monthly Review. Vol. 52, No. 1 (January, 1970), pp. 12-15;
Milton Friedman, "The Euro-Dollar Market:
Some First
Principles," Morgan Guaranty Survey (October, 1969), pp.
4-9; John Leimone, "The Euro-Dollar Market: An Element in
Monetary Policy," Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Monthly
Review. Vol. 53, No. 8 (August, 1968), pp. 2-3; Kvasnicka,
o p . c i t ., pp. 11-15; Swoboda, o p . c i t .. pp. 30-34.

makes possible the creation of Euro-dollars.

However, only

if the creditor deposits the dollar check he receives into
a dollar denominated account in a European bank (for reasons
of risk minimization,

transactions requirements, locational

advantages, or interest return) does the deposit of the
claim on a U„S. bank result in the creation of Euro-dollars.2^
Conversion or redeposit in a U.S. account forestalls this
Euro-dollar creation.
No matter what the receiving bank subsequently does
with the asset gained by this transaction,
deposit now exists.

a Euro-dollar

Future use of the deposit by its owner

may lead to the extinguishing of the Euro-dollars, but at
this stage the Euro-dollars created by the transaction form
a net addition to the total Euro-dollar supply outstanding.
The T-account in Figure 1 traces this transaction.
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Note

that the only change in the U.S. is the transfer of owner
ship of the U.S. bank deposit.

However, in Europe both an

26This ignores the BIS qualifications discussed above.
27

Only those entries which change are included in the
T-accounts.
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asset and a liability have been created by the deposit of
the dollars.
Thus, one way that a Euro-dollar can come into
existence is through the deposit of U.S. funds by a foreign
receiver in a dollar denominated deposit in a European bank.
Generally, any owner or receiver of dollar funds may deposit
dollar claims on U.S. banks into dollar denominated deposits
in banks in Europe.

Central banks,

for example, may transfer

their deposits with U.S. banks to European banks.

This

action may b e taken to gain a higher return on the b a n k s '
reserve balances,

to assist domestic commercial bank earnings,

or to influence the foreign exchange market.

Figure 1.

The Euro-dollar

Euro-dollar Creation
Eurobank_______

U.S. Banking System_________________
-Demand Deposit
of U.S. citizen

+Demand
Deposit in
U.S. bank

+Euro-dollar
Deposit

+Demand Deposit
of Eurobank

deposits created will remain in existence until such time as
the owner withdraws it or uses it to pay a debt of some kind.
Upon withdrawal or use,

the funds may leak out of the Euro

dollar system or they may remain in it.

Figure 2 illustrates

the T-accounts for a transaction by a central bank.
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Figure 2.

Central Bank Generated Euro-dollar Deposit

U. S. Banking System_______________________ Eurobank
-Demand Deposit
of Central Bank

+Demand Deposit
at U.S. Bank

+Euro-dollar
Deposit of
Central Bank

+Demand Deposit
of Eurobank

Central Bank
Reserves:
-Demand Deposit
at U.S. Bank
+Euro-Dollar
Deposit at
Eurobank

C.

Pyramiding or the Intermediary Function
The receiving banks in Europe are willing to pay

interest on Euro-dollar deposits because they can lend the
funds obtained to others, either banks or final users.
Eurobanks accept dollar denominated deposits from non-bank
depositors even when they have no immediate need for the
funds.

They do this in order to maintain their competitive

position in the market and for interest arbitrage gains.
The funds gained may be lent to a second bank at a
slightly higher rate of interest.

This interest differential

may arise from the added risk a second bank faces due to its
smaller resources, the relative weakness of the local
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currency, or because the second bank has a more profitable
use for the resources than does the first.
reason,

Whatever the

interbank transactions of this type occur in very

great numbers .2 8
The lending and relending of dollar claims on U.S.
banks by Eurobanks has come to be called pyramiding.

This

is an unfortunate term since pyramiding normally refers to
the erecting or creation of more and more deposits upon a
given reserve base as money is lent out and redeposited
within the banking system.29
building more deposit layers

pyramiding, then, refers to
(always smaller, since on each

2 8 Scott,

oj>. c i t .. pp. 8-9. While Euro-dollar trans
actions between banks occur for reasons similar to those
that motivate the lending and borrowing of Federal Funds in
the United States, most Euro-dollar transfers are usually
undertaken for a considerably longer period of time than the
one day which is common in the Federal Funds market.
These
transfers more closely resemble short-term loans between
banks or correspondent balances than they resemble overnight
reserve lending.
29
Machlup, "Euro-Dollar Creation...," oj5 . c i t ., pp. 229230y
Leland Yeager, International Monetary Relations
(New York:
Harper and Row, 1966), p. 470 outlines pyramiding
on an international scale.

round some funds are sterilized in reserves) on a given
base.

This is not the case with interbank lending in the

Euro-dollar system.

Rather, like the Federal Funds market

or U.S. savings and loan associations, these interbank
activities are really nothing but intermediary activities.
Funds are gained from a depositor and channeled through
various institutions to a final borrower.

There is no money

creation here, merely an exchanging of one type of asset for
another.

Indeed, these are the transactions netted out

by the BIS when it measures the stock of deposit liabilities
of the Euro-dollar system.
To illustrate this process, Figure 3 indicates a
chain of intermediation.
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Funds originating in the U.S.

(for example) are deposited in Eurobank A by a European
creditor of the U.S.

Eurobank A then lends to Eurobank B

who relends to Eurobank C.

Eurobank C creates a deposit

based on these funds, lending to a final user.

These

activities typically take place with little or no reserves
held back and at slightly higher rates at each stage.
As the consolidated balance sheets in Figure 3 show,
the chain of intermediation among the Eurobanks was made
possible by the initial dollar deposit in Europe.

Depending

3°Little, o£. c i t ., p. 13 forms the basis of this ex
ample.
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Figure 3.
1.

Euro-dollar Intermediation 9

U.S. Banking System

2.

-Demand Deposit
of U.S.
citizen
which becomes
+Demand Deposit
of, first,
a) European
Creditor,
then
b) Eurobank A,
c) Eurobank B,
d) Eurobank C
3.

Eurobank A
+Demand
+Euro-dollar
Deposit at
(E$) Deposit
U.S. Bank
of European
which becomes Creditor
+Euro-dollar
(E$) Deposit
at Eurobank
B

Eurobank B

Eurobank C

+Demand
+E$ Deposit
Deposit
of Eurobank
at U.S.
A
Bank
which
becomes
+E$ Deposit
at Euro
bank C

+Demand
Deposit at
U.S. Bank
and
+E$ Loan

5.

Final User

+E$ Deposit
at Eurobank
C
CONSOLIDATED POSITIONS
U.S. Banking System
+Demand Deposit
of Eurobank C
-Demand Deposit
of U.S.
citizen

+E$ Deposit
of Eurobank
B
and
+E$ Deposit
of Final
User

+E$ Loan Due
Eurobank C

Eurobanks A, B, C
+Demand Deposit
at U.S. Banks
(+E$ Deposit of
A at B)c
(+E$ Deposit of
B at C)c
+E$ Loan to
Final User

+E$ Depos
it of
European
Creditor
at Bank A
(+E$ Depos
it of A at
B)c
(+E$ Deposit
of B at C)c
+E$ Deposit
of Final
User
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Figure 3 - continued

a)

_________Final User_______________
+E$ Deposit
+E$ Loan Due Euroat Eurobank
bank C
C
Assumes no reserves maintained by intermediaries A and B.

b)

Ownership of the U.S. deposit may remain in Eurobank A.
In this case the entry on the asset side of the balance
sheet will b e Euro-dollars due from Eurobank A.

c)

These deposits cancel out:

upon the use of the loan proceeds, either all but the orig
inal Euro-dollar deposit will be cancelled (should the
borrower demand U.S. dollars or in other ways convert the
Euro-dollars into U.S. dollars) or the basis for credit
creation will be laid (should the borrower use the Euro
dollar deposit to pay a creditor and the deposit be re
deposited) .

Each Eurobank receiving title to the demand

deposit in the U.S. has merely transformed the asset into a
different kind of asset,

i.e., a Euro-dol3ar deposit at

(loan to) another Eurobank.

These assets and liabilities

cancel out when the balance sheets are combined.

Thus, a

Euro-dollar deposit asset of A at B is cancelled by the
Euro-dollar deposit liability of B to A.

Note, nonetheless,

that the original Euro-dollar deposit does remain in

existence and is offset by the loan extended by Eurobank C
to the final user.

When the final borrower utilizes his

loan funds, the demand deposit at U.S. bank asset and the
Euro-dollar deposit of final borrower liability will also be
cancelled, unless the funds are redeposited into the Euro
dollar system.

The intermediation process has thus trans

ferred the purchasing power held by the European creditor
to a final user.
Theoretically,
extended infinitely.

the intermediation chain could be
However, since small reserves are often

held at each stage such a result could not occur.

While the

banks in the Euro-dollar system attempt to maintain a close
correspondence between the maturities of their liabilities
and their assets,

those most active in the market do carry

small balances with U.S. banks primarily to compensate the
U.S. bank for the costs of clearing the many deposit trans
fers arising from their activities-**- and also to maintain
their credit should they need immediate dollar loans in the
face of sudden and unexpected withdrawals.

^Scott,

o£. c i t .,. p. 9.
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Secondly,

the required higher interest rate at each

subsequent transaction works to limit the number of times
the title to the claim on a U.S. bank can be transferred.
The limit here is the rate at which the final borrower
could alternatively obtain funds.
Pyramiding in the Euro-dollar system, then, does not
refer to credit creation as such .-*2

Rather, it refers to

the intermediation activities of the Eurobanks that make
up the system.

However, when the final user of the funds

utilizes the demand deposit created by his borrowing,
possibility for credit creation does arise.

the

It is at this

point that major difficulties for European monetary policy
may occur, although intermediation may present some less
serious problems.
D.

U.S. Bank Borrowing
Euro-dollar deposits also form the basis for loans

by the Eurobanks to U.S. banks.

American banks may obtain

loanable funds by borrowing Euro-dollars deposited in their
European branches.

They may also instruct their branches to

borrow Euro-dollars from the Eurobanks and then lend them

32This is a source of confusion for many writers, in
cluding Scott, op. c i t ., pp. 9-10.
The Wall Street Journal
writers also make this error, speaking of the "multiplier
effect" and illustrating it with an example of interbank
transactions.
See "Central Banks Ponder...,"op. ci t . p. 1.
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to the home office.
As

noted earlier, the advantages of borrowing these

funds arose primarily from their availability and reservefree nature.

While Euro-dollars were relatively expensive

to borrow, they provided a source of loanable funds in 1966
and 1969 when other sources were limited by restrictive
Federal Reserve monetary policies.

For instance,

the Federal

Reserve imposed relatively low interest rate ceilings on
certificates of deposit in these years.

By so doing, and

with similar money market instruments yielding high rates,
a substantial run-off of CD's occurred as they matured.

33

U.S. banks without branches abroad may, of course,
obtain dollar loans directly from foreign banks and these
loans are also exempt from reserve requirements. However,
branch borrowing allows a broader access to the market, is
more convenient, and is perhaps cheaper in the long run.
Also, ". . .it allows access to a much larger volume of funds
than most banks can or would wish to secure through
borrowings abroad. And only the larger banks in the U.S.
have the credit standing that would enable them to obtain
sizable balances from foreign banks."
These are the very
banks who have branches in Europe already.
Fred Klopstock,
"Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity and Reserve Management of
United States Banks," in Essays in Domestic and Inter
national Finance (New York:
Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, 1969), p. 80.
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The banks,

faced with a decline in outstanding time

deposits and increased required reserves

(as time deposits

were transformed into demand deposits), turned to their
European branches in an attempt to mitigate the
contractionary effects of these changes.
The banks first used the Euro-dollar market as a
substantial source of funds in the 1966 tight money period.
However,

the length of this period was so short that

borrowing rose to only a bit more than $4 billion.
contrast,

In

in 1969, liabilities to foreign branches reached

almost $15 billion as CD's outstanding declined drastically .34
As noted above, the value of Euro-dollars to U.S. banks
derived partly from the fact that they did not require the
maintenance of reserves.
deposits,

34

Rather than being classified as

the funds obtained from foreign branches and banks

See "Liabilities of U.S. Banks to Their Foreign
Branches," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 54, No. 5 (May,
1968), p. A-104 and "Assets and Liabilities of Large
Commercial Banks, 1969," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 56,
No. 3 (March, 1970), p. A-102.
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were classified as non-deposit liabilities.

No reserves

were required on these liabilities until September,1969.
After this,

first a 10% and then a 20% reserve was required

on borrowings above a base amount . 3 5

The 10% marginal

reserve requirement was successful in tempering the
borrowing by U.S. banks of Euro-dollars.

However, the

easing of money in 1970 and the consequent decline in
domestic interest rates were probably more important
determinants of the reduction in Euro-dollar liabilities
outstanding at U.S. b a nks .3 5

Indeed,

the increase to 20% in

35

See Andrew Brimmer, Euro-Dollar Flows and the
Efficiency of U.S. Monetary Policy, paper presented before
a Conference on Wall Street and the Economy '69 at the New
School for Social Research, March 8 , 1969, pp. 15-17, for
an insight into his thinking prior to the imposition of the
marginal reserve requirements.
An excellent review of these developments from the
standpoint of U.S. banks may be found in "Eurodollar
Banking Today," First National City Bank Monthly Economic
Letter (July, 1970), pp. 78-81.
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the marginal reserve requirements

(in December,

1970) was

undertaken in an attempt to moderate the return flows of
dollars to Europe.

The repayment of Euro-dollar liabilities

by U.S. banks had begun to have serious effects on the U.S.
balance of payments.

By increasing the reserve requirements,

the Federal Reserve was attempting to make more attractive
the maintenance of a large reserve-free borrowing base.
base declines as Euro-dollar loans are repaid.

The

By en

couraging the banks to maintain their Euro-dollar borrowing
levels,

the Federal Reserve hoped to moderate the outflow

of dollars from the United States and thus moderate the
effects of such outflows on the balance of payments .3 7

"Reserve Reduces Discount Rate to 5*f/o from 5 3/4%;
Moves to Slow B a n k s ' Repayment of Eurodollar L o a n s ," Wall
Street Journal (December 1, 1970), p. 3; Tilford Gaines,
"The Dollar?" Manufacturers Hanover Trust Economic Report
(December, 1970), p. 1.
The logic of this action is somewhat obscure.
The 10%
marginal reserve requirement was instituted to reduce Euro
dollar borrowings, yet the higher 2 0 % requirement was in
stituted to encourage the maintenance of these borrowings.
While the base declines as Euro-dollar borrowings are repaid,
the cost of maintaining the base was such that there was
little incentive to retain high base levels.
Further, added
borrowing above the base would be subject to the reserve re
quirements.
Thus, no matter what Euro-dollar borrowing
level was maintained, additional borrowing would generally be
subject to reserve requirements.
This explains the failure
of this Federal Reserve policy and also points out the diffi
culties inherent in attempting to use one policy tool to
solve two different problems.
The 10% reserve requirement
was aimed at solving a domestic monetary policy leakage and
37
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The mechanics of U.S. bank borrowing may be illustrated as follows.

38

A U.S. bank, desiring loanable funds,

instructs its London branch to bid for a certain amount of
Euro-dollars.

While these funds may b e gained directly

from depositors,

the amounts desired may be so large and so

immediately required that the branch must enter the inter
bank Euro-dollar-market.

Amounts transferred in the market

are quite sizeable/usually in

$1

million blocks.^9

The U.S. branch, then, bids in the market for a
certain amount of Euro-dollars,

frequently through an agent

so that the U.S. bank will not get a claim on its own
demand d e p o s i t s . G a i n i n g such a deposit would reduce

the 2 0 % rate was aimed at solving a conflicting foreign
monetary policy goal.
If the reserve requirement was
successful in solving the domestic problem it certainly
couldn't be strengthened and be expected to generate the
opposite results.
38
A particularly comprehensive exposition on U.S.
bank borrowing of Euro-dollars may be found in Klopstock,
"Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity...," oj£. c i t ., pp. 72-80.
3^Clendenning, oja. c i t ., p. 9.
40

Bloch,

0 £.

c i t ., p. 21n.

considerably the value of the loan since only the
reserves previously held on the demand deposit would then
become available to the bank.
$100

of loanable funds,

Paying 10% interest to obtain

for example, is, in the context of

money market rates in the 1960's, an expensive price to
pay for funds.

To pay this rate on the amount borrowed and

obtain the use of only $17.50 (the amount of reserves freed)
would approximate a 60% rate of

interest and be,

to say the

least, a rather expensive source on which to rely.
Once title to the funds is obtained, the branch
transfers it to the head office in the United States.

The

draft is placed in the clearing system and the reserves of
the bank borrowing the funds are increased by the amount of
the loan.

The reserves of the bank on which the draft was

drawn are reduced b y the same amount.

The losing bank finds

its deposits and reserves reduced by a certain amount and
the gaining bank experiences an increase in its total
reserves in that amount.

The decline in required reserves

of the losing bank is not immediately offset by an in
crease in the required reserves of the gaining bank.

In

stead, reserve balances that were previously required
because of deposits outstanding have become, temporarily,
excess reserves.

The deposit on which the reserves were

kept has been extinguished, replaced by a liability to a
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foreign branch that does not require reserves.

Euro-dollar

borrowing by large U.S. banks does not increase the total
amount of reserves in the U.S. monetary system nor does
it generally increase the total money supply.
noted later,

As will be

the borrowing does, however, allow an ex

pansion of the loan portfolio of the borrowing bank by
amounts larger than the loans recalled by the losing bank.
Euro-dollar borrowing,

then, redistributes reserves and

loan assets away from those U.S. banks who do not use the
market due to cost or information considerations and to
banks that do use the market.41Borrowing b y U.S. banks reduces the amount of
possible credit creation in the Euro-dollar system.

This

occurs because such borrowing represents a leakage of
reserves out of the system.

The greater is U.S. bank

borrowing, the greater the leakage and the lower the possible
money multiplier in the Euro-dollar system.

42

Euro-dollar

41

Brimmer, ojo. c i t ., pp. 4-6; Leimone, o£. c i t ., p. 4;
Klopstock, "Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity...," o p . c i t ., pp.
79-80. Also see note 33.
42

See Chapter 3 for an explanation of the leakages that
affect the Euro-dollar system's ability to create money.
The
money equation taking into account the various leakages is
presented-there.

50

borrowing by U.S. banks, then,has a contractionary effect
on the Euro-dollar system.

However, the rise in yields

associated with the increased demand for Euro-dollars by
U.S. banks has brought out greatly increased supplies of
dollars and appears to indicate that Euro-dollar supply is
fairly price elastic . 4 3

This means that the contractionary

effect of U.S. borrowing may be offset by additional flows
of funds into the Euro-dollar system.
Figure 4 illustrates the borrowing of Euro-dollars by
Bank A in the United States.

In step 1, the Eurobanks

accept a dollar deposit and gain a claim on U.S. Bank B.
The Eurobanks relend the claim on Bank B to U.S. Bank A's
London branch, transforming their asset into a claim on
U.S. Bank A's London branch.

In step 2, U.S. Bank A's

branch lists the Euro-dollar deposit of the Eurobanks as a
liability and the claim on U.S. Bank B as an asset.

The

4 3 Klopstock, "Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity...," o p .
c i t ., p. 73.
Swap arrangements between U.S. banks, which
will be detailed in later chapters, had the effect of in
creasing both demand and supply.
In these cases, both the
demand for Euro-dollar funds and the supply of such funds
was artificially inflated.
In this sense it can be said
that U.S. banks were responsible for the growth in both
supply and demand in the Euro-dollar markets.
More basi
cally, U.S. bank demand drew additional funds into the
system and thus fostered its development.
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Figure 4.
1.

U.S. Bank Branch Borrowing 3

Eurobanks_________________ 2.

+ Deposit at
U.S. Bank B

+E$ Deposit

U.S. Bank A London Branch

+Deposit at
U.S. Bank B

which becomes

which becomes

+E$ Deposit
at U.S.
Bank A's
London
Branch

+Due from
Home Office

3.

U.S. Bank A

+Deposit at
Bank B

tLiability to
Foreign
Branch

4.

+E$ Deposit
of Euro
banks

U.S. Bank E

Reserves and
Assets

which becomes

which becomes

+Temporary
Excess
Reserves

-Reserves
(17% Req.
83% Excess)

Deposit due/
first Euro
pean, then
Eurobanks,
then Bank A's
branch, then
Bank A
which becomes

or
-Assets (83%)
-Res. (17%)

a)

-Deposit
Liability

Prior to reserve requirements or within the
reserve-free base.
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claim on Bank B is transferred to the home office and its
asset is transformed into a loan to home office.

In step 3,

U.S. Bank A, having obtained title to the claim on Bank B,
records the transfer from its branch as a non-deposit
liability to its foreign branch.

The claim on Bank B is

placed in the clearing mechanism and Bank A is credited
with the amount of the draft.

The reserves gained by this

action are initially excess r e s e r v e b e c a u s e Bank A need
hold no reserves on its liabilities to foreign branches.
The net result of these transactions is that the
reserves previously held by Bank B are now held by Bank A.
At this point the money supply has contracted by the amount
of the Euro-dollar borrowing.

However, Bank A may be

expected to transform its excess reserves into loans and
create a demand deposit.

This deposit will be equal to

the deposit destroyed at Bank B.
The entire banking system is affected in a somewhat
different way.

Basically, when the lending bank loses re

serves and sells assets to replenish these balances
(assuming no excess reserves), it causes a multiple con
traction in the amount of deposits outstanding in the
banking system.

However, the borrowing bank offsets this

contraction by lending out the amount of its excess
reserves, generating a multiple expansion of deposits in

53

the system.

The net effect on the money supply is zero.

The non-deposit liability that is created by the Euro-dollar
borrowing adds to the entries on the liabilities side of
the ledger.

Offsetting this is a net increase in loans

outstanding.

While loans contract due to Bank B's actions,

they expand due to Bank A's actions.

As shown in Figure 5,

a net increase in loans equal to the amount of the Euro
dollar borrowing has occurred.

These loans are balanced

by increased non-deposit (non-money) liabilities on the
liability side of the bank statement.

Thus, Euro-dollar

borrowing does not affect the money supply but it does
affect the magnitude of loans that the banking system can
extend.

This result has important implications for credit

policy and will be analyzed in later chapters.

Figure 5.

U.S. Bank Euro-dollar Borrowing-System Effects

_________Source Bank___________
- 1 0 0 Reserves - 1 0 0 Dem. Dep.
-400 Loans
-400 Dem. Dep.

r =

20%

Receiving Banks____
Reserves
+100 Non-Dep.
Liability-E$s
+500 Loans
+500 Dem. Deps.

+100

Net Increase in Loans = 100
Net Change in Dem. Deps. = 0

54

E. Money Creation and Leakages from the System
Basic to money creation in the United States is the
existence of a fractional reserve system and the redeposit
of funds lent out by the banks.

The greater the leakages

from the system (into hand-to-hand currency,

for instance)

and the higher the required reserve ratio, the less credit
creation can occur.

In the Euro-dollar system, credit

creation may result if the final borrower

(omitting inter

mediation) uses his funds to pay debts to those who re
deposit the funds into the Euro-dollar system.

The

possibility of payments to those outside the system (i.e.,
to U.S. creditors or to creditors who convert the funds
into domestic currency derived from a central bank that does
not return the funds to the Euro-dollar system), means that
leakages from the system can occur and credit creation will
be halted.
In the U.S. system,
most part,
other hand,

identifiable.

leakages are small and,

for the

In the Euro-dollar system, on the

leakages frequently occur on a large scale and

are not as. easily predicted.

In the past,

this was due to

the fact that the market existed primarily to supply funds
to debtors of U.S. creditors or to supply a currency that
could be readily converted into the domestic currency re
quired by the borrower.

As the system developed, however,
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the currency of the system came to be accepted for itself
rather than as a vehicle convertible into domestic currency
or usable only to pay U.S. debts.

Further, as European

central banks reached the point where they considered their
dollar reserves adequate,

these banks followed the policy

of returning (or recycling)

to the Euro-dollar market dollars

gained in foreign exchange market stabilization operations.^4
Payments have come to be made more and more in Euro
dollars and redeposited as is by receivers.

Leakages

formerly arising from central bank reserve accumulation
have also been reduced drastically.

Finally, purchasers

of dollars on the foreign exchange markets have frequently
placed their funds in Euro-dollar accounts.

Thus, while a

closed system similar to the U.S. monetary system has not
been created,

there has certainly developed one where fewer

leakages occur.
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The policy of recycling and its effects will be dealt
with in later chapters. An indication of the dawning reali
zation that such recycling has expanded Euro-dollar deposits
may be found in "European Bankers Planning to Manipulate
Dollar Supplies: Washington Seen Uneasy," Wall Street Journal
(April 7, 1971), p. 4;
"Europe's Central Banks Agree to
Withdraw Funds in Bid to Control Eurodollar Market," Wall
Street Journal (June 15, 1971), p. 5; "Reserve Board Isn't
Studying Added Control Over Eurodollar Market, Daane Asserts,"
Wall Street Journal (May 27, 1971), p. 7.
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Leakages may also be caused by the maintenance of
reserves by the Eurobanks.

However, since there are few

regulations requiring reserves on Euro-dollar deposits,
only small levels of reserves for working balances and
safety purposes are k e p t .4 5

The existence of foreign

exchange markets j.n which dollars can be obtained with,
little difficulty obviates the need for the maintenance of
reserves

(of dollars)

mean, necessarily,

in any real amounts.

This does not

that no reserves of any kind are kept

but rather that specific dollar reserves are not required
for safety.
The process of money creation may be illustrated with
a table similar to those used in explaining the credit
creation process in the U.S. monetary system.

Assume an

exporter to the U.S. deposits into a dollar denominated
account a claim on a deposit in a U.S. bank.

deposit

46

This primary

adds to the Eurobank's dollar reserves.

4 5 Williams,

The

op. c it., pp. 16-17.

46
A primary deposit is one that increases total deposit
liabilities and total cash reserves of the monetary system.
A derivative deposit is one that derives from the extension
of credit by the banks of the system and increases only total
deposit liabilities, not cash reserves.
Thus, a primary de
posit represents an infusion of reserves into the system,
and a derivative deposit evidence of the relending of funds
within a fractional reserve system.
The distinction, while

Eurobank then creates and lends to a non-bank borrower a
Euro-dollar demand deposit equal to 90% of the funds ob
tained.
reserve.

The bank retains a 10% working and precautionary
The borrower pays a debt to another European by

drawing a check on or similarly transferring ownership of
the Euro-dollar deposit lent to him.

The receiver rede

posits the funds in a dollar account, allowing his Eurobank
to relend 90% of these funds to another borrower.

Thus,

credit creation has occurred and, as long as the Euro
dollars are not used to pay a creditor outside the Euro
dollar system,

the credit creation chain continues.

Even

if they do find their way out of the system after three or
four circuits,

there has still been an expansion in the

total supply of Euro-dollars.
As Figure

6

indicates, a primary deposit of $1,000

results in an addition to the stock of Euro-dollar deposits
of E$3,439, of which E$1,000 is the original deposit and

theoretically sound, is empirically extremely difficult to
observe.
This is one reason why the preponderance of
international bankers have been loath to accept the possi
bility of credit creation in the Euro-dollar market.
To
them, there are no derivative deposits and evidence to the
contrary is not readily available.
See Machlup, "EuroDollar Creation...," 0 £. ci t ., p. 237, and Klopstock, "Money
Creation in .. ., " l o c . cit.
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Figure 6

Euro-dollar Creation

(2 )
Reserves
Retained
(10%)

Bank

Eurobank A
Eurobank B
Eurobank C
Eurobank D
Totals

E$ 1,000*
900
810
729
3,439

*primary Deposit.
deposits.

E$

(3)
Loans

100
90
81
73
344

E$

900
810
729
656
3,095

All further deposits are derivative

E$2,439 the new money created based upon the new reserves
gained with the initial (primary) deposit.

The loan made

by Eurobank D is used to pay a debt to the U.S. and thus
$656 of reserves leak out of the system.
further Euro-dollar creation.

This halts

Had there been no payment

to receivers outside the system,

the money multiplier of

10

would have been operational and for every $ 1 , 0 0 0 deposited
a total of E$10,000 of new deposits

(E$9,000 derivative,

E$1,000 original) would have resulted.
multiplier here is about 3.4.

As it is, the

Generally, as long as there

is. at least one redeposit into the system,

a positive amount

of Euro-dollars can be created.
Theoretically,
be infinite,

the Euro-dollar money multiplier could

for there are often no official reserve re

quirements on Euro-dollar deposits in the European

countries.

However, it is unrealistic to postulate such

a situation because banks will, in prudence, maintain some
47
reserves.

Further, substantial leakages out of the

system and into other domestic systems will normally occur,
reducing the possible multiplier.
Finally, U.S„ bank borrowing from the Euro-dollar
system generates a leakage from the system.

This occurs

because funds are taken out of the system for use in another
system rather than redeposited within the Euro-dollar
system.

However, as the demand for Euro-dollars expands

(shifts out) due to the added demanders in the market, the
resulting increased price (interest rate) induces Euro
banks and others to transform some of their European
domestic currency assets into dollar assets via the foreign
exchange market.

Thus, the European central bank concerned

will be required to supply dollars to the system out of
their reserves.

Taken together, these responses appear to

indicate that the Euro-dollar supply curve is fairly price
elastic.^®
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Williams, loc. cit.

Klopstock,
loc. cit.

"Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity...,”

To the extent that the central banks find it necessary
to utilize their dollar reserves to fund these asset
transformations, the leakage deriving from U.S. bank
borrowing is offset by what are essentially new primary
deposits from the central banks.

U.S. bank Euro-dollar

borrowing thus sometimes forces central banks to take
actions which they may have preferred not to.
There is little difference between U.S. bank
borrowing of Euro-dollars and U.S. bank borrowing of U.S.
demand deposits held by European banks.

In both instances

what is borrowed is European banks' claims on U.S. demand
deposits.

The difference is the origin of these claims and

how they are viewed by the holding bank.

Dollar denominated

deposits are issued to individuals and non-bank corporations
by European banks in exchange for claims on demand deposits
of U.S. banks.

These deposits in European banks are Euro

dollars and are liabilities of the Eurobanks, the reserves
of which are the demand deposits in U.S. banks.

When Euro

dollars are then borrowed by U.S. banks, what is really
borrowed are the reserves of the Euro-dollar system or the
assets obtained in return for the Euro-dollar liability
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issued to the depositor .4 9

When U.S. bank deposits held

by European banks are borrowed by U.S. banks, it is not
Eurobank reserves that are borrowed but rather a different
category of asset.

U.S. banks are borrowing what to them

are the same thing but are to the European banks different
things.
borrowed.

In one case, it is a reserve asset that is
In the other, it is an investment, working

balance asset, or recently transformed U.S. money market
asset (Treasury Bills for example) that is borrowed.
To summarize, U.S. bank borrowing of funds in Europe
constitutes a leakage from the Euro-dollar system, either
actual or potential, and as such, reduces the money
creation possibilities in the system.

Nonetheless, offsets

to this borrowing occur both in the form of direct foreign
central bank infusions into the system or indirect central
bank infusions through the financing of the conversion of
European domestic currency assets into Euro-dollar deposits.
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This situation has caused many to draw a parallel
between the Euro-dollar system and the Federal Funds market
in the United States.
The comparison is questionable.
See
Scott, op,, c i t ., pp. 7-9. Machlup, "Euro-Dollar Creation
...
o£. c i t ., pp. 231-234 refutes the comparison.

I
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Other leakages result from the interconnectedness of the
Euro-dollar system with domestic monetary systems.

Even

with the leakages, however, Euro-dollar credit creation
can occur.
The creation of Euro-dollars in Europe has no effect
on the U.S. monetary system except to the extent that
foreign central bank dollar reserves may

be pulled into

the U.S. monetary system, expanding the reserve base in
the United States and, potentially, the money supply.

In

the U.S. system, the Eurobanks serve only as intermediaries
between borrowing American banks and (reluctant) lending
American banks.

There is no creation by the Eurobanks of

U.S. deposits. U.S. banks borrow Eurobanks' reserves

(assets)

while Europeans and others borrow Eurobank liabilities.
Eurobanks can create their liabilities but they can not
create their reserve assets.

In the same way, U.S. banks

can create their liabilities but not their reserves.

The

Eurobanks can borrow their reserves from their reserve
creator (U.S. banks) or from other Eurobanks.

They can also

convert their assets into these reserves (through the fore ign exchange m a r k e t ) .
Generally, then, the primary consequences of the
existence and operation of the system influence Europe,
not the United States, and make much more difficult the

execution there of effective monetary policy contrary to
U.S. monetary policy.

CHAPTER III
SUPPLY AND DEMAND
I.

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to indicate the major
theoretical determinants of the demand for and supply of
Euro-dollars.

Primary emphasis will be placed on the

factors that have influenced U.S. bank demand for Euro
dollars but an outline of the major sources of demand in
general will also be included.

Likewise, the main concern

with Euro-dollar supply is the sources of the funds that
are lent to U.S. banks.

However, a brief discussion of

the factors influencing the supply of funds generally will
also be undertaken.
Section II discusses the Euro-dollar market and
delineates the various factors that influence the demand
for Euro-dollars generally and the determinants of U.S.
bank demand specifically.

Section III presents the

determinants of the supply of funds to the Euro-dollar
market and concludes with a recapitulation of the main
points of the analysis.
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II.

A.

Demand in the Euro-dollar Market

The Euro-dollar Market
As detailed in Chapter 2, there is a significant

difference between the concept of a market and of a
system.

A market, recall, is a meeting between those who

wish to lend, sell, or otherwise dispose of their goods or
purchasing power and those who wish to borrow, buy, or
otherwise gain control over goods or purchasing power.

A

market reflects the supply and demand influences that are
manifested in the quotation of prices
rates)

(including interest

and involves measurements of the amount of the good

traded over a certain period of time.

A system, on the

other hand, involves a much broader range of activities
and measurements than the trading of goods or purchasing
power.

As such, it includes, but is not limited to,

market activities.
The Euro-dollar system contains within it a market
where the money produced by the system and the reserves it
utilizes are exchanged.^

This market for funds plays the

^-This market has no physical setting as such.
Rather,
it is made up of numerous geographically separated suppliers
and demanders and their agents who, via various tele
communication devices, remain in constant contact with one
another.
In the same say, the U.S. money market has no
physical trading floor as do the various U.S. stock
exchanges, for example.
It may be noted that as New York
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same role in the Euro-dollar system that the U.S. money
market plays in the U.S. monetary system.

The Euro-dollar

market reflects the various monetary pressures that occur
throughout both the Euro-dollar system and many national
systems in the same way that pressures arising within the
U.S. monetary system are reflected in the U.S. money
market.

The strong and complex pressures that occur in a

multitude of national monetary systems and in the inter
national exchange markets pyramid to and are concentrated
in the Euro-dollar market, generating wide fluctuations in
the interest rates prevailing there.
The Euro-dollar market has, until recently, been
remarkably free of direct governmental interferences.
However, governmental intervention and structural rigidi
ties in both national money markets and the international
payments system have been responsible for a substantial
portion of the increased activity in the market.

Thus,

while the market itself has been generally free of inter
ferences, governmental intervention in other markets
has been felt in this market.

The link between national

is the primary center of the U.S. money market, so is
London the main location of the agents through which Euro
dollar funds are channelled.
See, among others, Saunders,
op. ci t . , pp. 21-24; Scott, op. cit., p. 3; Clendenning,
o p . c i t . , pp. 5-8.
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systems that the present exchange rate system provides has
facilitated the transmission of demand and supply pres
sures in one market to the Euro-dollar market and through
the Euro-dollar market to other national money markets and
systems.^
Supply and demand factors operating within the
Euro-dollar market are definable and of substantial im
portance, but the pressures arising outside the system
also play a significant role in the operation of the
market.

One of the external factors that has greatly in

fluenced the Euro-dollar market, both with regard to
interest rates and with regard to the amount of activity,
has been U.S. bank borrowing and subsequent repayment of
dollar balances.

Indeed, the entry into the Euro-dollar

market by U.S. banks as large scale demanders and their
later exit as they undertook massive repayments had pro
found effects on the market.

These effects are delineated

below.

2 as will be detailed later, it may be said that the
Euro-dollar system and the market through which it works
have formed a bridge over the barriers that were erected
between national systems in order that external occur
rences would not influence domestic economies.
In other
words, the system of fixed exchange rates and the ancilliary institutions that were set up after World War II and
which were to act as a barrier to the export of recession,
for instance, has been overruled by the Euro-dollar system.
The operation of the Euro-dollar system, although quite dif
ferent, has had many of the same effects as those which were
associated with the operation of the gold standard in the
last century.
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To conclude, the Euro-dollar market is unusual in that
it is pressures and interferences originating outside the
Euro-dollar system that have the most powerful effects on
the operation of the market.

These factors have, in

essence, generated both an increased demand for and an in
creased supply of loanable funds in the market.
B.

General Demand Considerations
The demand for any good, including money, is based

upon the expected utility to be gained from the possession
and use of the good.

Given the expected utility, a

rational purchaser or borrower determines the quantity of
the good

he will purchase or borrow based upon the price

of the good, the price of complementary and substitutable
g o ods, expectations about future prices, and a host of
other considerations.

The borrower of Euro-dollars is not

particularly distinguishable from the borrower of any other
currency or good, as such.

He desires to obtain purchasing

power and is motivated by the same considerations as other
borrowers.

Indeed, the Euro-dollar borrower is not concerned

with the form that the borrowed purchasing power takes be
cause he may convert the funds obtained in the foreign ex
change markets, should he so wish.
transactions costs will be incurred.

If this is necessary,
These costs are then

added to the other factors the borrower must take into con
sideration.

The Euro-dollar borrower compares the costs
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and benefits associated with borrowing purchasing power
in this market with those costs and benefits associated
with borrowing in other markets and determines the amount
he wishes to demand.

He is no different than any other

borrower of loanable funds although some of the con
siderations he must weigh may be.
Euro-dollar borrowing occurs in a market that is
generally free of rigidities and imperfections.
market has been available to all entrants

The

(of sufficient

3
credit worthiness ) and has been fiercely competitive.

It

has provided an outlet for demanders whose motivations
have ranged from a desire to overcome a scarcity of funds
in the domestic country, to bypass the oligopolistic banks
of a particular country, or to obtain a supposedly
superior form of transactions currency.

It would be a

mistake to dismiss the market as one that feeds funds to
borrowers only when all other sources have vanished.

It is

not generally a last resort source of funds any more than
the commercial paper market in the United States, for
example, is a last resort for large U.S. businesses.

3
There has been some controversy surrounding the
criteria utilized for determining the credit worthiness of
Euro-dollar borrowers.
See "Easing of Criteria in Inter
national Lending Hit by Bankers at Foreign Trade Meeting,"
Wall Street Journal (April 27, 1971), p. 9; "Eurodollar
Banking: ...?" o p . ci t ., pp. 14-15.
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Rather, the Euro-dollar market is an alternative source of
funds for borrowers.

A borrower will consider the Euro

dollar market as one of many possible sources of pur
chasing power.
C.

Market Participants and Their Motives
The specific demanders who have entered the Euro

dollar market include large non-financial corporations,
both with and without operations in other countries,- private
financial institutions, including commercial banks both in
the United States and abroad, importers and exporters in
foreign countries, official and international financial
institutions, speculators, and securities brokers and
dealers.

All of these demanders normally have access to

various alternative sources of funds and their demand for
Euro-dollar balances is influenced by the alternative
costs of these different sources and by their concern for
the maintenance of these sources.4

^This concern was, of course, behind the imposition
of marginal reserve requirements on Euro-dollar borrowings
by the U.S. banks from their branches
(10%) instituted by
the Federal Reserve.
By creating a base above which
reserves were required, the Federal Reserve increased the
cost of further borrowings by the banks.
At the same time
the base acted as a floor, below which the banks would
theoretically not want to go since, should they do so,
their reserve-free base would dealine.
However, experience
in 1970 and 1971 would seem to indicate that the desire
to maintain the base was not as strong an incentive to hold
Euro-dollar borrowings as the higher cost associated with
maintaining these borrowings was a detriment.
Even the
imposition of higher marginal reserve requirements (2 0 %)
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The primary concern in this study is with the
borrowing of Euro-dollars by U.S. banks.

This particular

group of borrowers entered the Euro-dollar market in the
1960's both because of the limited availability and con
sequent high cost of funds in the United States at certain
stages of the business cycle and because of the technical
advantages that such entry

(and borrowing)

involved for

reserve computation.^
Limited availability of funds has arisen in boom
periods, when the Federal Reserve has attempted through
tight money policies to restrict the availability of re
serves and deposits to the banks.

In these situations and

with businesses and others demanding large amount of funds
in late 1970, and changes in the computation of the base
did not halt the rapid decline (pay-off) in Euro-dollar
borrowings outstanding.
Indeed, the Export-Import Bank
and the Treasury were forced in 1971 to issue debt securi
ties to soak up the flow of returning (to Europe) Euro
dollars since this flow was severely affecting the balance
of payments.
These securities, besides paying an interest
return, can be used to satisfy the marginal reserve require
ments on Euro-dollar borrowings above the base and, thus,
effectively reduce the cost of maintaining a given level
of borrowings.
See, on this subject, Chapter 6 and
"Treasury Slates Offering...," lo c . c i t .; "The Money and
Bond Markets in January," Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Monthly Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 (February, 1971), p. 33;
"Change in Discount Rate," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 56,
No. 12 (December, 1970), p. 963; Coombs, "Treasury and
Federal Reserve Operations," oj>. c i t ., p. 47; "The Uneven
Retreat in World Interest Rates," First National City Bank
Monthly Economic Letter (March, 1971), p. 15; and "Reserve...
Moves to Slow Banks' Repayment of Euro-dollar Loans," Wall
Street Journal (December 1, 1970), p. 3.
5 Williams, 0 £. cit., pp. 25-29 includes a comprehen
sive calculation of the costs of Euro-dollar borrowing by

72

due to the boom conditions, U.S. banks have looked to nonU.S. sources of loanable funds to offset the reserve
stringencies imposed by the Federal Reserve.

These

sources, of which the Euro-dollar market has been of
primary importance, were generally utilized only when
U.S. funds were scarce.

Only the scarcity of funds and

consequent high cost of such funds made it economic for
U.S. banks to tap the Euro-dollar market for funds.

The

Euro-dollar market provides large quantities of loanable
funds but only at rather high interest rates, by U.S.
standards.

Thus, the Euro-dollar market generally becomes

a feasible alternative as a source of funds only when
rates in the U.S. rise to high levels.
Additional incentives to borrow in the Euro-dollar
market also existed prior to August, 1969.

While the

nominal cost of such funds was high, technical considera
tions increased the value of borrowing such funds.

These

factors included the reserve free nature of borrowings
from foreign branches and the opportunity afforded by such
borrowing to reduce required reserves through increases
in cash items in process of collection, a deductable item
when computing required reserves.

Both these factors

U.S. banks and non-bank businesses.
As will be detailed
later, Euro-dollar borrowing reduced required reserves of
the borrowing bank because these cash items in process
of collection were deductable from required reserves prior
to August, 1969.
This advantage is different from that
gained by borrowing funds from foreign branches and trans
forming that deposit into a non-reserve liability to foreign
branch, again, non-reserve prior to August, 1969.
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increased the value of Euro-dollar borrowings and lowered
the level to which U.S. rates had to rise before Euro
dollar borrowing became profitable.

Indeed, through the

judicious use of swap arrangements with other large U.S.
banks, a constant reduction in reserve requirements could
be obtained at almost no cost to either bank.
The Euro-dollar system provides an escape valve
through which U.S. banks have been able to avoid some
of the reserve stringencies imposed on them by the
Federal Reserve.

In these times, Euro-dollar borrowing

increased by substantial amounts.

The banks have thus

been able to maintain or expand their loan portfolios
during tight money periods.

Banks without access to the

Euro-dollar market, of course, have not been as readily
able to avoid the effects of tight money.
In addition to the availability and reserves benefits
derived from Euro-dollar borrowing, a third motive has
impelled U.S. banks to enter the market.

They have done

so in order to defend themselves from reserve losses to
other banks who are borrowing Euro-dollars.®

Thus, for

defensive as well as for simple source reasons numerous

£1

A redistribution of reserves between U.S. banks with
access to the Euro-dollar market and those without such
access may have occurred, with effects on the impact of
monetary policy within the U.S. and competitive conditions
in the financial sector.
These effects will be discussed
in Chapter 6 .
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banks have found it necessary and desirable to establish
branches in Europe and elsewhere
from European banks ) . 7

(or to borrow directly

Table 1 indicates the growth in

the number of branches these banks maintain there and
the rise in the number of banks having branches.
As more banks have entered the market, demand for
Euro-dollars has increased, but much of this increased
demand has caused nothing but additional churning of the
market with little or no real change in the distribution
of bank reserves, at least among large U.S. banks with
branches.

The result of such defensive borrowings by

U.S. banks may then be higher Euro-dollar interest rates
due to the increased demand but no real change in the
distribution of available reserves in the U . S . 8

There

may be, of course, a redistribution of reserves between
the large banks with branches and banks that do not have
branches or direct foreign lending sources.
The demand for Euro-dollars arising from borrowers

7John Leimone, "The Euro-Dollar Market:
An Element
in Monetary Policy," Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Monthly Review, Vol. 53, No. 8 (August, 1968), pp. 1-2.
8This is not the view taken in many Euro*-dollar
analyses but appears to contain at least a measure of
realism.
Brimmer, "Euro-Dollar Flows...," o£. cit. ,
pp. 3-6 has maintained that this borrowing has caused a
redistribution of reserves among U.S. banks.
Both
possibilities will be explored in Chapter 6 .
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TABLE I
FOREIGN BRANCHES OF U.S. FEDERAL RESERVE MEMBER BANKS
End of
Year

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

Number of
U.S. Banks
with
Foreign
Branches

8
8
10
10
11

13
13
15
26
53
79

Year to
Year Per
centage
Increase

Number of
Branches

Number of
Countries
in which
Branches
Occur

-

124
135
145
160
180

33
35
39
42
45
50
53
54
57
60

0

25
0
10

18

211

0

244
295
373
459
532

15
73
96
50

66

Source : Annual Report (Washington: Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, 1960 -1970), cited in
Williams, 0 £. cit. , p. 11.
other than U.S. banks certainly has significance, for
fluctuations in their demand have a good deal to do with
the rate that is quoted on these funds.

However, for the

most part, U.S. bank demand for Euro-dollars has been the
overriding factor in the market, at least in the years
from 1966 to 1970.9

9 Scott, o£. cit., p. 7; Williams, o jd . cit. , pp. 10-11;
"Euro-Dollars: A Changing Market," o£. cit., pp. 771-775;
and "The Money Machine Magic of Eurocfollars, Business W e e k ,
No. 2112 (February 21, 1970) , p. 114.
"Eurodollar Banking:
...?" 0 £. cit., p. 12 has noted that the demand for Euro
dollars now comes from Europe.
These European demanders
4
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The net amount of Euro-dollar deposits outstanding
(exclusive of interbank transactions) was estimated to be
$37.5 billion at the end of 1969 and U.S. bank borrowings
to be $13.5 billion at the same point in time.

Over a

third of all Euro-dollar balances at the end of 1969, then,
were on loan to U.S. banks.

(See Table 2.)

As was noted

in Chapter 2, Euro-dollar loans to U.S. banks are a leakage
out of the Euro-dollar system.

Since one third of all

Euro-dollar deposits outstanding were lent to U.S. banks,
more than one third of the Euro-dollar system's reserves
were lent to U.S. banks.

If there is credit creation in

the Euro-dollar system, the remaining deposits are not
backed 100% by reserves.

In all likelihood, 50% or more

of the system's reserves were on loan to U.S. banks,
assuming a money multiplier of only

2 . 10

Subsequent to the surge in borrowing by U.S. banks
in 1969, Euro-dollar borrowings by these banks declined
drastically.

This decline was due primarily to the

have replaced the withdrawing U.S. banks, who previously
constituted the major source of demand in the market.
•^Assume E$100 deposits outstanding.
If $33 are
lent to U.S. banks, that represents a loss of $33 in re
serves to the Euro-dollar system.
With $ 6 6 in deposits
remaining in the Euro-dollar system and assuming a money
multiplier of 2, this requires $33 in reserves.
There
fore, U.S. banks have borrowed half of the Euro-dollar
system's reserves ($33 U.S. loans + $33 reserves on other
deposits = Total Reserves).
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TABLE II
EURO-DOLLAR DEPOSITS OUTSTANDING (NET) AND COMPARISON
WITH U.S. BANK LIABILITIES TO THEIR BRANCHES 5

Cumulative sources
and uses of Euro
dollars by area

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

Sources
Outside area-*U.S. and
Canada®
Japan
Eastern Europe
Other
Total

4.2

1.7
•••
.4
4.0

2.6

4.5

2.8

1.3
•• •
.3
3.3

•••
.5
4.8

.1
.6
6.6

1.0
10.6

4.6

4.9

6.1

7.9

1 1 .8

18.7

25.0

1.8
2.6

2.2

2.8

5.6

3.9
5.7

5.2

4.4

8.0

9.4
9.2

9.7
11.3

4.4

6

.6

8.4

9.6

13.2

18.8

21.0

9.0

11.5

14.5

17.5

25.0

37.5

46.0

2.2

2.7
.5
.5
1.5

5.0

5.8

10.2

.4
.5
.9

.6

12.7
•
15.9

3.0

1.7
.9
4.2

17.8
1.5

.7
1*9

1.0
.8

4.0

5.2

8.2

10.6

17.0

25.8

28.6

2.3
2.7

3.3
3.0

3.7

4.1

5.6

10.1

2.6

2.8

4.7
3.3

6.1

7.3

5.0

6.3

6.3

6.9

8 .0

11.7

17.4

9.0

11.5

14.5

17.5

25.0

37. 5

46.0

1.5
•• •
.3

6.7
.4

20.8

’

Inside area
Nonbanks
Banks 5
Total
Total
Uses
Outside area^
U.S. and
Canada 6
Japan
Eastern Europe
Other
Total
Inside Area
Nonbanks
Banks 5
Total
Total

1.0

5.5
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TABLE II (continued)
Liabilities of U.S.
banks to Their
Foreign Branches
Liabilities as per
cent of net Size

1.2

1.3

13.3

11.3

4.0
27.6

4.2

6.1

24.0

24.4

13.54
36.0

7.7
16.7

1-Banks and nonbanks in all countries except BelgiumLuxembourg,
France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, and Great Britain.
2 Amounts converted from other currencies and used
for Euro-dollar-type lending, as estimated by BIS; also
includes liabilities to central banks and BIS.

3Amounts converted to other currencies, as estimated
by BIS, excluding Italian banks' conversions to third
currencies for relending to nonbank residents (included in
nonbank uses).
4Peak borrowings were $14.8 billion at the end of
November, 1969.

^Estimated, end of year, in billions of U.S. dollar
units.

f

^For 1970, U.S. only.

Canada included in all other.

Source:
40th Annual Report (Basle: Bank for Interna
tional Settlements, 1970), p. 158; 41st Annual Report
(Basle: Bank for International Settlements, 1971), p. 164;
Federal Reserve Bulletin (May, 1968;
May, 1969; May, 1970;
May, 1971), pp. A 104, A 102, A 102, and A 86 respectively.
imposition of marginal reserve requirements, restrictions
on what items might be deducted from required reserves,
relatively higher rates of interest in the Euro-dollar
market as opposed to the U.S. money market, and the
rapidly easing monetary situation in the United States.
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Indeed, by mid-1971, Euro-dollar borrowings of U.S.
banks had been reduced to less than $3 billion.
This rapid reduction had serious repercussions on
the U.S. balance of payments and caused the Federal
Reserve to increase the marginal reserve requirements
on Euro-dollar borrowings by U.S. banks in an attempt to
slow the banks' net repayment of loans.

This action may

be viewed as a contribution to the banks' demand for
Euro-dollars since its desired effect was to encourage U.S.
banks to maintain their Euro-dollar borrowings.12

Further,

^ C o o m b s , 0 £. cit. , p. 47; Federal Reserve Bulletin,
Vol. 57, No. 5 (May, 1971), p. A30; Salomon Brothers Bond
Market Roundup (June 18, 1971), p. 2. The equations for
mulated in the’ next chapter do not predict this decline
particularly well.
This may be explained by the changed
structure prevailing in 1971 and the exchange rate in
stability that has distorted the market.
■^This policy did not work because cost considera
tions swamped any attraction the maintenance of a larger
base might have had.
Given the marginal nature of the Euro
dollar market to U.S.banks, they could not be expected to
retain high levels of Euro-dollar borrowings in the face
of major interest rate declines and increased money avail
ability in the U.S.
The value of the Euro-dollar market
to the banks lay in the availability of funds in time of
need, not as a general source of funds.
It was a temporary
alternative when U.S. generated funds were unavailable.
The maintenance of a reserve free base would not
allow the banks to increase their borrowings when the need
arose.
See Andrew Brimmer, "Euro-Dollar Flows...," o p .
cit., pp. 17-21 and Williams, o p . cit. , pp. 26-28 for an
analysis of the costs associated with Euro-dollar borrowing
before and after the reserve requirements were instituted.
Tilford Gaines has also discussed the entire concept of
marginal reserve requirements in "Public Policy Issues,"
o p . c i t . , pp. 3-4 and in "The Dollar?" 0 £. cit., p. 1.
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the Treasury and the Export-Import Bank acted to soak up
some of these returning flows through issuance of several
billion dollars of securities, usable by the U.S. branches
m

.

.

.

meeting their reserve requirements.

i

J

In addition to the demand originating from U.S.
banks, other participants such as multinational and national
corporations, importers and exporters, and speculators,
foreign central banks, and governments have often
entered the market on the demand side as their need for
funds or policy requirements dictated.

For instance,

central banks have purchased Euro-dollars from time to
time in order to stabilize the foreign exchange markets.14
The Swiss and German central banks especially have found
this action necessary at the end of each quarter and at the
end of the year in order to offset the effects of window
dressing operations undertaken by commercial banks under
their jurisdiction.

Frequently, some type of swap

See note 5, this chapter.
Recently, to soak up
excess dollar funds that are not now being placed or re
cycled
in the Euro-dollar market, the U.S. Treasury
issued more non-marketable notes to the German Bundesbank.
While this note issuance has occurred intermittently over
the last decade, these notes were specifically designed to
absorb funds that otherwise would have been invested in the
Euro-dollar system or redeemed for marks or gold.
See
"Bundesbank Will Buy U.S. Notes as Treasury Bids to Ab
sorb More Dollars," Wall Street Journal (June 29, 1971),
p. 2; "Europe's Central Banks Agree to Withdraw Funds...,"
loc. cit.
•^"Euro-dollars:
pp. 767-768, 771.

A Changing Market,"

0 £.

cit.,
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arrangement is entered into, with the transaction being
reversed shortly after the statement date passes.15
Also, central banks have on occasion entered the
market as demanders when they have found it necessary to
add dollar balances to their reserves.

The first

operation (maintaining orderly markets)

is an accomo-

dative one while the latter is undertaken because the
bank itself needs dollar balances.

However, the avail

ability of credit via swap lines with other central banks,
IMF drawings, and the like, make it rare for central banks
to enter the market to obtain foreign currency reserves.

16

Governments of various countries have also at
times been demanders in the Euro-dollar market due to such
factors as advantageous costs

(the case of U.K. local au

thorities) , rigid limits on central bank deficit financing
(the case of Belgium), state import needs

(Eastern Euro

pean case),1^ or for monetary policy reason

(the Italian

case).1 ®

l^Coombs, o£. cit., pp. 51, 54, and earlier reports;
Williams, 0 £. c i t ., pp. 10, 31-32; Ibid., pp. 778-779. The
BIS also frequently enters the market for purposes of
stabilization.

pp.

^Clendenning,
.

0 £.

cit. , pp. 52-53; Williams,

0 £.

ci t .,

1 0 -1 1

l^Clendenning, o£. cit. , p. 52; Scott, Q£. cit., p. 5.
18

Oscar Altman, "Euro-Dollars: Some Further Comments,"
Inter-National Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. 12, No. 1
(March, 1965), pp. 2-3.
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Thus, the participants in the market are many and
varied.

The motives behind the demand of each of these

participants may also be different.

Nonetheless,

basically all are motivated, by considerations of cost or
availability.

In this respect, Euro-dollar demanders are

no different from demanders in any other market.
D.

Institutional Constraints
Certain institutional constraints have also affected

the Euro-dollar market on the demand side.

The various

investment controls instituted by the Treasury have
forced many U.S. corporations into the Euro-dollar market
m

their quest for financing.

1Q

Also, foreigners

accustomed to borrowing purchasing power in the United
States have, since the imposition of the interest
equalization tax and other capital export restrictions in
the U.S., resorted to the Euro-dollar market for shortdated funds.

This occurred whether their needs were for

dollars, third currencies, or even for their own currency.
Upon obtaining claims on these funds, they may be used as
is or converted through the foreign exchange market into
any currency required.

The Financing of Business with Euro-dollars (New
York: Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 1969), p. 4; Williams,
o p . c i t ., p. 12; Clendenning, o£. c i t ., pp. 10-11.
^ B u s i n e s s e s in countries whose money and capital
markets are notoriously thin have utilized the market on
numerous occasions.
Clendenning, 0£. c i t ., p. 54;
Williams, 0 £. c i t . , p. 25.
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Demand has been reduced by various Federal Reserve
restrictions on U.S. banks.

Regulations that require

the treatment of overnight balances due branches as
deposits

(and therefore subject

to reserve requirements)

and the imposition of marginal reserve requirements on
liabilities to branches beyond some base level have tended
to raise the cost of these funds and to decrease the
amounts demanded . 2 1

in addition, restrictions on the

treatment of certain cash items in process of collection
have been instituted.

Prior to September, 1969, banks

borrowing Euro-dollars were allowed to deduct from their
required reserves these borrowings since the draft on the
U.S. bank giving up the reserves

(lending the dollars) was

treated as a cash item in process of collection.

Thus,

for one day the Euro-dollar borrowing reduced the reserves
required of the borrowing bank.

A good deal of overnight

Euro-dollar borrowing that occurred prior to August 1969
was motivated entirely by the technical advantages in
volved.

Indeed, it appears that many banks entered into

swap agreements whereby each borrowed, via the Euro-dollar
market, funds from the other.

Both then were able to

2;
1-Gaines, "The Dollar?" o£. cit., p. 1.
See
Bloch, o p . cit., pp. 15-22 for an exposition of the over
night borrowing technique and its benefits, prior to
Federal Reserve restrictions.
This shift may be viewed
either as a movement up along the demand line as real costs
rise or as a shift to the left of the line, implying a
reduced demand at every price.

84

reduce their required reserves by the amount borrowed
(and since both paid interest on the borrowing to the
other, there was no cost to the transaction).

On the

following day, further operations of the same sort were
undertaken.

The constant reborrowing or rolling over of

these Euro-dollar "borrowings" provided the participants
with costless excess reserves.

This particular game was

halted when the Federal Reserve amended Regulation D.^2
Prior to the amendment of Regulation D, however, large
amounts of these swaps may have inflated demand figures
substantially.
Finally, the political realities involved in re
strictive monetary policy within the U.S. almost guaranteed
that the demand for Euro-dollar balances deriving from
U.S. banks would be of a temporary nature and, with the
new reserve requirements on Euro-dollar borrowings,
perhaps permanently reduced.

23

This may well cause an

^ T h i s technique employed to reduce required re
serves has not been documented publicly.
However, certain
discussions undertaken within the Federal Reserve and the
discussion of the changes instituted in Regulation D in
"Amendment To Regulation D," Federal Reserve Builetin,
Vol. 55, No. 7 (August, 1969), p. 656 and in "Revision of
Money Supply Series," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 55,
No. 10 (October, 1969), pp. 788-78d imply that this
activity did occur.
23That is, restriction of reserve availability appears
to be politically possible only over a short time period.
Thus, the demand for Euro-dollars by banks attempting to
moderate stringent monetary policy will tend to be of short
duration.
Evidence of this probability may be seen in the
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increase in Euro-dollar deposits outstanding, in the
long run, since U.S. bank borrowing has acted as a
leakage from the system.

As the leakage is reduced, a

larger money multiplier may operate.
To conclude, the demand for Euro-dollar balances
derives from many different sources.

One source that has

been of prime importance is the demand arising from U.S.
banks during times of tight money in the United States.
With the. reduction in reserves supplied by the central bank
and with the imposition of effective limits on interest
rate payments on time deposits,

24

U.S. banks have turned

to the Euro-dollar market in force.

Availability, de

fense, and alternative cost considerations have motivated
U.S. bank borrowing.

In general, the demand for Euro

dollars has arisen both from market imperfections and
distortions within countries and from alternative cost
and benefit considerations by borrowers.

sharp decline in outstanding U.S. bank liabilities to their
branches in 1970-71 even in the face of various incentives
initiated by the Federal Reserve, Treasury, and ExportImport Bank aimed at moderating this return flow.
See
note 4, this chapter.
24These limits are contained in Regulation Q and
reduce the ability of banks to sell certificates of
deposit and other time deposit instruments when other
money market rates rise above the ceiling.

86

III.

A.

Sources of Supply

General Supply Considerations
In the same way that demanders of goods or money

weigh the alternative costs of obtaining the good and,
ceterus paribus, choose that which satisfies their demand
at the lowest price, so also do suppliers of goods or
funds weigh the alternative prices or yields that different markets and investment vehicles provide, choosing
that which best meets their requirements.

Suppliers of

loanable funds generally wish to obtain the highest yield
consistent with the level of risk they are willing to
bear.

Other factors which influence their choice of

vehicle and market include the availability of the in
vestment vehicle, the accessability of the market, the
depth of the resale market for these particular debt
instruments, the transactions costs that must be incurred,
and expectations of future exchange rate values and
interest rate levels.
It is not necessary that the supplier's assets be
denominated in a particular currency.

With fixed exchange

rates and convertibility, an investor may choose almost
any market in which to place his purchasing power.

Ig

noring transactions costs, the present exchange rate system
allows an investor to transfer his assets to the market
with the highest expected yields, after risk differentials

87

are considered.

So-called "hot" money flows are the

result of investors moving into and out of various
investment vehicles in different currency markets in
response to interest differentials or expectations of
exchange rate changes.

The ownership of purchasing power,

not the form in which the purchasing power is denominated,
is the determining factor in the supply of funds to any
money market.
An asset owner whose calculations of net return after
transactions costs indicate that the Euro-dollar market
provides the most profitable investment alternative must
take into account the existence of certain risks, some of
which are unique to the Euro-dollar market and some of
which are more general in application.

First, the investor

with non-dollar denominated assets who converts his funds
into Euro-dollars may frequently wish to reconvert the
asset and the earned interest into his own currency.

The

possibility that exchange rates may be altered between the
time he makes the investment and the maturity of the in
vestment must be considered.

To reduce the risk, the

investor may purchase forward cover.

This involves the

forward sale of dollars for his own currency, timed to
coincide with the maturity of his investment.

Any

non

domestic currency investment involves this risk, unless
the investor intends to utilize the non-domestic currency
in some further way upon maturity.

Of course, should the

purchasing power owner expect exchange rates to change in
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a way that would make his dollar asset plus interest
return worth more in terms of foreign currencies, he
might wish to take an uncovered (unprotected) position,
waiting until maturity to enter the exchange markets to
reconvert his purchasing power.2^
A second risk that the investor faces, and one that
is unique to the Euro-dollar market, is that the Euro
dollar system does not contain an official lender of last
resort .2 6

This means that a bank which has issued dollar

liabilities may not be able to meet its repayment commit
ments, should it encounter difficulties.

This problem,

of course, is not as serious as it may seem since the
foreign exchange market and other Eurobanks are pre
sumably available to the bank should a shortage of dollar
funds occur.^7

25This and the following paragraphs rely heavily on
Williams, 0 £. cit., pp. 23-29 and Clendenning, o£. cit.,
pp. 43-51, 57-62.
^ w i l l i a m s , oja. cit. , pp. 28-29.
The BIS has tended
towards taking on this function in an indirect way.
In the
past, it has undertaken operations aimed at stabilizing the
market, especially at quarterly and year-end window
dressing dates.
Thus, to a certain extent, the BIS does
act as a lender of last resort but does so through the
market rather than directly to"the banks who make up the
market.
See Scott, o|>. ci t ., p. 4; Williams, 0 £. ci t ., p.10?
and Clendenning, o p . ci t ., pp. 61, 162-168.
2 ^Provided, of course, that the bank has domestic
funds that it can utilize and convert, and provided its
access to the foreign exchange market is unimpeded.
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Finally, with reference to general supply considera
tions > the source of funds to the Euro-dollar market must
take into account the fact that the reserves of the Euro
dollar system are dollar deposits in the United States.
Strictly speaking, the supply of Euro-dollars refers to
the supply of these Euro-dollar deposits to borrowers.

In

a broader sense, however, the supply of Euro-dollars re
fers to the supply of the reserves to the system.

Thus,

the supply of dollars to Eurobanks may be considered as
an integral part of the analysis of Euro-dollar supply.
While Eurobanks create all the Euro-dollars subsequently
supplied by the deposit owners to Euro-dollar borrowers,
the source of the dollars that allow the Eurobanks to
create Euro-dollars must be identified and investigated.
In the same way that a discussion of the supply-of dollar
funds to the U.S. money markets must include Federal
Reserve actions, so also must the discussion of Euro
dollar supply include the actions of the Euro-dollar
system reserve suppliers for it is upon these reserves that
the Eurobanks base and create the Euro-dollar currency.
Euro-dollar supply therefore involves both the lending of
dollar denominated deposits in Eurobanks by asset owners
(including the Eurobanks as deposit owners and creators)
and the original lending or deposit of dollars by asset
holders.
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B.

Market Participants and Their Motives

A Euro-dollar supplier must hold a claim on a
Eurobank in order to enter the Euro-dollar market as a
supplier.

But, any owner of dollar denominated deposits

in Eurobanks or any owner of dollars themselves who
supplies them to the Eurobanks

(by depositing them in a

dollar denominated account) may be considered a Euro
dollar supplier.
The sources of Euro-dollar deposits and of the
dollars that form the basis of these deposits are extremely
varied.

Eurobanks are large scale suppliers of Euro

dollar deposits to borrowers.

They utilize the dollars

they obtain from depositors to support a multiple ex
pansion of Euro-dollar deposits.

Exporters and importers,

U.S. and foreign corporations, U.S. and foreign commercial
banks with and without branches, foreign central banks
and international financial institutions, and wealthy in
dividuals and speculators supply both reserves and Euro
dollar deposits to the market . 2 8
Each of the participants in the market supplies funds
for his own particular reasons.

As noted above, U.S.

corporations, because of U.S. balance of payments re
straints that limit the amount of capital they can send
abroad, have offered long-term securities in Europe

28Clendenning, o£. ci t ., pp. 43-51.
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denominated in dollars.

The proceeds of these issues

are frequently placed temporarily in dollar denominated
deposit accounts in European banks until they are needed
for corporate p u r p o s e s . 29

Also, many corporations, both

domestic and foreign, maintain dollar balances in these
banks for various purposes.

Indeed, the custom of keeping

such balances in these banks existed long before any
active market for them existed.30
In addition, U.S. corporations and individual in
vestors enter the market in order to take advantage of the
(relatively) higher rates of return offered and the high
degree of liquidity available.

An additional impetus to

their conversion of. assets into Euro-dollars is the payment
of interest on what are basically demand deposits, a
return that is illegal in the United States.

Further,

holders of certificates of deposit (CD's) have moved their
assets into Euro-dollar deposits when Regulation Q
ceilings limited the return that U.S. banks could pay on
CD's.
Speculators enter the market as suppliers when there
are unsettled conditions in the foreign exchange markets
and when expectations of local currency devaluation are

2 9 "Euro-Dollars:

A Changing Market," o£. c i t .,

pp. 774-775.
30see Note 10, Chap. 2 and 39th Annual Report, o p .
cit., p. 148.
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strong.

The Euro-dollar market is a haven for "hot"

money in these periods, except when the dollar itself is
the currency under suspicion.
activities can affect supply

In addition, arbitrage
(and demand)

in the market.

31

Of great importance in the market are the funds
placed by official institutions, both at the national and
supranational levels.

Central banks of many foreign

countries have utilized the market for several r e a s o n s . ^

^ciendenning, o£. cit. , pp. 108-109.
32

The Federal Reserve has not entered the market
directly but has, of course, influenced, its growth tremen
dously, through the use of various controls placed on U.S.
commercial banks.
An interesting experiment was under
taken, however, in early 1971 by the Federal Reserve in an
attempt to influence the flow of funds from the Euro
dollar market into German marks.
By selling marks for
ward, the Federal Reserve was able to increase the cost of
(or reduce the incentive for) swapping Euro-dollars for
marks.
(By driving the forward mark price down, the
higher yields associated with German securities was
offset.)
This action was taken in order to slow the buildup
of dollars occurring in official German reserves, reduce
the possibility of conversion of these dollars into gold or
SDR's by the Germans, and thwart the negation of the German's
anti-inflation policy which this flow entailed.
The results
of this action appeared to be insignificant, at best, for
German reserves have continued to increase.
Thus, in ad
dition to interest arbitrage, par value speculation has been
occurring and affecting the Euro-dollar market.
See "New
York Reserve Experiment," Wall Street Journal (March 1, 1971),
p . 5 and Coombs, o£. c i t ., pp. 51-52.
The F e d e r a l R e s e r v e has also affected the market in
directly by entering into swap agreements with foreign
central banks, the object of these swaps being the soaking up
of temporarily (hopefully) excess dollars in the foreign
exchange markets.
Williams, 0 £. c i t ., p. lOn.
Recently, it has been reported that a group of Euro
pean central banks are planning to manipulate the Euro
dollar market in order to reduce the supply of funds and
drive up the interest rate in the market.
This will be
accomplished by the central banks' Withholding the
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They have found it necessary, at times, to place funds
in the Euro-dollar market in order to stabilize it, to
stabilize the foreign exchange markets, and to maintain
or implement their policy

g o a l s .

33

These are basically

defensive-type actions in that they maintain the status
quo and, although they may be only marginal in amount, they
occur after all other market forces have been felt and
may thus be quite effective in influencing rates and the
flow of funds.

., . .

In addition to their stabilization activities,
central banks have also entered the market as investors.
Euro-doliars normally gained in their exchange rate
stabilization operations from the market rather than re
cycling them immediately as they have done in the past.
This had the aim of reducing supply, driving up interest
rates, and reducing pressure on their domestic interest
rate structures which they have been attempting to main
tain at high levels for counter-inflation effects.
The
flow of Euro-dollars returned to Europe by U.S. banks which
can now obtain funds inexpensively in the U.S. has driven
Euro-dollar rates down.
This has caused European investors
to sell Euro-dollars, replacing them with mark, franc and
other higher earning assets.
The central banks then must
buy the Euro-dollars and in so doing create more domestic
liquidity than they desire.
See Chapter 6 and "European
Bankers Planning to Manipulate Dollar Supplies: Washington
Seen Uneasy," Wall Street Journal (April 7, 1971), p. 4.
The similarity between these central bank actions and '
Federal Reserve open market operations, at least in effect,
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6 .
33These goals may either be general policy aims, such
as restricting credit or short-term capital flows, or they
may be aimed at assisting the banks in order that they may
finance trade, purchase foreign assets or exchange, or
reduce their foreign liabilities.
Clendenning, op. cit.,
p. 44.
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They have placed their excess dollar reserves in the
market with the purpose of earning an interest return.
Whether for stabilization or investment purposes, the
central banks have several ways by which they can effect
the placement of Euro-dollars.

Direct deposits of dollars

in banks outside the U.S., including domestic banks, swap
or loan arrangements with their domestic b a n k s , 3 5 or
operations in the foreign exchange markets are all methods
by which central banks place funds . 3 6

Indirect methods,

such as the placement of dollar deposits with the Bank for
International Settlements or the European Investment Bank
have also been employed.3^
It should be noted that the direct deposit and the
foreign exchange operation may not affect the Euro-dollar

3 4 As Williams, 0 £. cit., p . n and others have noted.
The latest BIS Annual Report states, as reported in
"Eurodollar Banking: . .. ? " o y . ci t . , p. 13, that European
central banks have made official placements in the market
for many years.
One reason for these placements has been
the responsibility placed on the banks"... for 'conserving'
the value of their countries' official external monetary
assets; and 'in times of mounting inflation, the preserva
tion of this value means securing a reasonable return on
them.' Briefly, the central banks seek the highest re
turn on their dollar assets." (p. 13)

35These arrangements usually stipulate that the
dollars gained must be used in certain r e s t r i c t e d . ways.
3 6 Williams, ojd. cit., p. 10; Scott, 0£. c i t ., p. 4;
Clendenning, 0£. c i t ., pp. 44-45.
3 ^Scott,

loc. cit.
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market directly.3®

While the commercial bank with which

the central bank places dollars may place these funds in
the market, the decision to do so is based on the various
yields, risks, liquidity, and costs that pertain to other
possible uses,, such as conversion into domestic currency
(which may frustrate the policy of reducing dollar re
serves) , conversion into a third currency

(which may

merely shift the reserve adjustment burden to another
country), or investment of the funds in the U.S. money
market itself

(in which case, the dollars are returned to

the U.S. but do not affect the Euro-dollar market or the
rates there).

Operations in the foreign exchange market

may also have counter-productive results, at least under
certain circumstances.
Finally, as is evident from the above discussion of
other participants in the market, foreign commercial banks
and foreign branches of U.S. banks play a central and in
fluential role in the market.

These banks undoubtedly make

up the largest part of the market both on the demand and on
the supply sides.3®

This is the case since they act both

3®Clendenning, oj>. cit., p. 45.
39Williams, 0 £. cit. , p. 10.
Swap arrangements be
tween U.S. banks added to both the supply and the demand
for Euro-dollar funds.
In this case, however, demand
created its own supply, or the reverse, and had no effect
on true demand and supply pressures operating in the
market.
Account of such operations should, nonetheless,
be taken.
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as creators of funds, intermediaries,40 and users of
funds.

They are the primary agents through which the

other suppliers operate and, in addition, they act for
their own account by undertaking the lending of

(created)

Euro-dollar deposits.
The source of Euro-dollar system reserves has changed
over the decade of the I960*s.

In the early years of the

decade, official institutions and corporations in Europe
(the "inside" area, according to Bank for International
Settlements classification) were the largest suppliers of
reserves to the Eurobanks but in the later years of the
decade, the "outside" area (non-European, including the
U.S. and Canada) became increasingly important as a
supplier of funds.^1

Thus, the Eurobanks' source of re

serves has shifted, at least partly, from depositors
located within Europe, to those located outside Europe.
These non-European sources are generally not financial

4^The intermediation process, also incorrectly
called pyramiding, can have several steps.
Thus, an
original deposit may move through several banks before
it is lent to a final borrower.
The limit to the
number
of intermediate steps that can occur is the level
towhich
the rate can be raised before the market demand disappears.
Since this activity of borrowing
and relending is
soim
portant in the market, and since
the final result
is
basically the same (i.e., a certain amount lent to a final
u s e r ) , data calculations on the size of the market are net
of these transactions.
See Chapters 2 and 5 and Machlup,
o p . c i t ., p. 230; and "The Euro-Currency Market," 39th
Annual Report, o p . c i t ., pp. 146-151.
^ 3 9 th Annual Report and 40th Annual Report, o p . ci t .,
pp. 147-150 and pp. 155-159, respectively.
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institutions but are rather non-banks, both individuals
and

c o r p o r a t i o n s .

^2

^o matter what the source of these

funds may be, the increased reserves held by the system
have augmented the supply of Euro-dollar deposits by
making possible the increased lending of created deposits.
C.

Institutional Constraints
Institutional or structural factors have affected

the supply as well as the demand for

f u n d s .

43

while

basic price, risk, liquidity, and transactions costs
determine supply, interferences in the market have acted
both to augment and to restrict the supply of reserves.
Increased supply has been encouraged through
Federal Reserve imposed Regulation Q ceilings.

When

effective, this restriction on the rate of return payable
on time deposits in the U.S. has made the Euro-dollar
market more attractive to investors and has generated an
increased supply of Euro-dollars.

In addition, the U.S.

restriction of payment of interest on deposits of a

4 2 ciendenning,

o£. cit., p. 51.

43The general outline of most of these constraints,
but not the analysis, may be found in Williams, op. cit.,.
pp. 11-13.
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maturity of less than 30 days would make any market that
did provide a return on this type of deposit attractive.
The practice of foreign central banks of placing
their dollar reserve balances in the Eurobanks has tended
to augment the supply of Euro-dollars both directly and
indirectly through the supplying of reserves necessary to
the credit creation process.

This practice arose from

these b a n k s 1 concern for the stability of the interna
tional monetary system and the deleterious effects the
alternative action of withdrawing gold or other reserves
from the United States would (presumably) have had.

It

also arose from the desire to obtain higher yields on dollar
reserves held.44

jn addition, central banks have shifted

their reserve holdings to Euro-dollar deposits for reasons
of nationalism, proximity to the deposit, control over the
depository banks, and the facilitating of monetary policy.
The central banks began to withdraw from the market in 1971
as they came to realize the harm their deposits had caused.
Their withdrawal, however, was too slow and too late to
halt the impending collapse of the international payments
system.

The collapse was at least partly due to the

As will be noted in Chapter 6, this practice in fact
led, through a greatly increased supply of Euro-dollars,
to the collapse of the international exchange rate system
and, prior to that, generated destabilizing influences on
their own monetary systems.
The policy was, to say the
least, ill advised.
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growth of the Euro-dollar system which was, in turn, due
partly to central bank use of the system.
The relatively high degree of competition among the
Eurobanks for Euro-dollar deposits

(and reserves) may

also have increased the supply of Euro-dollars.^

The

cartel arrangements that exist within most of the domestic
European banking systems tend to hold interest yields down.
The competitive nature of the Euro-dollar system, however,
has brought about high deposit interest rates.

The com

paratively higher return on Euro-dollar deposits may have
generated an increased demand for the deposits by asset
holders and, thus, an increased supply of reserves and
loanable funds.

Redeposits in the system, motivated by

the higher interest rates, allowed further increases in
the supply through multiple credit creation.
Increased supply also occurs temporarily due to
window dressing activities by foreign banks at quarterly
and year-end bank statement dates.

As statement dates ap

proach, Euro-dollar supply increases and, after the date
has passed, demand for Euro-dollars increases.

Central banks

enter the market to offset these influences.46

45"Euro-dollars:
46

A Changing Market,"

0 £.

c it., p. 774.

Coombs, o p . ci t . , pp. 51, 54, and earlier reports;
Williams, o£. c i t ., pp. 10, 31-32; "Euro-dollars: A Changing
Market," 0 £. cit. , pp. 767-768, 771.
The BIS also frequently
enters the market for purposes of stabilization.
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Restrictions on supply derive primarily from
official activity or interference.

For instance, Regu

lation Q limits do not apply to foreign official deposits
in U.S. banks.

Had these limits applied, a greater flow

of funds than actually occurred might have moved into the
Euro-dollar market from official sources.

The magnitude

of this negative effect on supply is difficult to gauge.
Also, the restrictions placed on U.S. businesses and banks
by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve for balance of
payments purposes have tended to reduce the (visible, but
not necessarily actual)

supply of dollars flowing into the

market from the United States.

However, while this set of

restrictions may have reduced the supply of reserves to the
Euro-dollar system and thus the supply of Euro-dollars, its
impact was probably felt primarily on the demand side of
the market.

The demand for Euro-dollars has certainly been

increased by the imposition of these restrictions.

To

the extent that the flow of funds from the U.S. to the
Euro-dollar market might have.risen as interest rates rose
in that market, it can be said that these balance of payments
restrictions negatively influenced supply as well.

In the

same way that Regulation Q restrictions were plausible in
their effects on the supply so also might these balance of
payments restrictions be important.

Nonetheless, the

practical significance of the controls appears to be quite
limited.
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Finally, there have been some rather significant
institutional restraints on the growth of (or, perhaps,
maintenance of) the size of the Euro-dollar market.4^
These restraints are the controls placed on lending and
borrowing activities of Eurobanks by their home central
banks.

As the demand for Euro-dollars began to grow in

1968 and due to various circumstances in several of the
countries, restrictions on dealings in Euro-dollars were
placed on the banks.

France, Italy, Belgium, the Nether

lands , and Canada all instituted restraints on the flow of
funds into and out of the market in 1969.48

In most

cases, balance of payments considerations were the
principle cause of these limits but the effects of the fund
flows on the efficacy of monetary policy were also important.

4Q

Germany especially found that the Euro-dollar

market made it more difficult to implement an effective

4 7a fairly complete discussion of these restraints may
be found in "Euro-dollars:
A Changing Market," op. cit.,
pp. 779-784.

4 ^Indeed, quite recently several foreign central banks
have begun to explore the possibility of reducing the supply
of Euro-dollars by failing to recycle such funds gained in
the exchange stabilization activities they normally under
take.
"European Bankers Planning to Manipulate...," loc.c i t .
See Chapters 6 and 7 for a more detailed discussion.
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monetary policy in 1970 and 1971.50

The effect of these

restraints is difficult to evaluate, but it would appear
that at least the supply of funds originating in the
countries in question was reduced.

However, the increase

in the flow of funds from the "outside" area may have
negated the effectiveness of these restraints.

Further,

the intermediary functions performed by these banks were
probably little affected.

Certainly, the British banks

have long experienced controls but their intermediary
activities have been affected not at a l l . ^
To conclude, supply has been increased by the develop
ment of the market, through various institutional influences,
through the increased availability and usage of the dollar
in the international monetary system, and most important,
through the redeposit of Euro-dollar loans within the
system, allowing credit creation to occur.

Redeposit of

dollar funds gained in foreign exchange market stabiliza
tion activities by central banks has also generated an
increased supply of reserves to the Euro-dollar system.
Basically, then, supply refers to the flow of reserves
(dollar deposits in U.S. banks)

into the system and the re

deposit of Euro-dollar deposits originally borrowed and used

50
51

Coombs,

0 £.

c i t ., pp. 45-47, 50-52.

C l e n d e n n m g , o p . ci t ., pp. 22-24.
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as payment of debts into the system.
influx of primary deposits

A decline in the

(reserves) may be offset by

the reduced leakages out of the system and consequent
increased money multiplier.

CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL DETERMINATION OF THE DEMAND
FOR EURO-DOLLARS BY U. S. BANKS
I.

Introduction

The preceding chapter discussed the general deter
minants of the supply and demand for Euro-dollars.

The

analysis was nonquantitative and focused on those factors
that might logically be expected to affect demand and supply.
In this chapter, a quantitative test of some of the influ
ences postulated in Chapter 3 will be outlined.

The results

of a regression analysis of the determinants of Euro-dollar
demand by U.S. banks will be reported and the implications
for U.S. monetary policy of these results will be discussed.
II.
A.

Hypotheses

General Demand Considerations
The actions of the Federal Reserve appear to contribute

significantly to determining the amounts of Euro-dollar
borrowing undertaken by U.S. banks.

Therefore, the analysis

of the determinants of U.S. bank borrowing of Euro-dollars
in the 1960's must logically begin with the influence of
tight money on U.S. banks.

The availability of reserves and

other factors imposed by the Federal Reserve compose one set
of influences that must be included in a quantitative study.
Secondly, an allowance for cost factors must be made, since
104
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the purchase or borrowing of anything is theoretically
influenced by the price required to gain the use of the good.
Thirdly,

the demand for Euro-dollar funds is a derived

demand, derived from the demand by borrowers from U.S. banks
for loanable funds.

Therefore/ some measures of the

original demand may be useful in explaining Euro-dollar
borrowing by U.S. banks.

Fourth, seasonal factors should

normally be taken into account, and fifth, changes in the
environment in which the banks operate (including, for
instance, the imposition of marginal reserve requirements
on liabilities to foreign banks and branches) must be
specified.
Taken together, the determinants of U.S. bank Euro
dollar borrowing are a complex of interrelated factors.

In

order to determine which factors may influence this borrow
ing most significantly, regression analysis may be employed.
By analyzing quantitatively the relationships postulated to
exist between U.S. bank borrowing and various independent
variables, it becomes possible to isolate the specific
determinants that most influence Euro-dollar borrowing
by U.S. banks.
Prior to an analysis of this type, it is useful to
postulate or hypothesize the relationships that are expected.
Given the analysis presented in Chapters 2 and 3, the fol
lowing hypothesis is made.

The amount of Euro-dollar borrow

ing undertaken by U.S. banks in the mid-to-late 1960's
was primarily determined by U.S. monetary policy and the
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resultant contraction in the availability of reserves to
U.S. banks.

That is to say, a combination of factors, all

influenced or imposed by the Federal Reserve, caused U.S.
banks to turn to the Euro-dollar market for loanable funds.
Reserve stringencies and high U.S. interest rates were
direct results of the implementation of restrictive monetary
policy by the Federal Reserve.

The decline in time deposits

outstanding at U.S. banks was due to Regulation Q interest
payment limitations that became effective
as U.S. market rates rose.

(and restrictive)

Finally, the method by which

cash items in process of collection and liabilities to
foreign branches were treated was stipulated by the Federal
Reserve in its Regulations D and M.

Taken together, these

factors motivated U.S. banks to borrow in the Euro-dollar
market.

The market provided the least cost alternative

source of funds in the tight money periods of the 19 60's.^
The nominal price of Euro-dollars may not have a
significant effect on the amount of U.S. bank borrowing
because the advantages of this borrowing, even at rel
atively high interest rates, outweighed the nominal costs.
Further, the differential between Euro-dollar interest rates
and domestic (U.S.) interest rate levels remained relatively
constant throughout these periods.

It was non-price factors

Some part of the cost of maintaining foreign branches
should be included in the determination of the total cost of
borrowing Euro-dollars.
However, no data is available on
these expenses.
It must be assumed that these costs were
not large enough to deter Euro-dollar borrowing or, indeed,
that they may actually have motivated increased borrowing
in order to reduce the per-dollar cost of such borrowing.
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from which U.S. banks derived the cost benefits.

In ad

dition, the increased price of Euro-dollars in these
periods may well have been the result of, rather than the
cause of, increased U.S. bank Euro-dollar borrowing.
It is expected that, beyond some measure(s) of avail
ability or reserve losses, the demand for loans from which
the demand for Euro-dollars is derived will have some influ
ence on Euro-dollar borrowing.

Commercial and industrial

loans by large banks may serve as an indication of the
demand for loans and, as these loans increase during tight
money periods, so also may Euro-dollar borrowing increase
in order to fund such loans.

Seasonal factors and changes

in the structure under which U.S. banks operate may also
have some influence on U.S. bank borrowing of Euro-dollars.
It is expected, therefore, that U.S. bank Euro-dollar
liabilities will be a function of CD's outstanding at
U.S. banks

(negatively), some interest rate differentials

between Regulation Q ceilings and various U.S. money market
investment vehicles such as Treasury Bills or commercial
paper, commercial and industrial loans (positively), and
seasonal and structural factors of some type.
B.

Specific Possible Demand Determinants
This section outlines in some detail the possible

determinants that may have affected or influenced Euro
dollar borrowing by U.S. banks in the 1960's.

Each variable

specified and the logical basis for its inclusion in the
regression analysis is stated.
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The hypothesized determinants are:
1.

The interest rate on three month Euro-dollar deposits.

The interest rate is the nominal price of Euro-dollars and
may be expected to influence the quantity of Euro-dollars
demanded by U.S. banks.

It is the rate paid by the U.S.

banks' branches for these funds.
price

Theoretically/ as the

(interest rate) rises, the amount of borrowings

should fall.2

Although the rate is not expected to be a

^The three month rate is utilized because the three
month deposit has been one of the more popular maturity
lengths, the rate is available, and is closest to the average
maturity of Euro-dollar deposits at U.S. bank foreign branches.
(See Release G. 17 issued monthly by the Federal Reserve.
The
April l, 1971 release is reproduced below.)
In addition, this
rate is easily compared to many other U.S. money market rates.
MATURITY OF EURO-DOLLAR DEPOSITS IN FOREIGN
BRANCHES OF U.S. BANKS
(end of month)
Amounts in
Cumulative
Maturity of Liability billions of dollars percentage
1970
1971 1970
1971
Nov.
Dec.
Jan.
Nov.
Dec.
Jan.
1. 37 1.51
Overnight
1.30
4.8
5.4
4.9
Call
1.78
12.4
11.2
1 1 .8
2.07
1.77
Other liabilities,
maturing in following
months after report date:
10.69
8 .85
43.5
First calendar month 9.07
45.9 . 49.3
4.46
5.00
61.5
Second
5.32
65.1
65.5
Third
3.75
3.91
75.6
3.23
77.4
78.5
Fourth
1.58
1.57 1.51
81.0
83.2
84.0
Fifth
1.39
1.33 2.03
88.4
88.3
88.8
Sixth
1.46
1.29
1.48
93.1
94.0
93.6
Seventh
.26
94.4
.34
.23
94.4
94.9
Eighth
.19
.25
.20
95.3
95.6
95.1
Ninth .
.18
.16
96.2
95.8
.18
95.9
Tenth
.14
.14
.23
96.6
96.5
96.7
Eleventh
.20
.24
97.4
.15
97.0
97.5
Twelfth
.21
.20
.14
98.1
98.0
97.8
Maturities of more
than 1 year
.60
.53
.54 1 0 0 . 0
100.0 100.0
Total

27.11

28.10 27.83
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significant explanatory variable, a test of the influence
of price on quantity demanded should normally be attempted.
2.

The Federal Funds rate and the Discount Rate.

These

two variables are indicative both of availability and of
alternative costs.

As these rates rise as a result of

restrictive monetary policy, Euro-dollars become a relatively
less expensive source of liquidity, ceterus paribus.
Thus, a direct relationship may exist between either rate
and Euro-dollar liabilities.

In actuality, of course, the

increased demand for Euro-dollar funds will drive up Euro
dollar rates too, but perhaps not by the same amount, given
the depth of the possible Euro-dollar supply.

That is,

the elasticity of the supply of Euro-dollars is relatively
high.3

Indeed, the availability of the various types of

funds may well be the determining factor,^ rather than the
Average Maturity at end of January: 2.3 months.
—
Note:
Details may not add to totals due to rounding.
Source:
Release G.17 (Washington:
Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, April, 1971).
Abridged version also
published monthly in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, Table No.
22,"International Capital Transactions of the U.S."section.
3 Klopstock,

"Euro-dollars in the...," o£. cit., p. 79.

^The literature on the availability doctrine is sub
stantial.
For a good summary see Mayer, o p . ci t ., pp.
127-137 and Joseph Aschheim, Techniques of Monetary Control
(Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), pp. 12-16.
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rate charged, since all rates have tended to move
together.^
3.

Two interest rate spread variables.

These are, first,

the interest rate spreads between three month Treasury
bills and the Regulation Q ceiling rate on CD's and, second,
the yield spread between 4 to
the Q ceiling rate on CD's.

6

month commercial paper and

Both the Treasury Bill rate

and the commercial paper rate indicate the state of monetary
policy.

That is, a restrictive monetary policy means

that the spread between these rates and the Q ceiling rate
becomes positive and larger.

In response, banks would,

it is assumed, increase their borrowings of Euro-dollars.
Further, as yields rise on Bills and paper, these debt
instruments become more attractive as investment vehicles,
both to former CD holders and to the banks themselves.
4.

Large certificates of deposit (CD's) outstanding at

large banks.

The amount of CD's issued by U.S. banks may be

expected to have a strong influence on Euro-dollar
liabilities .6

CD's outstanding is a measure of the avail

ability of funds and, more important, is an indication of

5Rates tend to move together unless interferences of
some type impede the adjustment of a particular rate, i.e.,
Regulation Q and CD rates.
6 Indeed, one would expect this variable to be of
overriding significance, for it is Regulation Q and its
effects on CD's outstanding that is generally conceded to
have given impetus to the growth and development of the
Euro-dollar market.
This expectation is not disappointed
in the results.

Ill

the loss of competitiveness of U.S. banks in the short-term
money markets in times of tight money and Regulation Q
restrictions.?

U.S. banks appear to have resorted to the

Euro-dollar source as CD runoffs reduced time deposits,
increased average required reserves, and reduced the banks'
ability to lend funds.

A negative relationship between

CD's outstanding and Euro-dollar liabilities of U.S. banks
is expected.
5.

Commercial and industrial loans by large b a n k s .

This is

a measure of the underlying demand for Euro-dollars.

Should

these loans increase at large banks with access to Euro
dollar funds during restrictive monetary policy periods,
rising as Euro-dollar liabilities rise, a direct relation
ship will exist and the assumption that Euro-dollars are
financing at least part of these loans may be made.

Further,

as noted in Chapter 2, Euro-dollar borrowing allows an in
crease in loans outstanding, ceterus paribus.
However, since commercial and industrial loans will
rise in periods of easy money as well, and since Euro-dollar

7
The values utilized are for large ($100,000 or more)
negotiable time CD's outstanding at large commercial banks.
The data was readily available (in contrast to other CD data)
and applied to large banks, the institutions that have access
to the Euro-dollar market and, further, who feel the impact
of Regulation Q first and most severely.
Brimmer, EuroDollar Flows..., o p . c it. , p. 5.
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liabilities will decline , 8 given their "high" cost,
the relationship between the changes in loans and in Euro
dollar liabilities may be more informative.

As the amount

of change in these loans declines, indicating restrictive
monetary policy, the amount of increase in Euro-dollar

ft .

.

°Witness the 1970-71 experience, as recounted in
"Banking and Monetary Developments in the Fourth Quarter
of 1970," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Monthly Review,
Vol. 53, No. 2 (February, 1971), pp. 30-34; “The Money and
Bond Markets in November," Federal Reserve Bank of New
York Monthly Review, Vol. 52, No. 12 (December, 1970),
pp. 277-278; and "Eurodollar Banking Today," First Na
tional City Bank Monthly Economic Letter (July, 19 70),
pp. 78-80.
It is interesting to note the predictions made by
Henry Wallich in "What Ever Became of the Balance of
Payments," Morgan Guaranty Survey (March, 1970), pp. 13-14.
Wallich notes that should the demand for Euro-dollars
subside appreciably because of cheaper funds in the U.S.,
United States banks might substantially reduce their Euro
dollar liabilities.
This decline "would be self-limiting,
for as such repayments were made, Eurodollar rates . . .
would decline (which) would tend to keep such rates in line
with interest rates in the United States, thereby minimizing
American bank motivation to make further (Euro-dollar) re
payments." (p. 13)
Further, such repayments as do occur
may not end up in official reserves since other foreign
rates would also decline, reducing any incentive to move
out of Euro-dollars.
(pp. 13-14)
Experience in the last
year and a half has shown the danger in forecasting movements
based on assumptions of non-interference by official
institutions.
Wallich is correct in his analysis, as far as
it goes.
However, since it appears that official inter
vention can not be ruled out and since U.S. banks view Euro
dollars not as alternative fund sources but as marginal fund
sources, it is questionable to conclude that these banks
will continue to draw on the Euro-dollar system in the face
of equally cheap and readily available funds at home.
The
market interferences in Europe by central banks attempting
to maintain high domestic rates for inflation fighting pur
poses and in the U.S. by the Federal Reserve in the form of
marginal reserve requirements on Euro-dollar borrowings, com
bine to make Euro-dollar borrowing a great deal more costly
than comparable U.S. borrowing.
Thus, the run down of
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borrowings is expected to increase, and vice versa.

An

indirect relationship is therefore expected in these first
differences.^
Any relationships that occur between the stock
variables will indicate either trend (rather than determina
tion) , the inviolability of these loans, the effect of
Euro-dollar borrowing on loans, or a combination of all
these factors.

The sanctity of commercial and industrial

lending means that this is the last type of lending activity
to be reduced in periods of restricted reserve growth.1®
The lines of credit previously negotiated, the profitability
of business loans, and the need to maintain market position
all dictate that these loans be made if at all possible.
Thus, in spite of the supposed "lock-in” effect that the
banks experience 1 1 with respect to government and other
securities during tight money periods, loans, not securities,
Euro-dollar borrowings by U.S. banks has occurred in spite
of Wallich's theoretically sound analysis.
^These loans, of course, depend on Euro-dollar
borrowing during "tight" money periods since they are
financed from this source.
The reverse relationship postu
lated in the text is intended to measure the impact of tight
money on Euro-dollar borrowing.
1 0 Brimmer,

Euro-Dollar Flows..., op. ci t ., pp. 5-6,8.

1 1 Basically, it is thought that in periods of "tight"
money, when interest rates are high, banks will find them
selves "stuck" with bonds bought in boom periods at high
prices.
In the subsequent period, bond prices decline and
the capital loss that would result should the bond be sold
is thought to deter the banks from liquidating their
securities holdings.
Thus they are considered "locked-in"
to holding the securities.
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appear to be the last asset to be reduced, at least at
these large b a n k s . ^
6

.

Free Reserves at member banks.-*-3

This is an additional

availability variable that may be related to movements in
Euro-dollar liabilities of U.S. banks.

While free reserves

may be an imprecise or incorrect measure of monetary ease
or tightness, the Federal Reserve has apparently used the
measure as a target.14

Therefore, when free reserves

Thomas Mayer, Monetary Policy in the United States
(New York:
Random House, 19 6 8 ), pp. 130-134 discusses
the "locking-in" effect but doubts its significance.
His
footnotes 21 and 22, pp. 133-134 refer to the literature
on the effect and the empirical evidence cited to support
or condemn it.
The term derives from Robert Roosa and
J. H. Williams' development of the availability thesis
approach to monetary policy.
Mayer, o j d . c i t ., pp. 127-128.
l^Brimmer, Euro-Dollar Flows..., o p . ci t ., pp. 5-15.
l^Free reserves at all member banks are used because
it is assumed that the Federal Funds market in particular
and the U.S. money market in general are perfect enough to
allow the transmission of ease or tightness with little
friction throughout the system.
Alternatively, it may be
assumed that, while the effects of monetary policy hit latge
money market banks first, their relationships with banks
throughout the country are such that they can utilize the
excess reserves that exist there to offset some of the im
pact of this policy.
Funds will flow to those willing to
pay the highest rates for them.
1 4 See, for instance, William Dewald, "Free Reserves,
Total Reserves, and Monetary Control," Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 71, No. 2 (April, 1963), pp. 141-153; Jack
Guttentag, "The Strategy of Open-Market Operations,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 80 (February, 1966),
pp. 1-30; and Mayer, 0 £. cit., pp. 100-104 and his foot
notes 27, 29-34 on these pages.
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decline or become negative, monetary policy is restrictive,
at least as far as the Federal Reserve is concerned.

Since

it appears that Euro-dollar liabilities increase in re
sponse to stringencies of various types imposed by the
Federal Reserve, it may be postulated that an inverse re
lationship exists between the level of free reserves and
Euro-dollar liabilities.
7.

The adjusted money supply.

This variable is another

t h a t .indicates reserve availability and it may influence
the movements of Euro-dollar. liabilities.

An increase in

the money supply generally indicates that monetary policy
is not stringent, the amount or rate of increase

(above

some minimum level) being an indicator of the amount of
ease.
Since banks have borrowed Euro-dollars primarily to
offset tight money, an increase in the money supply would
imply a decrease in (the need to incur) Euro-dollar
liabilities.
supply

It is probable that the change in the money

(i.e., the first differences) may be the most

valuable form for this variable.

Since banks borrow Euro

dollars in order to continue making loans, any relation
ship obtained between the money supply and Euro-dollar
liabilities will require cautious explanation.
since a decline in CD's

Further,

(a non-money supply item)

increases

demand deposit levels and since Federal Reserve policy in
1966 and 1969 was specifically aimed at a reduction in
outstanding CD's, a rise in the money supply may be
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associated with a rise in Euro-dollar borrowings, both
variables reflecting "tight" money.
8.

U.S. Government securities held by large b anks.

This

variable should also indicate the direction of monetary
policy and is expected to move inversely to Euro-dollar
borrowings.

Security holdings are traditionally reduced by

banks during tight money periods and since, as noted above,
large banks are least influenced by any "lock-in"

e f f e c t , - ^

they may be expected not only to increase Euro-dollar
liabilities but also to decrease their holdings of govern
ment securities during tight money

p e r i o d s .

l^See note 11, this chapter.
This assumes that large
banks are more concerned than smaller banks with employing
their assets as profitably as possible.
See D. R. Cawthorne,
"Reserve Adjustments of City Banks," Essays on Commercial
Banking (Kansas City:
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,
1962) , p. 31; Stuart Greenbaum, "Competition and Efficiency
in the Banking System," Journal of Political Economy, Vol.
75, No. 4, Pt. II (August, 1967), pp. 461-479; and Jack
Guttentag and Edward Herman, Banking Structure and Per
formance (New York:
Institute of Fxnance of the Schools
of Business, New York University, 1967), pp. 15-19, 21-29.
^ v a l u a t i o n problems are present in this variable.
Should the securities held by the banks be valued at market
prices, the value of these holdings would decline in tight
money periods.
Should the more likely method of valuing
at par be followed, the value of such holdings would still
decline (without any sale of securities) if the funds deri
ving from maturing issues are not reinvested.
Whichever,
government securities were sold off by the large banks as
they adjusted to tight money in 1969.
See Brimmer, The EuroDollar Market..., o p . cit., pp. 8-9ff; "The Economy xn
1969," Survey of Current Business, Vol. 50, No. 1
(January, 1970), p. 20.
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9.

Two sets of seasonal dummy variables.

These variables

are entered to take account of possible seasonal influences.
One dummy was postulated for the summer months
and August).

(June, July,

An alternative set of dummies was included in

order to test the influence of each month separately.
The summer dummy was included for two reasons.

The summer

months typically cause a decline in business activity
generally and financial activity specifically .-*-8

Second,

preliminary tests of the 1969 weekly demand model indicated
that there was some type of summer influence on Euro
dollar liabilities, unexplained by any other variable.

The

monthly dummies allow the months which had the greatest
effect on the dependent variable to be precisely determined.
As such, they allow a greater degree of precision in
analyzing seasonal impact.
10.

A dummy variable representing structural change.

The imposition of marginal reserve requirements on Euro
dollar borrowings from foreign branches and the redefini
tion of cash items in process of collection by the

•^Ronald Wonnacott and Thomas Wonnacott, Economet
rics (New York; John Wiley and Sons, 1970), pp. 68-77
explain the use of dummy variables.
18This is evident in the financial press.
See also
Stanley Black, "An Econometric Study of Euro-Dollar
Borrowing by New York Banks and The Rate of Interest on
Euro-Dollars," Journal of Finance, Vol. 26, No. 1
(March, 1971), pp. 87-88.
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Federal Reserve in September 1969 changed the environment
in which Euro-dollar borrowing occurred.

Presumably, by

making Euro-dollar borrowings more expensive, the demand
for these liabilities would decline.

This, at least, was

the reasoning the Federal Reserve used in imposing the
requirements in response to the massive increases in such
borrowing in 1969.19

Thus, when the dummy is coded 1

(reserves required and cash items redefined)

Euro-dollar

liabilities should decline, and when coded

(no reserve

0

requirements and cash items defined as before)

these

liabilities should increase.
III.

A.

Estimating Procedure and Sources
of Data

Estimating Procedures
Regression analysis requires the statement of a

dependent variable and one or more independent variables.
The movements in the independent variable(s)

are hypo

thesized to influence the movements of the dependent
variable.

By analyzing the contribution that each inde

pendent variable makes toward the explanation of the

l^See, among others, "Euro-dollars: A Changing
Market,” 0 £. c i t ., p. 766; Gaines, 0 £. c i t ., p. 1;
Williams, op. c i t ., pp. 12, 25-28; "Eurodollar Banking
Today," o p . c i t ., p. 78; Coombs, o£. c i t ., (March, 1970),
p. 64; and Andrew Brimmer, The Euro-dollar Market and the
United States Balance of Payments, paper presented at the
London School of Economics, London, November, 1969.
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dependent variable's movements, an equation can be con
structed that explains or predicts the value the dependent
variable will take depending on the values that the in
dependent variables take.

This equation is an estimate of

the true relationships that exist between the dependent
and independent variables.
This section outlines briefly the procedure used in
estimating the demand equations for Euro-dollars by U.S.
banks.

The following section indicates the sources of the

data used in the analysis.

With this basis, the results

of the regession analysis and an interpretation of the
results will be provided.
The dependent variable specified in the analysis is
the amount of Euro-dollar borrowings by U.S. banks.

This

value can be approximated by the data compiled by the
Federal Reserve and titled,

"Liabilities of U.S. Banks to

Their Foreign

The measure omits the amount of

B r a n c h e s

."20

direct borrowing by U.S. banks of dollar balances held by
European banks, such data being unavailable.

However, it

seems logical to assume that such direct borrowing,
while perhaps less profitable, was motivated by the same

2 0 see, for instance, Table 21, Federal Reserve
Bulletin, Vol. 56, No. 12 (December, 1970), p. A 8 6 .

(
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factors as impelled the borrowing of Euro-dollars through
European branches.

Further, the effects of such borrowing

on the efficiency of U.S. monetary policy are generally
similar to those that result from borrowing from overseas
branches.
The time period considered is January, 1966 through
December,

1970.

Monthly data was collected for each of the

hypothesized determinants of demand and, in addition, weekly
data for 1966-67 and 1969
piled and tested.

(January through August) was com

Comparing the results obtained for the

weekly subperiods with those obtained from the monthly
analysis provides an indication of the explanatory power of
certain independent variables in different situations.

The

1969 weekly test has the added advantage of being structur
ally (internally)

consistent . 2 1

That is, the period begins

with the imposition by the Federal Reserve of tight money
and ends as marginal reserve requirements on Euro-dollar
liabilities above the base amount are about to go into
effect.

Thus, Euro-dollar borrowing in this period occurred

under comparatively constant conditions and provides an
excellent model in which to test the hypotheses of this

21See J. Johnston, Econometric Methods
McGraw Hill Book Co., 1963), p. 232.

(New York:
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dissertation.

Finally, a comparison of the differences

between this period and the entire period under review
is possible.
A starting date of January 1966 was chosen for the
study since it was in this year that banks first actively
entered the market on a large scale.

Prior to this time,

relatively little borrowing from branches occurred and
most U.S. banks were, it appears, generally unaware of the
advantages the market offered to them . 2 2

December 1970 is

the end point of the analysis because reliable data beyond
this date could not be obtained due to research time con
straints.

In addition, the movement by the Federal

Reserve towards encouraging the maintenance of Euro
dollar balances by the banks for balance of payments
reasons introduced a change in the structure or environ
ment that made the date seem a logical concluding point.
The procedure used in estimating the predictive or
I

descriptive equations was to postulate the major theo
retical determinants of the demand for Euro-dollars by
U.S. banks

(Chapter 3), approximate these determinants with

quantifiable measures

(this chapter, Section II,B), collect

2 2 See, for instance, Williams, o p . c it., pp. 9-11,
and Clendenning, op. c i t . , pp. 26, 56.
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the data describing these factors for the time period
under consideration, and utilize a stepwise regression
program to sort out the most important factors influenc
ing

d e m a n d .

23

rp^e

stepwise procedure operates, as its

name implies, in steps.

In the first step, the compu

tation of the simple regression line between the depen
dent variable and the independent variable that reduces
the standard error to its smallest value is undertaken.
Thus, the independent variable that explains the most
variation in the dependent variable is chosen and the
regression equation between it and the dependent variable
is calculated.

Then, step by step, additional variables

are added to the equation one at a time in the order that
reduces the unexplained variation by the greatest amount.24
The determination of which variable should be added
is made by taking that variable, not included in the
equation as it stands, which has the highest partial cor
relation coefficient and adding it to the regression

^ H e r e , the BIOMED 02R canned program was utilized.
An outline and explanation of the print out of this program
may be found in Donald Harnett, Introduction to Statistical
Methods (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Co., 1970), chapters 9 and 10.
The following explanation
derives from this discussion.
2 4 i b i d . ,

pp.

*

354-355.
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equation.

The square of the partial correlation coefficient

indicates the proportion of the unexplained variation which
is reduced by adding that variable, relative to the varia
tion remaining to be explained.

The addition of variables

based on this criteria continues until all the specified
variables have been added or until the stated number of
steps has been reached.
The stepwise procedure becomes somewhat unwieldy
when a large number of variables are postulated.

This

occurs because there often exist several different
equations that equally well explain the variation in the
dependent variable.

Thus, alternative specifications of

the variables to be included and excluded from the re
gression equation must be made.

For example, the simple

stepwise regression may indicate that one variable is
extremely important in the determination of the variation
in the dependent equation.

However, if this variable is

excluded from the equation, it often appears that other
variables, whose influence was swamped by the original
important variable and were therefore of little or no
importance in explaining the variation, become quite
important.

This frequently indicates that multicollin-

earity is present.

The determination of which variables

to include in the final equation, then, rests not merely on
the mechanical determination of the explanatory power of
each variable and on the observation of multicollinearity,
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but on the researcher's intuition as to the proper
variables to include.

The researcher has available to him,

in many instances, several different equations, all ex
plaining remarkably well the variation in the dependent
variable.

The choice of which equation finally to use

then rests on the theoretical basis upon which the model
was originally constructed.25

Also, since both flow and

stock analyses were computed, a choice between the par
ticular form the equation will take must be made.

The

final criterion will be the attainment of the best de
scriptive equation possible.
No lag structure was specified in the variables for
several reasons.

Most important, it was assumed that the

international and U.S. financial markets are sufficiently
well organized and the participants sufficiently well in
formed that responses to changes in a particular sector of
a market are relatively rapid.

The communication of

pressures from one market to another, and between sectors
within a market, was assumed to be quite fast.

A second

25Edward Kane, Economic Statistics and Econometrics
(New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, l$t>8 ) , pp. 273-274
makes this warning.
He also notes that the testing of so
many different hypotheses or combinations of variables in
creases greatly the probability that at least one "signifi
cant" result will be obtained.
The solution to these prob
lems, as noted above, involves the specification of the model
based upon logical or sound theorization.
This will provide
insurance against spurious significance.
Secondly, careful
observation of the effect on the partial correlation co
efficient of a dropped variable when other variables are
added will insure that the dropped variables are truly of
no value.
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reason for omi ttinq a lag structure was that the results
obtained wiLhout specifying such a structure were quite
satisfactory.

Finally, anticipations play an important

role in the money markets and it was therefore assumed that
any lags which might exist were offset by the anticipations
and resultant discounting of future changes that occur.
B.

Data Sources
Most of the data used was obtained from the Federal

Reserve Bulletin, the Wall Street Journal, and the pub
lications of Salomon Brothers . ^ 6

in some cases, consis

tent data back to 1966 was not directly available.

In

these cases, and where possible, reconstruction of the data
was undertaken.

Where this was not possible, the Federal

Reserve Board supplied copies of the records it maintains
for its own use.
Monthly data is published as of the end of the month
in some cases and as of the first of the month or as of the
first Wednesday of the month in others.

To maintain con

sistency, an attempt to convert all data to beginning of
the month values was made.

Published data as of the end

of the month were utilized as a measure of the variable
for the following month.

While some slight irregularities

might result, cross checking indicated that they were very

26primarily An Analytical Record of Yields and Yield
Spreads (New York! Salomon Brothers and Hutzler, 1969 (?)),
and tHeir weekly Bond Market Roundup and Comments on Credit.
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minor.

Measures of a variable for June 30, for instance,

and July 1 do not normally vary greatly.

In the case of

a few series of data that were available only for the
first Wednesday of the month, no adjustments were
possible.

These series were used as they were and it is

conceded that a slight lag may therefore exist in these
series.

However, it is a short lag, of less than a week

and probably of limited importance.

The data used for the

weekly models is consistently as of Wednesday of each week.
This is the form that such series are issued by the
Federal Reserve Board.

The source of each data series is

noted in Appendix A.
IV.
A.

Empirical Results and Implications

The Basic Equations
The use of a stepwise regression program was under

taken in order that an equation with substantial explana
tory power might be obtained.

This procedure, as noted in

section III, entails the specification of a number of
theoretically relevant variables.

These variables are

entered into the analysis, one at a time, and a regression
run.

Values for the excluded variables are also calculated

so that a check may be maintained on the effect that adding
(or deleting)

a variable has on the power and significance

of all the included (and excluded) variables.

In this way,

a respecified equation including only the significant
variables can be obtained.

Table 1 indicates the final

TABLE I
REGRESSION RESULTS --- STOCKS AND FLOWS 1

Stock
(1)

Demand-Monthly

R'

E$D = -22,665.2 -.197CD +.112CIL +.13MS +1.17RCP-RQL
(3.7)
(18.7) (3.65)
(11.05)
L— .1763
L 235] L 4671
[,28$

SEE

F

971

737.7
d=l.04
(+AC)

734

362.2
d=l.96
(No AC)

950

207.5
223.5
d=l.41
(Indeter.
Region)

457.1

Flow
(2)

A E $ D = 402.61 -.3ACD -.26ACIL -.41RRE$ -847.6JAN
(4.8)
(2.98)
(3.07) (5.09)
[-.509]

\r.424]

L-.277]

23.9

t.323]

+654.01JUL +451.4ARTB-RQL
(2.88)
(2.92)
[.276]
[.226]
Stock
(3)

Demand - 1966-67 Weekly
E$D = -9,850.23 -.2CD +.28CIL -509.21JUNE
(9.1)
(14.4)
(4.3)
[-.241]
[.878] [-.154]
-531. 26JULY +339 .ORTBr-RQL
(4.01)
(3.45)
[-.145]
1.128]
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TABLE 1 - CONTINUED

Flow
(4)

Demand - 1966-67 Weekly
A E $ D = 18.98 -.11ASECS +202.07JUNE*
(2.79)
(2.47)
[-.349]
[.285]

Stock
(5)

R2

SEE

F

193

158.2
7.3
d = 2 .51
(Indeter.
Region)

967

462.1
d= l . 2 2
(+AC)

500

377.7
d=l.89
(No AC)

Demand-1966 Weekly
E$D = 20/755.69 -.61CD +1/833.05RTB-RQL
(22.25)
(5.36)
C-.730]
[.294]

470.0

Flow
(6 ) A E $ D = 65.86 - ^ A S E C S 1
(2.39)
[-.637]

+2,042.1ARTB-RQL
(2.14)
[.574]

-2,246.32ARCP-RQL
(2.29)
[-.543]
Stock
(7)

+1,214.23 JUNE
(2.79)
[.793]

Black's 1966-68 Weekly Demand 2
E$D = -.446CD -1,480E$RATE +650RFF +1,681RTB +26.0TREND
(2.2)
(4.6)
(2.3)
(7.7)
(44.3)

Significant at .02 level.
iFigures in millions of dollars except interest rate and dummy variables.
2Stanley Black, "An Econometric Study of Euro-Dollar Borrowing by New York
Banks and the Rate of Interest on Euro-Dollars," Journal of Finance,
Vol. 26, No. 1 (March, 1971), pp. 85-88.
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stock anti flow equations that best explain the fluc
tuations in Euro-dollar liabilities of U.S. banks for the
late 1960's.

The particular equations were chosen because

of their various attributes, discussed below.
The t value for each variable is indicated in paren
theses directly below the variable and, unless starred, the
variable is significant at the .01 level.

In addition, the

Beta coefficient is noted in brackets below each v a r i a b l e . ^
The summary measures, R^, SEE (Standard Error of Estimate),
and P value for the entire equation are indicated for each
equation.

Table 2 lists the complete variable set used in

each analysis and, in addition, indicates the theoretically
expected coefficient . signs derived from the analysis in
Section II.

2?The Beta coefficient is obtained by multiplying the
regression coefficient by the ratio of the standard de
viation of the variable to which the regression coefficient
applies and the standard deviation of the dependent variable.
The result is sometimes called a standardized or normalized
regression coefficient.
The usefulness of the measure is
that, unlike the regression coefficient, the impact or im
portance of each variable on the dependent variable is in
dicated by the relative size of its Beta coefficient.
The
sign of the coefficient may be positive or negative, de
pending upon the sign of the original regression coeffi
cient.
However, the sign is often omitted since it has no
significance in explaining the importance of each variable.
The Beta coefficient is unaffected by the units of
measure of each variable.
The square of the coefficient is
the direct contribution of that particular variable to the
of the entire equation.
One drawback of the Beta co
efficient is that it becomes less reliable as the degree of
multicollinearity increases.
See Mordecai Ezekiel and
Karl Fox, Methods of Correlation and Regression Analysis
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959) , p. 197 and Norman
Draper and Harry Smith, Applied Regression Analysis
(New York:
John Wiley ana Sons, 1966), Chapters 2 and 4.

130

TABLE 2
VARIABLES TESTED AND THEORETICALLY EXPECTED
COEFFICIENT SIGNS

Monthly Demand
1.
2.
3.
4.

Liabilities of U.S. banks to their foreign branches
Euro-dollar interest rate on deposits (-)
Large CD's outstanding at large banks (-)
Commercial and industrial loans at large banks (+)
(-for flows)
5. Free reserves at all Federal Reserve System member
banks (open)
6.
Dummy for required reserves on Euro-dollar liabilities,
starts September 1969 (-)
7. U.S. government securities held by large banks (-)
8 . Dummy for summer, June, July, and August
(-)
9. Money supply, adjusted (open)
10.
20. Monthly dummy, excluding December (open)
21. Federal Funds rate (+)
22. Discount rate in effect (+)
23.
Three month Treasury bill rate versus Regulation Q
ceiling rate on three month CD's— spread (+)
24.
Four-six month commercial paper rate versus Regulation
Q ceiling rate on three month CD's— spread (+)
Note:
minus value for spread means favor of CD's,
positive value means spread in favor of bills or
commercial paper.
Demand-1966-Weekly
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Liabilities of U.S. banks to their foreign branches
Euro-dollar interest rate on deposits (-)
Large CD's outstanding at large banks (-)
Commercial and industrial loans at large banks (+)
Free reserves at all Federal Reserve System member
banks (open)
6.
U.S. government securities held by large banks (-)
7. Dummy for summer, June, July, and August (-)
8.
Money supply, adjusted (open)
9. — 19.
Monthly dummy, excluding December (open)
20. Federal Funds rate (+)
21. Three month Treasury bill rate versus Regulation Q
ceiling rate on three month CD's— spread (+)
22.
Four-six month commercial paper rate versus Regulation
Q ceiling rate on three month CD's— spread (+)
Note:
signs as in Monthly Demand.

131

TABLE 2 CONTINUED

Demand-1969-Weekly
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Liabilities of U.S. banks to their foreign branches
Euro-dollar interest rate on deposits (-)
Large CD's outstanding at large banks (-)
Commercial and industrial loans at large banks (+)
Basic deficit at 5 Chicago and 8 New York banks
(-means surplus) (+)
6.
Free reserves at all Federal Reserve System member
banks (open)
7.
Dummy for summer, June, July, and August (open)
8 . Money supply, adjusted (open)
9.
U.S. government securities held at large banks (-)
10. Federal Funds rate (+)
11. Discount rate in effect (+)
12.
Three month Treasury bill rate versus Regulation Q
ceiling rate on three month CD's— spread
(+)
13. Four-six month commercial paper rate versus Regu
lation Q ceiling rate on three month CD's --spread (+)
14-20.
Monthly dummy, excluding January
(open)
Note:
Signs as in Monthly Demand.
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There are several general points that should be made
concerning the analysis.

First, stock equations may be

expected to exhibit autocorrelation since this is a time
series analysis and since the omission of variables, both
known and unknown, may be important in some combination.
Also, these disturbances may affect more than one week or
month.2®

As the table shows, the Durban-Watson d statistic

indicates the presence of autocorrelation in the stock
equations.

Autocorrelation is not indicated in the flow

equations, however, which confirms that here, at least,
first differences analysis solves this problem.
Second, multicollinearity is expected in at least
some cases and does occur in the stock analysis.

For

example, the preliminary regressions indicated that the
various interest rate spreads were correlated with each
other, as well as with the dependent variable.

The final

equation contains only one such spread, however, which
negates the problem.

The correlation between interest rate

spreads is to be expected if the assumption of interrelated
money markets and interrelated rates within markets is
valid.

The flow analyses are basically free of multi

collinearity because all but one of the related variables is
dropped in the final equations.

28
Black, op. c i t . , pp. 85-86.
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Third, the variables that were found to be signifi
cant in the stock analysis are generally so in the flow
analysis although, as can be noted, the use of first
differences reduces the number of significant variables
(and generates a somewhat lower r 2 ) .
Fourth, the signs of the coefficients are generally
as expected with one or two exceptions.

The most glaring

abnormality was a positive coefficient attached to the
Euro-dollar rate in several equations of monthly demand.
None of these preliminary equations was finally selected.
They indicated that as Euro-dollar rates rose, demand for
these funds increased.

One explanation for this is that

the rate rises as a result of the increased demand.
Government securities also tended, in some cases, to be
positively related to Euro-dollar liabilities, a some
what unexpected result but one that valuation problems
may e x p l a i n . 29

Again, the final equations did not

include this variable.
Fifth, the multiple

r2

measures indicate a high

•

explanatory power for both the stock and flow equations.
Exceptions to this include the flow weekly demand for the
two subperiods.

In the 1969 case, the equation explains

about half of the variation in Euro-dollar liabilities.
For the 1966 weekly flow analysis, less than one-fifth of
the variation is explained by the best equation.

Flow

29Brimmer, Euro-Dollar Market..., o p . c i t ., pp. 8-9ff.
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analysis of these subperiods is therefore of marginal
usefulness.

Whether the equations are misspecified or

merely confirm the suspicion that the weekly data is
affected by transitory forces of a truly random character
is unknown.

However, since the variables specified did

allow the formulation of several good monthly equations,
both stock and flow, it seems likely that it is transi
tory forces rather than misspecification that is respon
sible.
Sixth, the Beta coefficients indicate the wide
variability in the explanatory power of the significant
independent variables.

In some cases, one variable

clearly contributes more to the explanation of the
variation than any of the others while in other cases each
independent variable has relatively the same power of
explanation.

As stated in note 27, the Beta coefficient

indicates, by its relative size, the impact of each in
dependent variable on the dependent variable.

Since it is

stated in absolute numbers, the units of measure do not
bias the interpretation of the contribution of each de
terminant, assuming that there is little or no multicollinearity.

The sign of the Beta coefficient indicates

the sign of the particular variable's coefficient and the
variable's contribution to the slope of the final re
gression line.
Overall, the flow analysis of monthly demand may be
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considered the most satisfactory equation.
multiple

While the high

measures associated with the stock equation

indicates a better explanatory power, the flow or first
difference analysis avoids several of the problems asso
ciated with stock time series analyses and has a suffi
ciently high

to be both useful and acceptable.

The standard error associated with all of the
equations is relatively small.

It varies from about

$150 million to slightly above $700 million.
magnitudes being considered

Given the

(billions of dollars), these

error ranges seem acceptable.

The F values associated with

each equation are, in all cases, significant at the

.01

level.
Finally, the equation that Stanley Black has derived
to explain weekly Euro-dollar demand‘d

(reproduced in

Table 1) is similar to the equation derived here for
1966-1967.

Black's equation is distinguished by the im

portance of a trend component and several interest rates.
Neither it nor the weekly equation derived here predict
well the 19 69-70 experience.
B.

Interpretation of the Generated Equations

Introductory
The equations finally chosen as the best descriptions
of the demand for Euro-dollars by U.S. banks generally

^®Black, o p . cit. , pp.

86-8 8 .
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verify the hypotheses made prior to the regression, analysis.
As was expected, the monthly demand for Euro-dollars was
influenced primarily by monetary policy or the effects of
such policy.

Thus, CD's outstanding and an interest rate

spread (in this case, between the commercial paper rate
and the CD ceiling rate) have substantial effects on the
amount of Euro-dollar borrowing undertaken by U.S. banks.
In addition, the demand for commercial and industrial loans
at large banks in the U.S., as indicated by the amount
of such loans outstanding, affected Euro-dollar borrowing.
The basis of the demand for loanable funds by banks

(i.e.,

Euro-dollar borrowing) derived from the demand by their
customers for such funds and from the pressures restrictive
monetary policy placed on the banks.
Monthly Demand
The stock monthly demand equation 1 indicates that
U.S. monetary policy affected the demand for Euro-dollars
by U.S. banks.

Based on the Beta coefficients, the money

supply variable

(MS) is the most important determinant

of Euro-dollar borrowing.

An increase in money is asso

ciated with an increase in Euro-dollar liabilities.

This

direct relationship was not expected since Euro-dollar
borrowing appears to rise during tight money periods and
one of the characteristics of tight money is a halt or
decline in the growth of the money stock.
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Several explanations of the strong direct relation
ship are possible.

First, the money supply rarely stops

growing completely, even in tight money periods.

There

is, therefore, an upward trend in the money supply series.
In the time period tested, Euro-dollar borrowing also rose
fairly steadily.

Thus, since both series trend upwards,

a direct relationship results in the regression analysis.
This trend explanation is reinforced by Stanley Black's
results

(Table 1, equation 7).

He found a positive weekly

trend of $26 million affecting Euro-dollar demand.

This

variable was the most important influence on Euro-dollar
demand.

The other independent variables were regarded

by Black as " . . . determining deviations around the un
explained trend increase of $26 million per week."31
Equation 1 presented here may be viewed as utilizing the
money supply as a proxy for the trend evident in the
Euro-dollar liabilities series.

Money supply rose less than

$1 billion a month over the tested time period.

This means

that the money supply variable "explained" something less
than $13 million a month of the total rise in Euro
dollar liabilities.

While this is only l/ 8 th the effect

that Black's trend variable has, the negative impact of
rising Euro-dollar rates in Black's equation, taken to
gether with the trend, generates a total effect roughly
similar to that postulated by the money supply in equation

3 1 Ibid.,

p.

88.

1

.
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A second possible explanation of the direct relation
ship between money supply and Euro-dollar liabilities
relies on the analysis presented in Chapter 2.

Euro

dollar borrowing was undertaken by U.S. banks as they lost
CD's in 1966 and 1969 due to effective Regulation Q limits.
These time deposits became demand deposits as former CD
holders channeled their funds into more profitable in
vestment vehicles.

Time deposits are not included in the

money supply but demand deposits are.

Therefore, a direct

relationship between money supply and Euro-dollar lia
bilities of U.S. banks derives from the purely mechanical
fact that the shift from time deposits to demand deposits
occurred at the same time that banks were increasing their
Euro-dollar liabilities, i.e., during tight money periods.
Neither of the above explanations implies any real
affect of money supply on Euro-dollar liabilities.

The

inclusion of a money supply series in such an equation,
therefore, must be based on the usefulness of the

variable

as a proxy for trend, monetary policy or economic activity,
or as an indicator of the impact of monetary policy on the
composition of bank deposits and thus on the banks' desire
to borrow Euro-dollars.
It should also be noted that multicollinearity re
duces the value of the Beta coefficient.

Since multi

collinearity was present in the analysis, the Beta value
may be giving false significance to the money supply
variable.
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The other variables that contribute to the ex
planation of the monthly variation in Euro-dollar lia
bilities are also associated with monetary policy.

As

hypothesized, outstanding CD's are negatively related to
these liabilities, but not in the magnitude expected.
Commercial and industrial loans at large banks

(CIL) are

positively related to Euro-dollar borrowings.

The lessened

availability of U.S. funds and higher domestic interest
rates associated with tight money thus did not choke off
these loans but merely redirected the lending banks'
search for funds to finance them.

As noted in Chapter 2,

Euro-dollar borrowing allows the banking system to increase
its loans even though the money supply remains constant.
This, combined with the upward trend of both Euro-dollar
liabilities and loans, generates the direct relationship
observed.
Finally, the positive relationship between Euro
dollar liabilities and the yield spread advantage of
commercial paper over CD's indicates that monetary policy,
by restricting rates payable on time deposits, causing
other market rates to rise, and increasing the proportion
of demand deposits and thus average reserves, provided a
further incentive to U.S. banks to borrow in the Euro
dollar market.

Taken together, the explanatory variables

of Euro-dollar borrowing reflect the impact of monetary
policy in the United States.
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Both multicollinearity and autocorrelation appear in
the stock equation.

Multicollinearity was expected

because money supply and commercial and industrial loans
are interrelated.

Since both variables contribute appre

ciably to the explanation of Euro-dollar borrowing, however,
they are both included in the final equation.

The

presence of autocorrelation, as indicated by the DurbanWatson d statistic, implies that there is some unexplained
correlation between Euro-dollar liabilities and the
residuals.
To solve the autocorrelation and multicollinearity
problems, first differences analysis of the monthly demand
data was undertaken.

J

In this flow analysis(equation 2)

the same types of variables that were significant in the
stock analysis are significant except that the influence
of seasonality

(January and July), the imposition of

marginal reserve requirements

(a dummy, RRE$), and the

lack of significance of changes in the money supply are
evident.

The

r2

is lower in equation 2 indicating a

lower explanatory power for the flow equation.

The

benefits derived from the reduction of autocorrelation

^^Tests excluding each of the variables in turn in
dicated that both variables had significant explanatory
power.
In addition, both retained the signs obtained when
utilized together.
^-^Wonnacott and Wonnacott, o£. ci t ., p. 140.
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and multicollinearity and the achievement of correctly
signed coefficients outweigh the loss implicit in this
reduced explanatory power.
In addition to the seasonal factors, the marginal
reserve requirements dummy is significant in the flow
analysis.

Euro-dollar demand falls substantially when

reserve requirements go into effect.

But, the month of

July brings out large upward changes in Euro-dollar
borrowings.

This may be due to pure seasonality or to some

other unspecified factor.

The suspicion is that the un

winding of mid-year window dressing by Eurobanks increases
Euro-dollar demand.

But this would not explain the greatly

increased demand for borrowings by U.S. banks in these
particular months.

The explanation is elusive.

Changes in CD's outstanding (ACD) is the most
important variable in the flow equation.

These changes

are negatively related to changes in Euro-dollar liabili
ties, an expected result.
dustrial bank loans

Large commercial and in

(ACIL) are also negatively related to

the dependent variable.

This result also conforms to the

postulated relationships previously noted.

While Euro

dollar borrowings are directly associated with loans, the
change in loans outstanding is inversely related to changes
in the dependent variable.

Thus, smaller and smaller in

creases in loans occur in tight money periods while the
change in Euro-dollar borrowings is increasing, a logical
and expected result.
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A yield spread between the rate on Treasury Bills
and on CD's is significant, as is a similar spread in the
stock analysis.

Thus, except for the seasonal and

structural components in the flow analysis, and the money
supply in the stock analysis, the two monthly demand
equations and Black's weekly equation covering the same
general period are quite similar.

They indicate that

Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks is affected by monetary
policy, as measured by the different variables included.
Further, access to the Euro-dollar market negates, in
some sense, the efficiency of monetary policy.
Demand-Tight Money Periods
The 1966 weekly demand-stock analysis

(equation 3)

includes the same basic factors as did the monthly demand.
CD's outstanding (CD), commercial and industrial loans
(CIL), a rate spread between Treasury

Bills and the

Regulation Q ceiling (RTB-RQC), and early summer seasonal
factors are the significant variables.
pected sign and are significant at the

All have the ex
.01

level.

The most important determinants are CD's and com
mercial and industrial loans.

Note the pervading influence

of loans, CD's, seasonal factors and a yield spread on
demand, whether in the monthly or in the 1966 weekly sub
period.

The flow analysis of weekly 1966 demand (equa

tion 4) is of little value, indicating only that May had
a positive influence on changes in Euro-dollar borrowings
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and changes in government securities held by large banks
had a negative influence.
Weekly demand, stock, for 1969

(equation 5), includes

the variables for CD's and the Treasury Bill-Regulation Q
ceiling spread.

The equation is significant at the .01

level and explains 97% of the 1969 variation in Euro
dollar borrowings.

The flow equation (equation

6

), ex

plaining half the variation in Euro-dollar liabilities,
includes government securities holdings (ASECS), the
Treasury Bill-Regulation Q ceiling spread, commercial paperRegulation Q ceiling spread, with the wrong sign (ARCP-RQL),
and the June dummy.
at the

.01

Only the June variable was Significant

level.

The 1966 and 1969 demand tight money subperiods
tested generally support the entire period demand analysis
conclusions.

All include in some form reference to CD's

outstanding and spreads between the Q ceiling and either
Treasury Bills or commercial paper.

In addition, some

include a seasonal factor aYid a factor "measuring bank
assets, either loans, government securities, or the like.
All have substantial explanatory power.
Conclusions
Demand equations can be constructed to explain al
most all of the variation in Euro-dollar liabilities of
U.S. banks for the 1966-70 period.

While the problem of

the independence of the variables does exist, the pre
dictive power of the equation is substantial.

By using
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first differences some of the predictive power is
foregone but the problems of multicollinearity and
autocorrelation are solved.
The 19 70 and 19 71 experience with U.S. bank borrow
ing of Euro-dollars alters the structure of the model
used in this dissertation.

The increased marginal reserve

requirements, the change in the definition of cash items
in process of collection, the lifting of the CD rate
ceiling, and the influence of tight money in Europe on
Euro-dollar rates have all combined to make the equations,
as presently constituted, somewhat less than reliable as
predictors of future Euro-dollar demand by U.S. banks.
Prediction, however, was not the primary aim of the re
gression analysis presented here.
was the goal.

Rather, explanation

The determination, quantitatively, of the

major factors that influenced U.S. bank Euro-dollar
borrowing in the period considered was undertaken.
results were,

for the most part, as expected.

The

Generally,

the monthly flow equations explain somewhat less of the
variation but overcome some of the disadvantages inherent
in the stock equations.

The weekly flow demand equations

on the other hand, were unacceptable primarily because
weekly changes were so erratic.
were of more value.

Here the stock equations

All the equations, stock and flow,

point to the impact of monetary policy on Euro-dollar
borrowing and, in reverse, the leakage from the effective
ness of such policy due to bank access to the Euro-dollar
funds market.
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Further analysis could be undertaken combining the
best stock and flow variables.

In addition, an extension

of the time period and the specification of an easy money
subperiod could be undertaken.
borrowing,

Whether Euro-dollar

at the considerably lower level now prevailing,

is affected by the same determinants in the same magnitude
is questionable.

Also, whether this low level of borrowing

has any appreciable impact on monetary policy in the United
States is debatable.

It would appear, however, that the

decline in U.S. bank Euro-dollar liabilities in 1971 is
added proof of the marginal nature of Euro-dollar
borrowing to U.S. banks and of the importance of monetary
policy on such borrowing.

It may be that the flurry of

Euro-dollar borrowing in the last half of the 1960's
was a temporary aberration.
verify or negate this.

Only further experience will

CHAPTER V
CREDIT CREATION AND MONETARY POLICY
I.

Introduction

The last chapter verified empirically that U.S.
monetary policy was the primary determinant of Euro
dollar borrowing by U.S. banks.

As measures of this

policy, the amount of CD's outstanding and interest rate
differentials served as the best proxies.

Previously,

in Chapter 2, a discussion of the Euro-dollar system
mechanism was undertaken and a description of the basic
process by which credit creation can occur in the system
was given.
In this chapter, a more extensive discussion of
Euro-dollar credit creation, the Euro-dollar money
multiplier, and the effects on U.S. and European
monetary policy of such credit creation will be presented.
Of primary interest will be an investigation of the
effects of Euro-dollar credit creaticn on U.S. bank
borrowing and thus on U.S. monetary policy.

It is

through such borrowing of Euro-dollars that the Euro
dollar monetary system impinges directly on the U.S.
146
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monetary system.

Further, the substantial intervention

by central banks and official institutions has influenced
credit creation in the Euro-dollar system and, through
U.S. bank borrowing from the system, has affected the
*

efficiency of U.S. monetary policy.

The effects of this

intervention on credit creation in the Euro-dollar
system and a comparison between Federal Reserve open
market operations and the evolving open market-type
operations by European central banks and official
institutions in the Euro-dollar system will conclude
the chapter.
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II.
A.

Credit Creation

The Money Multiplier in the Euro-dollar System
Two distinctive differences between the U.S. and

the Euro-dollar monetary systems with regard to credit
creation were noted in Chapter 2.

First, leakages of

unpredictable magnitude may occur in the Euro-dollar
system while such leakages in the U.S. system are small
and usually predictable.

Second, the reserves of the

Euro-dollar system are the created money of another
monetary system rather than the created money of the
Euro-dollar system.

Thus, credit creation in the system

depends upon two factors, neither of which is completely
controllable by the Euro-dollar system itself.

To a

certain extent, these factors can be overcome.

Re

serves may be obtained by exchanging domestic currency
assets for dollars in the foreign exchange markets and by
making Euro-dollar deposits more attractive to dollar
holders.

Leakages may be reduced by increasing the

value to the user of holding Euro-dollar deposits. This
can be achieved by higher interest rates on deposits and
by measures designed to increase the availability and
acceptability of the currency produced.

Nonetheless,
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leakages and reserves present the two greatest problems
to credit creation in the Euro-dollar system.
Theoretically, multiple credit creation in the
Euro-dollar system,^ with a given level of reserves,
depends on the percentage of reserves required or
optionally held on each deposit and upon the loan
retention ratio.

The amount of reserves held will vary

depending on the number of intermediaries that are used
before final disposition of the funds is made.

Interbank

lending of Euro-dollars may appreciably increase the
proportion of the original dollar deposit held as
reserves and, as such, represents a leakage that reduces
possible credit creation levels.

Basically,

the credit

creation multiplier is equal to the inverse of leakages

•*-The following credit multiplier was developed by
Swoboda, op. c i t ., pp. 31-33, 41, and his basic idea and
notation is used below.
His analysis has been con
siderably expanded here.
2

The loan retention ratio represents the pro
portion of a loan that is redeposited within the system,
on average.
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out of the system and into other currency assets or
withheld from circulation in r e s e r v e s . ^
If the primary deposit is denoted x, the reserve
ratio a_ (assumed,

for simplicity, to be the same for all

intermediaries, including the final lender), and the
ratio relent as b=l-ja, then the total amount of Euro
dollar deposits

(original, intermediary, and final loan),

i.e., gross deposits, are:
(1 )

n

_
G '

m

i

i = o
where m is the number of bank intermediaries able to

Machlup, "Euro-Dollar Creation:...," op,, c i t ., pp.
239-242 also discusses the Euro-dollar system multiplier,
noting the leakages that can occur and the fact that a
statistical reserve multiplier, based on the keeping of
reserves of less than 1 0 0 % of deposit liabilities, does
not prove that a positive credit multiplier exists. What
does prove it, for Machlup (p. 241), is that Euro
dollar deposits do not equal, but rather exceed, the
total of net transfers of balances from U.S. to European
banks plus other dollar payments to European banks.
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operate on the lending-borrowing interest spread.^

Net

deposits after intermediation is netted out are:
(2)

D = x+xbm .
N

Both

(1) and (2) apply before the loan proceeds are

utilized.
When the borrower utilizes the proceeds of his
loan either he or the receiver may convert the funds
into domestic currency.

In this case, after clearing,

all that remains is the original primary Euro-dollar
deposit.

No credit creation has resulted and Djj = x.

Should the creditor redeposit some or all of the
Euro-dollar funds received (or reconvert the domestic
currency into dollars and deposit the dollars)

into a

Eurobank, multiple credit creation can occur.

Denote

the proportion of the loan redeposited b y the payee as d..

4

Swoboda, l o c . cit_., refers to gross lending
rather than to gross deposits.
However, only if the
original deposit is considered a loan would this be gross
lending. As Machlup correctly notes, original Euro
dollar deposits are no more to be considered loans than
are dollar deposits in U.S. banks.
Ibid., pp. 223-225.
Gross lending including intermediation would be
m
i
lG = £ x b
i = 1
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The loan based on the original deposit x has induced a
further deposit of x(bm d) and the creation, after inter
mediation, of the loan deposit x(bm )2 d.

Upon use, should

the proceeds of the loan be redeposited, the amount
in 2
x(b d)

would begin the next cycle and the final loan

deposit created would be x(bm )3 d2 .
within the Euro-dollar system

(3) _

_

DN "

C

Thus, net deposits

may be stated as

n

£ x (bm d) -1
i = 0

where ri is the number of times redeposits of loan funds
occur.
(4)

Net loans are
n+1

% =1 X<bma-V
i =

.

1

Total Euro-dollar deposits, excluding inter
mediation accounts between banks, may expand by various
amounts, depending upon the leakages caused by the com
bination of reserve holdings, a_, intermediation stages,

This presumes that the Euro-dollar deposit created
by the final loan clears against the system.

153

m, and redeposits rates, ci.

The greater is a, the lower

the amount b that can be lent out.

The greater the

system's loan retention ratio, or redeposit rate, d,
the more that can be relent.

Finally,

the higher is m,

the smaller the amount reaching a final borrower.
Generally, the lower the reserves held, the fewer the
intermediation steps

(which compound the reserve leakage),

and the higher the loan retention ratio, the greater the
amount of Euro-dollars that can be created.
The credit creation or money multiplier

can be

approximated by
(5)

M = ________ 1_______
1 - bm d

.

^This is the multiplier obtained by Swoboda,
o p . c i t ., p. 41. He takes the limit of the series
n
(6) £
(hmA)x = l+bm d + (bm d ) 2
+ (brad ) 3 + ...
i = 0
as n _______ .

, for bm d<l.

+ (bm d)n
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Table 1 provides an example of Euro-dollar lending and
redeposits for two stages, after which the funds are lost
to the system.

It also presents net deposits, net loans,

and the value of the money multiplier.
T-accounts and

Note in the

calculation that the E$64 loan

deposit becomes a E$51 redeposit.
retention ratio is .8 ,

20%

Since the loan

of the funds are not recycled

but rather represent a leakage from the system.
The credit creation multiplier depends on the
leakages from the system in the same way as do net
deposits.

In reality, the reserves kept by banks on

Euro-dollar deposits are very low, frequently approaching
zero.

The Eurobanks are able to maintain these low

reserves because they generally equalize the maturities
of their Euro-dollar deposits and of their Euro-dollar
loans or redeposits.

Nonetheless,

small amounts of

reserves are kept for working balances purposes and
to recompense the New York banks for the paperwork
involved with large volumes of Euro-dollar t r a n s f e r s . ^

7
Wxllrams, o p . c i t ., p. 16; Scott, op. c i t ., p. 10;
Little, op. c i t ., pp. 14-16; Klopstock, The Euro-Dollar
M a r k e t o p . c i t ., pp. 6-7; Klopstock, "Money Creation
...," op. c i t ., p. 14.
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TABLE

1

T-ACCOUNTS AND CALCULATIONS
Eurobank A____________
$100 U.S.
deposit

E$100 primary
deposit

Eurobank B
$80 U.S.
deposit

which
becomes

which
becomes

$20 U.S.
deposit
(reserves)
E$80 deposit
at Eurobank B

$16 U.S.
deposit
(reserves)
E$64 Loan

Eurobank C
$51 U.S.
deposit

E$51 deposit
(payee)

$41 U.S.
deposit

U.S.
deposit
(reserves)
E$33 Loan
$8

Eurobank E

$5 U.S. deposit
(reserves)
E$21 deposit at
Eurobank P

E$41 deposit of
Eurobank C

which
becomes

$10 U.S.
deposit
(reserves)
E$41 deposit at
Eurobank D

which
becomes

+E$64 deposit
(loan)
-E$64 deposit
(upon use and
clearing)

Eurobank D

which
becomes

$26 U.S.
deposit

E$80 deposit of
Eurobank A

E$26 deposit
(payee)

+E$33 deposit
(loan)
-E$33 deposit
(upon use and
clearing)

Eurobank P
$21 U.S.
deposit

E$21 deposit of
Eurobank E

which
becomes
$4 U.S.
deposit
(reserves)
E$17 Loan

+E$17 deposit
(loan)
-E$17 deposit
(upon use and
clearing)
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TABLE 1 continued
a =

20%

Net Deposits
n

b = 80%

%

=

£
i =

d = 80%
m = 2

x = E$100

M __= ____ 1_________
l-bm d
M __= ____ 1 ________
l - .8 2 • 7s~
M

=

1________ _JL
1 - .51
.49

M => 2.04

0

Dn = 100 + 1 0 0 (.8 2 • .8 ) +
100(,84 * .82 )
%

Multiplier

x(hm d)x

= 100 + 51 + 26 = E$177

Net Loans
n+ 1
%

I'jj =

=

£
i =

x (bm d - 1 ) 1
1

1 0 0 (.82

100(.8

*

4 .

.81 _ 1 )
9 —1

.8Z i)

+

+

1 00 (.86 * .83"1)
LN = 64 + 33 + 17 = E$114
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The reserve ratio that prevailed in the last half of
the 1960's has been estimated to have been between one
and five percent.®
With regard to the number of intermediaries that
can exist on the rate spread between borrowing and
lending interest rates, little information is available.
It has been reported that spreads of 1/8 percent or less
were sufficient to induce intermediation by some London
Euro-banks.^

Given the normal 1/2 point spread

between bid and offer rates quoted in the p r e s s , t h r e e
intermediations could occur before a new deposit is
relent to a final borrower

(assuming the final

borrower pays the offer rate).

With a 50% redeposit

g
Williams, oj>. c i t ., p. 16; Scott,
pp. 1 0 - 1 1 .
9

0 £.

c i t .,

Saunders, op> e x t ., p. 23; Exnzxg, ojo. e x t .,

p. 73.
•1-0"Money Rates, "
each issue.

The Economist,

last page,
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ratef-*- the money multiplier, M = _______ 1______ , equals
l-bm d
about 1 .8 .
For every new primary deposit of $1 placed in the
Euro-dollar system, an original deposit of E$1 plus a
further E$.80 was created.

The Euro-dollar system has,

then, been able to approximately double its size by
credit creation.

It is an example of a fractional

reserve system, holding reserves of 50% on its deposit
liabilities

(based on the ratios assumed h e r e ) .

Various writers have attempted to estimate the
value of the multiplier at work in the Euro-dollar
system.

Klopstock has stated (without supporting

calculations) that the multiplier varies from 1.5 to

•^The rate assumed may be low since the European
central banks have practised recycling of Euro-dollar
funds gained in the foreign exchange market. Machlup,
"The Magicians...," o p . c i t ., p. 6 , discusses the prob
ability of redepositing.
The lowest probability
is assigned to the redeposit of loans made to U.S.
citizens. A somewhat higher probability of redeposit
attaches to loans to, or investments in debt instruments
of, non-U.S. non-financial Europe parties. The greatest
chance of redeposit derives from loans to financial
Europe individuals.
Taken together, the 50% redeposit
assumed is probably not completely unrealistic.
Indeed,
in 1970 and 1971 the greatest part of Euro-dollar loans
have been made to financial Europe individuals.
See
"Euro-dollar Banking: — ?" op,, c i t ., pp. 12-13.
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1.9.^

He maintains that the redeposit cycle terminates

at a very early phase since the high level of U.S. bank
borrowing has drained large quantities of funds from the
system.

However, Klopstock does not take into account

the recycling activities of the central banks

(halted

in mid-1971 in an attempt to slow the growth of the
mark e t ) .

In addition, the repayment by U.S. banks of

over $10 billion of borrowings of what were Euro-dollar
system reserves in 1970-71 and the increased demand and
use of Euro-dollar deposits by Europeans in 1971 have
served,

theoretically,

to increase the multiplier above

that postulated by K l o p s t o c k . ^

a redeposit rate of

.8

(rather than the .5 postulated above) would increase the
credit creation multiplier to 3.3 or more, ceterus
paribus.

12Fred Klopstock, The Eurodollar M a r k e t : Some U n 
resolved Issues, Essays in International Finance, No.
65 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 8 .
Multiplier values restated to conform to those used above.
•^These events occurred after Klopstock published
his study.
See"Eurodollar Banking:...?" op. c i t ., pp.
11- 12 .
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In contrast to Klopstock, Geoffrey B e l l ^ and
Milton Friedman -1-5 have argued that the multiplier
operating in the Euro-dollar system may be a good deal
larger than 2.

That is, for every dollar primary deposit,

more than one additional Euro-dollar is generated.
Friedman sees the possibility of an almost infinite
multiplier while Bell limits his to less than 10.
Friedman bases his thesis on the premise that there are
few if any reserves kept on Euro-dollar deposits and that
redeposits are substantial.

Bell is less sanguine about

the redeposit rate but still assumes that there is a
large reflow into the system.
Most other writers lean to the view that the multi
plier is quite small but only Klopstock has clearly
indicated an alternative explanation for the rise in'
Euro-dollar deposits outstanding over the last decade ,-1-5

■^Geoffrey Bell, "Credit Creation Through Euro
dollars?" The Banker, Vol. 114 (August, 1964), pp. 497498. Multiplier restated.
**-5 Friedman, op. c it., pp. 9-10.
16In his "Money Creation...," op. c i t ., pp. 14-15.
Klopstock accuses Friedman of confusing what is possible
with what actually occurs, (p. 1 2 )
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pointed to by Friedman as partial proof of his thesis.
Klopstock attributes the rise in Euro-dollar deposits
not to credit creation but to the attractiveness of the
Euro-dollar investment vehicle.
the Euro-dollar market, and,

Funds have flowed to

" . . .

in recent years

(Eurobanks) have drained huge balances from major foreign
money and loan markets."

17

Also, the placement of funds

in the market by foreign central banks has been sizeable.
These funds have derived from U.S. balance of payments
deficits which have placed more dollars in the hands of
central banks than they have desired to keep for
reserve purposes.'*'®
The dispute between Friedman and Klopstock over the
amount of ink in the Euro-dollar bookkeeper's pen (to
use Friedman's expression)

is an empty dialogue.

Both

men are correct in their different frames of reference.

^ I b i d ., p. 14.
•*-®The deficit has caused the supply of dollars to
exceed the demand for dollars at the fixed rates main
tained in the foreign exchange markets by the European
central banks.
They have, therefore, had to purchase
these "excess" dollars,
ibid.
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Klopstock views the Euro-dollar system from the vantage
point of reserve flows while Friedman views it primarily
from the point of reflows.

The supply of reserves is a

necessary condition for the expansion of Euro-dollar
deposits but to view all such deposits, as Klopstock
appears to do, as primary deposits is clearly incorrect.
By the same token, to presume that the overwhelming
majority of such deposits may be secondary deposits
(redeposits), as Friedman does, is to ignore the fact
that leakages of some magnitude do occur and that there
is some basis required upon which to build Euro-dollar
deposits.

Friedman is persuasive, however,

in showing

that the $9 billion U.S. liquidity deficit over the past
five years and the less than $5 billion decline in
central bank dollar holdings do not in any sense equal
the E$30 billion in deposits outstanding (1969) plus the
Eurobond issues placed over this period. - The difference
is clearly the result of credit creation within the
Euro-dollar system . ^

•^Friedman, pp. c it., p. 4. This ignores, of
course, the creation of official dollar reserves by the
BIS, as noted by Machlup, "The Magicians...," op. c i t ..
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It appears likely that the magnitude of the
multiplier has increased dramatically in the last few
years.

While U.S. bank borrowing drained reserves from

the system in the late 1960's and held down credit
creation , 2 0 the decline in U.S. bank borrowing in 1970-71
and the increased European demand for Euro-dollar deposits
allowed greater credit creation and raised the multiplier
to higher levels.

Future credit creation by the system

may be smaller than that which occurred in the past,
however.

European central banks have stopped recycling

pp. 12-14.
The inclusion of these created dollars in
official reserves thus causes an understatement of the
decline in central bank dollar holdings.
See also
Machlup's article referred to above, pp. 8-11, for a
discussion of the discovery by analysts that the
difference between U.S. liquid liabilities to official
foreign and foreign exchange holdings of foreign monetary
authorities was growing larger and larger in the midto late 1960's.
No plausible explanation except Eurodollar-creation appeared possible.

20

The sensxtivity of supply to interest rate
changes may have offset much of this leakage, however.
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dollars gained in foreign exchange operations^! and
uniform higher reserve requirements,

taxes, and other

discouragements have been under consideration as well.
These actions will undoubtedly reduce the flow and re
flow of funds into the Euro-dollar system.

Further,

until the international monetary system is reconstructed,
capital controls will continue to impede the flow of
funds across national boundaries.
restraints, however,

Even with these

it is doubtful that the supply

of ink in the b ookkeeper’s pen will run completely
B.

d r y .
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U.S. Bank Borrowing and Credit Creation
In the last half of the 1960's, U.S. banks steadily

increased their borrowings of Euro-dollars.

Much of

this increased activity was attributable to tight money
policies imposed by the Federal Reserve.

Euro-dollar

2 ^The

dollars gained now are either sold to the
U.S., exchanged for various Treasury issues, or not
purchased in the first place (the German floating mark
case).
See "Eurodollar Banking:...?" op. cit., pp. 1113; "Common Market Panel...," loc. ci t .; "Europe's Centre!
Banks...," loc. c i t .; "Bundesbank Will Buy...," loc. cit.;
"Central Banks Ponder...," loc. ci t .
22

"Eurodollar Banking:...?" op. ci t ., pp. 14-15;
"Central Banks Ponder...," pp. ci t ., p. 13.

borrowing was a valuable source of funds to individual
banks but did not bring about any appreciable increase
in the total U.S. money supply or in total reserves.

The

borrowing did, however, allow an expansion of loans by
U.S. banks at times when Federal Reserve pressures were
working to restrict such loans.

Beyond the maintenance

or increase in loan portfolios allowed by Euro-dollar
borrowing, U.S. banks were able to reduce for one day
their required reserves by the amount of the borrowing.
This was allowed, until September,
D.

1969, under Regulation

The draft used to collect the borrowed funds was

treated as a cash item in process of collection.
Thus,

the short term advantage in borrowing

Euro- dollars was the reduction in required reserves.
The long term advantage derived from obtaining funds
upon which reserves were not required.

Both these

advantages were reduced by Federal Reserve amendment of
the relevant regulations in 1969.
Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks has had major
effects on the Euro-dollar system.

On its face, this

major leakage of reserves must reduce severely the
amount of credit that can be created in the Euro-dollar
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system.

However,

to the extent that the additional

credit created in the U.S. as a result of these
borrowings generates higher U.S. incomes and thus higher
U.S. imports,

some of the dollars will flow back into the

Euro-dollar system.

In addition,

the higher Euro-dollar

interest rates generated by the increased U.S. bank
borrowing have drawn more funds into the Euro-dollar
market.

While it is likely that a complete offset to

the leakage caused by U.S. bank borrowing did not occur
in past years, nonetheless, U.S. credit creation based
on these borrowings may have had some positive effect
(as well as the direct negative effect) on Euro-dollar
system reserves.
Mention must also be made of the effect that money
creation by the Euro-dollar system has on U.S. banks.
This may seem quite obvious.

Credit creation in the

system has no effect on U.S. banks since it is not
Euro-dollar deposits that U.S. banks borrow but rather
Euro-dollar system reserves, and Eurobanks can not
"create" these reserves. Yet,
reserves,

if they can not "create"

they can, as a group and individually, obtain

more of them.

While U.S. banks individually can obtain
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reserves by selling assets and thereby altering the com
position of their asset structures, U.S. banks as a
group can not "create"

more reserves.

reserves at the expense of another.

One bank gains

Eurobanks individu

ally can also alter their asset structures to gain more
reserves.

But no Eurobank need lose reserves as a con

sequence of this alteration.
The Eurobank desiring more U.S. bank deposits
(Euro-dollar system reserves) may sell non-deposit
dollar assets in the United States.

This will provide

additional dollar deposits in U.S. banks.

However,

since these dollar assets may be minimal, Eurobanks
may also sell domestic currency assets at home.

The

domestic reserves gained may then be converted into
dollars

(U.S. bank deposits)

market.

in the foreign exchange

Neither of these actions

(sale of dollar assets

or of domestic assets and conversion) adversely affects
either U.S. banks or other Eurobanks.

They merely

transfer ownership of the deposit previously held by a
U.S. citizen or by the foreign central bank to the
Eurobank.

Indeed,

if the central bank sells dollars

it holds with the Federal Reserve,

the deposit is
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transferred to a U.S. commercial bank with ownership to
the Eurobank.

This increases U.S. bank reserves.

Eurobank activity, then, may increase U.S. system
reserves.

Whether this occurs or not,

has obtained more reserves.

the Eurobank

While the Eurobanks do not

create these reserves they do gain the use of them.

The

Federal Reserve can control the absolute amount of
dollar system reserves and the various European central
banks can control, equally,

the volume of domestic

currency reserves in their systems.

However, neither

has directly controlled the amount of Euro-dollar system
reserves.

The limits on Eurobank reserve gains are

therefore set by strictures placed on asset composition,
the actual magnitude of these assets, and the price they
are willing to pay for such reserves.
Credit creation by the Euro-dollar system has pre
sented U.S. banks with competition in the provision of a
transactions medium and in the provision of new loans.^3

23

.
. .
Some extensive discussions of the competitive
effects of the development of the Euro-dollar system have
been published.
This particular topic is beyond the
scope of the present paper, except tangentially.
See,
for an exceptionally clear and original exposition,
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The competitive aspects of the production of a new
dollar asset by less regulated non-U.S. banks can not
be underestimated.

While credit creation by the Euro

dollar system may have no direct effect on U.S. banks
(or, at most a temporarily positive o n e ) , indirectly
Euro-dollar credit creation has meant the growth of
a very competitive source of dollar denominated bank
deposits and loans.
Euro-dollar credit creation has also affected
individual U.S. banks.

They find themselves in a

more competitive atmosphere and, in addition, the
deposits they have issued to foreigners are generally
more volatile than domestically held deposits.

The

shifting of ownership of the deposit and the
movement of the deposit into and out of

Swoboda, op. pit., pp. 11-14, 17-22. Also see Helmut
Mayer, Some Theoretical Problems Relating to the EuroDollar M a r k e t , Essays in International Finance, No. 79
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 2631; Williams, op. c i t ., pp. 27-29; Bloch, pp. c i t ., pp.
22-24; Machlup, "Euro-Dollar Creation:...," o p . c i t ..
p. 243; and Makowski, pp. c i t ., p. 182.
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particular banks may require the banks to hold an
increased level of reserves.^4

The higher reserve ratio

reduces credit creation possibilities in the U.S. system
and represents a leakage from the system.

This is one of

the penalties borne by a system whose currency serves as
an international money.
The effects on European banks individually and
collectively of credit creation in the Euro-dollar system
are quite varied.

The existence of the Euro-dollar system

presents to the banking institutions of these countries
competitive problems similar to those faced by U.S.
banks.

Borrowers and depositors now have an alternative

monetary system available to them.

Its currency is

accepted by creditors and convertible into other currencies
on demand.

The Eurobanks generate both dollar denominated

and home currency loans and deposits.

They appear to be in

a more favorable position than their counterparts in the
United States since they offer a broader product line than
U.S. banks.

However, this difference is more apparent than

This is, at least, the normal assumption made.
Greater volatility requires a higher safety margin of re
serves.
John Leimone, "The Euro-dollar Market: An Element
in Monetary Policy," Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Monthly
Review, Vol. 53, Mo. 8 (August, 1968), p.4, notes that in
creased Euro-dollar transactions tend to substitute more
volatile demand deposits for less volatile time deposits.
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real for large U.S. banks have international facilities
and can lend any currency desired (or they can lend
dollars that can be converted into the desired currency).
The development of the Euro-dollar system has re
duced the market power of the banks in particular
countries.

Cartel arrangements among national banks in

Europe had tended to reduce competition in the money
m a r k e t s . T h e Euro-dollar system, however, makes
available to prospective borrowers and depositors a wide
range of institutions and its international character has
tended to undermine the cartel arrangements that
previously e x i s t e d . T h e Euro-banks face competition
from other Eurobanks and also from banks in the United
States.
The effect of Euro-dollar credit creation on Euro
pean monetary systems is substantial.

Borrowers of

Euro-dollars may, at their option, convert loan proceeds

2^Bloch, l o c . c i t .; Swoboda, lo c . c it.
26Ronald McKinnon, Private and Official Inter
national M o n e y : The Case for the Dollar, Essays in
International Finance, No. 74 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1969), p. 21.
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into domestic currency in the foreign exchange markets.
The central bank must supply the home currency in order
to maintain the par value of its currency.

Therefore,

without offsetting monetary policy, the existence of the
Euro-dollar system and the availability of funds from it
(and through the foreign exchange markets the availability
of domestic currency) will increase the money supply in
the home country.

The lack of control over the creation

of Euro-dollars combined with foreign exchange market
requirements means that an additional uncontrollable
source of domestic liquidity is available to home citizens.
The central banks can, of course, reduce Euro
dollar system reserves by holding the dollars gained in
these transactions.

Further, they can offset the inflow

of domestic purchasing power by restrictive monetary
policy.

These actions may not be desirable to the central

bank forced to take them, however.

In addition, they

may be counterproductive, attracting greater amounts of
foreign purchasing power due to high interest rates.
U.S. bank borrowing of Euro-dollars has had
several effects on the European countries.

Since such

borrowing reduces the reserves of the system, it reduces
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the credit creating power of the system and thus the
possible impact on European domestic liquidity.

On the

other hand, U.S. bank borrowing has driven up Euro-dollar
interest rates and has tended to draw funds into the
system . 2 7

This flow of funds transmits the high rates

prevailing in the Euro-dollar system to the various
national systems and may offset easy money policies being
pursued by the central banks.

Also, the flow of funds

replenishes Euro-dollar system reserves lost due to U.S.
bank borrowing and allows continued credit creation to
occur.

The net result of these forces may be a continued

flow of liquidity into the national systems, since the
credit creating power of the Euro-dollar system remains
substantial.
To summarize, U.S. bank borrowing reduces the
reserves and the credit creation capabilities of the
Euro-dollar system.

It also tends to transmit to other

national money markets high interest rates prevailing in
the U.S. during times of tight money.

27

Klopstock,
o p . c i t .. p. 73.

Finally, it tends

"Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity...,"
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to draw funds from these money markets into the Euro
dollar system (and then to the U.S.) depleting fund
supplies in these countries.
Credit creation in the Euro-dollar system has
little direct effect on U.S. banks since these banks
borrow, ultimately,

the reserves of the Euro-dollar

system and these reserves are limited in magnitude.
Indirectly,

credit creation assists the Eurobanks to

compete in the production of dollar denominated assets
with U.S. banks.

However, while Euro-dollar credit

creation has made it easier for these banks to compete
with U.S. banks, it has also introduced competition into
the European banking system.

Finally, credit creation

in the Euro-dollar system introduces into the various
European monetary systems both leakages and injections'
of funds over which the central banks have exerted less
than full control.
The following section is concerned with the various
actions central banks can take to offset the effects of
Euro-dollar credit creation.

It concludes with a

brief discussion of the similarity between Federal Re
serve open market operations and the evolving policy of
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the European central banks with regard to the Euro
dollar system.
III.
A.

Official Intervention and Credit Creation

Central Bank Investment O p e r a t i o n s ^ ®
Until fairly recently, European central banks

entered the Euro-dollar market primarily for investment
purposes and for domestic stabilization reasons.

The

actions of these banks were generally uncoordinated and
were aimed at solving specific national problems.

The

banks have found, however, that the multinational scope
of the Euro-dollar system makes it quite difficult to
exert any control over the system.
From the return to convertibility in 1958 until
the surge of Euro-dollar borrowing by the U.S. banks in
1969, there were few controls on the operation of the

2®Clendenning, oja. ci t .. pp. 44-45 indicates that
investment activities did not play a major role in cen
tral bank intervention or participation in the market.
Others, however, note the use of the market for such pur
poses and indicate the investment was a primary reason
for these banks' entry.
The fact of recycling, which was
undertaken constantly over several years, implies in
vestment as well as stabilization goals.
See, on this
point, "Eurodollar Banking:...?" o£. c i t ., p. 13 and the
various Wall Street Journal articles referred to in this
chapter. Williams, o p . c i t ., p. 10 also supports this
view.
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Euro-dollar market.

29

This is not to say that central

banks did not enter the market during this time but rather
that it was basically a free market with few real re
strictions.

The central banks operated within the market

structure and did not attempt to change it.

As noted in

Chapter 3, central banks have been active suppliers of
Euro-dollar funds and, in a few cases, they have been
demanders of funds as well.

They have supplied funds

both in order to gain a high interest return and also
in an attempt to control domestic liquidity or offset
the effects of window dressing activities by their
commercial b a n k s .
The investment activities of the European central
banks eventually generated difficulties which they had
not anticipated.
disruptive,

The stabilization policies were less

in the long term, than were the investment

activities since the former were temporary in nature.

29

"Euro-dollars: A Changing Market," pp. ci t .,
pp. 779-784; Donald Hodgman, Euro-Dollars and National
Monetary Policies, Irving Economic Study (New York:
Irving Trust Co., 1971 (?)), pp. 13-24.
^^illiams,

op. c i t ., pp. 10-11.
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Central banks have kept dollars as international
reserves for many years.

Many of these reserves were

placed in various money market instruments in the United
States or in deposit balances at the Federal Reserve or
commercial banks.

As the Euro-dollar market developed

it was a logical extension of these banks' basic
investment policies to place dollar funds in the
investment vehicles offered in this market.

31

Placement

of funds in the system gave the central banks an
;

opportunity to keep the funds closer to home, allowed
them to assist their banks in competing with U.S. banks,
and perhaps most important, enabled them to earn a
higher return on their reserves than was available in
the U.S.

^ T h e facilities of the BIS offer an alternative
to the direct placement of these excess dollar reserves.
Central banks may deposit dollars with the BIS and the
BIS then invests the dollars gained in Euro-dollar
instruments.
Thus, whether the central banks or the BIS
redeposit the dollars in the Euro-dollar market, the
system becomes more closed and leakages from it are
reduced.
Machlup, "The Magicians...," o£. cit., pp. 1113 illustrates this process and notes not only the Euro
dollar credit creation that can result from this
activity but also the reserve dollar creation occurring
through BIS issuance of dollar deposit liabilities.
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In addition, as the basic U.S. balance of payments
continued to worsen, an ever increasing amount of dollars
flowed into these central banks.

These became excess

international reserves but, given the precarious con
dition of the gold exchange standard, all the dollars
could not be converted into gold or own currencies at the
U.S. Treasury.

Further, there was little reason to wish

to convert the excess dollars into sterile non-yielding
gold balances.32

Thus, the dollars were placed in the

Euro-dollar system for the return they could bring.
It appears that the central banks did not realize
the consequences that could result from their investment
activities.

The flow of funds into the Euro-dollar

system that these banks originated was a flow of Euro
dollar system reserves.

These primary deposits allowed

the creation of additional Euro-dollar deposits
(derivative deposits) and thus assisted in the growth of
the Euro-dollar system.

^ T h a t is, there was no reason to obtain non
yielding gold except the feeling that ultimate value
rested in gold and that there were/are risks involved in
maintaining a position in national currencies, especially
ones that may be devalued.
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The effects of this central bank supported
expansion of Euro-dollar deposits were several.

First,

the Euro-dollar deposit expansion allowed the Euro
dollar system to develop into a strong and mature
monetary system able to engage in a great many financial
operations.

Further, this development fed upon itself,

making the Euro-dollar an acceptable currency for more
and more kinds of transactions.

Also, the market's

strength and breadth attracted additional funds
suppliers,

further increasing its reserve base.

Second,

the expansion allowed the system to extend

ever larger amounts of loans.

These loans were sometimes

converted to domestic currencies and were sometimes used
in the form in which they were received.

As noted above,

the conversion of Euro-dollar loans/deposits into
domestic currency increases the liquidity of the parti
cular economy

i n v o l v e d .

^3

The central bank must supply

the funds for this expansion if it is to maintain the

33

Williams, o£. c i t .. pp. 39-40 discusses the
effects of Euro-dollar lending on other countries.
He
notes the implications of this lending on interest rate
policy, on credit policy, on central banks, and on the
attempts by these banks to deal with speculative flows.
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par value of its currency vis-a-vis the dollar.

The

receiving central bank, having added to its dollar
reserves, normally reinvested (recycled) the funds by
purchasing Euro-dollar system instruments, i.e., by
placing the dollars in Euro-dollar deposits.

The

potential leakage from the Euro-dollar system represented
by the conversion of Euro-dollar deposits into domestic
currency was halted and a further expansion of Euro
dollar deposits was made possible by the central bank
redeposits.
Third, the expansion greatly sensitized the
European money markets to various international
pressures,

especially those emanating from the United

S tates .3 4

A restricted availability of funds in the

United States, such as the 1969 experience, tends to
drive up interest rates both in the U.S. and, as demand

3 4 Scott, o£>. c i t ., pp. 17-27 has an especially com
plete discussion of this integration of national money
markets.
See also C.P. Kindleberger, "The Euro-Dollar
and the Internationalization of United States Monetary
Policy," Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro Quarterly Review,
No. 8 8 (March, 1969), pp. 13-15.
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is diverted from the U.S. money market to the Euro-dollar
market, in the Euro-dollar market as well.

Funds from

various European money markets are then drawn into the
Euro-dollar market and, as supply drops in the national
money markets, domestic interest rates are driven up.
The rise in rates may contradict the monetary authorities'
policy goals.
A rise in rates in the national money market can be
countered by an increased supply of reserves to the banks,
provided by the central bank.

This response may not have

the desired effect of lowering interest rates, however,
because the funds may leak out of the national system and
into the Euro-dollar system as rapidly as they are
supplied.

Unless the central bank is able and willing to

supply sufficient funds to offset the restricted avail
ability of funds in the U.S., there appears to be little
that can be done to keep domestic rates down without re
sorting to various capital controls to staunch the outflow.
When reserves become more readily available
in the United States, as they did in 1970, a reduced
demand for Euro-dollars by U.S. banks results.
occurs because Euro-dollars are a relatively

This
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expensive alternative source of funds to the

b a n k s .

The reduced demand will tend to pull down Euro-dollar
market rates and national money market rates.

While

the pressure on those countries attempting to maintain
easy money may abate, the pressures deriving from the
Euro-dollar system on those countries implementing
tight money will become severe.

The 1970-71 German

case illustrates this d i l e m m a . A s U.S. reserve
availability increased, U.S. banks reduced their Euro
dollar borrowing and paid off those liabilities out
standing.

This reduced demand drove interest rates down

in the Euro-dollar market.

The reduced cost of funds

drew German borrowers into the market and discouraged

^Wallach, oja. c i t ., pp. 13-14 has written that
Euro-dollar borrowing would not decline with the easing
of money in the United States because interest rates .
would move down in the Euro-dollar market in sequence
with U.S. rates. However, the availability of funds
from U;S. sources in amounts in excess of those desired
b y U.S. banks has meant a reduction in, rather than the
maintenance of, Euro-dollar borrowing by the banks.
See Coombs, o ]d . c i t . (March, 1971 and September,
1970), and Hodgman, lo c . c i t .
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German suppliers from entering it.

The combination of

increased loanable funds supplies in Germany and reduced
borrowing in Germany tended to push interest rates down
and increased the liquidity of the German economy.

The

Bundesbank could have reinforced its tight money policy
by further restrictive actions but, again, it would have
been necessary to reduce reserve availability by some
proportion of the incoming funds and increased domestic
supplies.
!

As is evident, the Euro-dollar system and credit
creation therein has served as a conduit for the trans
mission of monetary pressures from the United States to
European countries.

Only if all these countries,

including the United States, were "in phase" would this
this problem be minimized .3 7

The pressures flow primarily

from the U.S. to the European countries, a situation not
unlike pre-Euro-dollar system days.

The development of

3 7 "Eurodollar Banking:...?" o£. c i t ., p. 12. But
as Hodgman, o j d . c i t ., p. 14 notes, the impact of the
operation of the Euro-dollar market can not be completely
eliminated even when the business cycle phases in
various countries coincide.

this system has merely intensified and quickened the
transmission of the pressures.

38

The size of the

U.S. economy# the importance of the dollar in world
trade generally and as the reserve currency of the
Euro-dollar system in particular# and the present
system of precariously fixed exchange rates have
combined to make conditions prevailing in the U.S.
felt in the European countries quite rapidly.
Reverse pressures do not seem to be particularly
important except during periods of exchange rate
speculation.

Even then the U.S. is relatively

isolated from these pressures.

38

Euro-dollar borrowing

Hodgman# op. c i t ., p. 29; Kindleberger# op., c i t .
pp. 12-14; "The Future of the Dollar#" First National
City Bank Monthly Economic Letter (November# 1970),
p. 125.
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by U.S. banks in times of tight money may, as noted,
ease reserve stringencies but the Federal Reserve can
offset these inflows more easily than can their counter
parts in European countries.

Euro-dollar inflows

contribute a smaller proportion to U.S. liquidity
than they do to European liquidity.39

Further, the

reserve status of the dollar under the international
exchange standard does not require an open end
commitment to support its value in the foreign
exchange markets as is the case with other countries'
currencies.
To conclude, the investment activities of the
European central banks have been aimed at maximizing the
return on reserves that could not readily be transformed

39

Williams,

ojd .

c i t ., pp. 43-45.
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into gold or domestic currency.

These operations fed the

growth of the Euro-dollar system and allowed increased
credit creation to occur.

This resulted in the central

b a n k s ' loss of complete control over the liquidity of the
domestic system and sensitized the money markets to
conditions prevailing in the United States.

These problems

have until recently been attacked by piecemeal responses
that have been of limited effectiveness.

Section C will

discuss these responses and those which have been
contemplated.

B.

Central Bank Stabilization Activities
European central banks and official institutions

have also entered the Euro-dollar market for domestic
stabilization purposes.
structures,

To maintain interest rate

for instance, these central banks have

frequently bought Euro-dollars at quarterly bank statement
dates as commercial banks attempted to temporarily convert
their dollar assets into domestic currency for window
dressing purposes.

After the statement date, the central

banks have resupplied these Euro-dollars to the banks.
Swap arrangements and repurchase agreements have also been
used,

in addition to outright purchases and later resales.

Central banks have also entered the Euro-dollar market to
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control domestic liquidity levels, especially
during times of exchange rate speculation when "hot"
money flows have threatened to dry up or flood the
domestic money markets.

40

Any action by a central bank which supplies funds
to the Euro-dollar system will, as with investment
actions, supply reserves to the system and support
credit expansion by the system.

However,

these

stabilization activities may not be particularly
important over the long term since they are relatively
temporary in nature and are reversed when the pressures
they are designed to offset subside.

Only to the

extent that there may be trends at work for which
there must be constant compensations will these
activities have a long term effect.

40

Under-

or over-valued

The above and following paragraphs are based
upon the descriptions of stabilization activities in
Williams, op. c i t ., pp. 10-11 as well as on Clendenning,
o p . c i t ., pp. 43-45; Kvasnicka, op., c i t ., p. 12;
Klopstock, The Euro-Dollar Market..., o p . ci t ., pp. 2-3;
Helmut Mayer, op. c i t ., pp. 12-15.
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exchange rates,

for instance, may require fairly

constant stabilization activities.
The following section discusses recent European
central bank operations in the Euro-dollar system.

It

draws a parallel between these operations and Federal
Reserve open market operations in the U.S. money markets.
C.

Open Market Operations

41

In 1970 and 1971 European central banks, together
with the BIS, realized that their activities in the
Euro-dollar narket were at least partially responsible

The first use of the term open market operations
to describe official intervention in the Euro-dollar
market with the aim of influencing credit creation in
that system was made in "Eurodollar Banking:...?" o p .
c i t . (July; 1971), p. 13.
Previously, mention of
multipliers and the like appeared in the Wall Street
Journal. Gaines, "Public Policy Issues," ojo. c i t ., pp.
2-4 has applauded the Treasury's decision to issue bonds
to soak up the excess Euro-dollars.
Its acceptance of
its ultimate responsibility for the supply of dollars
in the world markets is commended by Gaines.
There is
some question as to the logic of this. Why, for.
instance, should Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks be
viewed as undesirable but Treasury borrowing of these
same Euro-dollars be commended? A distinction between
the effects of the borrowing by the two types of
institution may be drawn (especially with reference to
the efficiency of monetary policy) but if the goal is
the control of the world supply of dollars, then it
makes no difference what U.S. institution does the
borrowing.
Indeed, it may be more desirable to have the
banks do the borrowing.
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for that system's remarkable g r o w t h . T h e y had become
more and more concerned with the effects the Euro-dollar
system was having on their own particular monetary
systems, especially with regard to the frequent con
tradiction by the system of monetary policy goals of the
central banks.

The various currency crises, particularly

that in the spring of 1971 when the mark came under
extraordinary pressure, and in which the Euro-dollar
market played a major role in facilitating the destabi
lizing money movements, crystallized the central banks'
determination to take measures to counteract the in
fluence

of the Euro-dollar system.

In 1969 various controls were instituted by some of
the central banks in an attempt to limit the movements of
funds into and out of their c o u n t r i e s . ^3

Primarily,

^2This realization has been evident from the reports
on various meetings held by European central banks.
See,
on this topic, "Europe's Central Banks Agree...," loc.
cit.; "Drive for Eurodollar Curbs Called A i d e d , ...," l o c .
cit.; "Central Banks Ponder...," lo c . c i t .
43

"Euro-dollarss A Changing Market," l o c . c i t .;
Hodgman, op,. c i t ., pp. 13-24.
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the desire then was to reduce the flow of funds being
drawn into the Euro-dollar system by the high rates
vailing there.

pre

These flows adversely affected the

balance of payments of the countries experiencing the
outflows.

These controls were placed on the domestic

banks and were only mildly successful since British banks
were still free of these controls and were the center of
the market.

Further, the movement of funds by individuals

was not particularly restricted.
The combination of events in 1969 was quite dis
similar to the situation which prevailed in late 1970
and in early 1971.

In 1969 U.S. banks borrowed heavily

in the market at a time when tight money policies were in
effect in both the U.S. and in Germany.

There were,

therefore, no contradictory pressures existing between
these two systems.

Other European countries, however,

were attempting to maintain somewhat easier monetary
policies than those prevailing in the U.S. and Germany.
They were generally able to offset the pressures to
ward higher rates emanating from the Euro-dollar system
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by continued increases in the liquidity of their
44
systems.
In the more recent period (1970-71), U.S. banks
paid back much of their massive Euro-dollar
liabilities.

This tended to drive interest rates

down in the Euro-dollar market.

In addition, upward

revaluation of several European currencies was expected
by many currency speculators.

Thus, the pressures

arising from the Euro-dollar market were substantially
different

from those of 1969.

While funds were being drawn out of the national
systems,
1970-71.

in 1969, funds were flowing into the systems in
Germany, continuing its attempt to maintain

tight money and facing large balance of payments sur
pluses which placed its currency under upward valuation
pressures, was presented with Euro-dollar system
influences that were completely inimical to its
requirements.

Other countries, including Switzerland,

Belgium, Austria, and the Netherlands also were ex
periencing revaluation pressures and consequent

44

For a comprehensive report on these developments
see the articles by Coombs, op. ci t . (March and
September of each year), various pages.

inflows of funds.

45

The U.S., with a continuing massive

balance of payments problem, supplied additional dollars
to the system.
The Euro-dollar system provided a convenient
source of funds to speculators.

Once borrowed, the

Euro-dollar funds could be converted into the
currencies that were likely candidates for revaluation.
This, of course,

forced more unwanted dollars into the

central banks which, if recycled, would wind up right
back in their reserves on the next circuit.

In 1969

several European' currencies were under speculative
attack as candidates for devaluation.

Hot money

flowed from these currencies into the Euro-dollar system.
In contrast, in 1970 and 1971, the dollar came under
speculative attack and hot money flowed into these
currencies.

45Ibid.

These tremendous flows of very volatile
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funds at last brought action from the central banks.
This action is remarkably similar in effect to that
generated by open market operations of the Federal
Reserve in the United States.
Federal Reserve open market operations involve
the sale or purchase of bonds and the consequent
reduction or increase in bank reserve levels.

The

Euro-dollar system, however, operates in a manner
slightly different from the U.S. monetary system.
Eurobonds do not play a major role in the
availability of reserves in this system.

46

^6

pother,

This xs not to say that such bonds could not
play an important role in the future.
Should a
sufficient quantity of these Eurobonds be outstanding
and a portion be held by the central banks or other
official authorities, this vehicle could be used to
control reserve levels.
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the reserves of the Euro-dollar system are not created by
European central banks but rather are merely U.S. bank
deposits.

To affect these reserves and thereby credit

creation by the system requires adding or withdrawing U.S.
bank deposits from the system.
The Euro-dollar open market is a market for dollar
deposits.

Bids for and offers of deposits are made in a

manner similar to bids and offers in the U.S.
market or in the Federal Funds market.

(bond) open

The central banks

may, therefore, supply reserves to the market or drain them
from the market by offering or bidding for Euro-dollar
deposits.

In this way they may influence reserve

availability in the system.
In addition to the difference in the type of open
market and instruments used, the goals of the authorities
vary somewhat.

In the Euro-dollar system, the central

banks attempt to influence reserves and credit creation not
to affect national income, directly, but rather to alter or
lessen the impact of the system on foreign exchange markets,
central bank reserves, domestic money markets, and domestic
monetary policy efficiency.

Certainly,

the final impact is

on national income unless compensatory actions are taken,
but the goals supporting interference are different from
those in the U.S.

In Europe,

the direct effect of the
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Euro-dollar system on the exchange rate and central bank
reserves may often be the primary causal factor behind
these central bank open market operations.

Rarely is

this the goal of open market operations in the United
States.
While

the type of market is somewhat different and

the immediate goals of the operations may vary between
the Federal Reserve and European central banks, the same
basic tool or measure
cases.

(bank reserves)

is utilized in both

Control of reserve balances brings a measure of

control of the credit creating abilities of the system
involved.

In the U.S., the control of credit creation is

undertaken for domestic stabilization.
dollar system,

Within the Euro

control is desired in order to moderate

the effects of Euro-dollar flows on the various national
systems and upon exchange rate fluctuations.

The "hot"

money flows that upset exchange rate relationships and the
flow of funds into and out of the national systems in
search of maximum safety or interest returns involves the
transmission of monetary pressures between the U.S. and
Europe.

These open market operations by the European

central banks may influence to some degree the impact, of
these flows on the national systems.
The operations at present consist of attempts by
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major European central banks to cooperate in their
deposit policies,

in the spring of 1971 these banks

first agreed to withhold new deposits from the Euro
dollar system .^

That is, they decided that for the

present they would not recycle dollar funds gained in
their foreign exchange market operations.

Later,

they

further agreed that, in addition to withholding "new"
deposits, they would withdraw selectively some of
the funds already placed in the Euro-dollar system.
These actions, of course, reduce the reserves and thus
the credit creating potential of the system and its
impact on the various national economies.
The BIS has also been active in placing funds in
the Euro-dollar system over the years and has gained a
wide knowledge of the operations and mechanics of the
Euro-dollar system.

47

It appears to be developing into

"Europe's Central Banks...," l oc. cit.« "Central
Banks Ponder...," l o c . c i t .? "A Step to Slow Eurodollar
Flows," Business W e e k , No. 2175 (May 15, 1971), pp.
110- 111 .
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the primary coordinator of European central bank actions
to influence the Euro-dollar system's r e s e r v e s . ^

The

U.S. Treasury has been cooperating in these attempts to
control the Euro-dollar system.

Since withholding and

withdrawing funds from the system means that large
amounts of dollar funds accumulate in central bank
reserves,

the U.S. has moved to provide alternative

investment vehicles to these banks to soak up their
excess dollars.

It has issued large amounts of bonds

to the central banks providing a relatively high rate
of i n t e r e s t . I n addition, in order to moderate the
return flow of funds from U.S. banks to the Euro
dollar system, the Treasury and the Export-Import Bank
have issued special securities to U.S. bank foreign

"A First Step to Curb the Eurodollar Market,"
Business W e e k , No. 2181 (June 19, 1971), p. 35.
SO

Ibid.; "Bundesbank Will Buy...," lo c . c i t .;
"Euro-dollar Banking:...?" ojd. c i t ., pp. 13-14.
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branches to soak up some of these funds (and Euro
dollar system reserves as w e l l ) .51

These actions have

immobilized large quantities of Euro-dollar reserves
and have limited the expansion of credit by the system.
Finally, the New York Federal Reserve Bank, as the
operating arm of the Federal Reserve System, has experi
mented with intervention in the forward market for marks
in order to decrease the incentive that has existed to
swap Euro-dollars for marks.52

That is, it has attempted

to reduce the gains possible from interest arbitrage and
thus slow the flow of dollar funds to the Bundesbank.
This action, of course, really reduces leakages from the
Euro-dollar system and encourages credit creation.
any case,

In

it was not particularly successful and was

halted.
The first conscious effort to influence credit
creation by the Euro-dollar system has been undertaken

51"Treasury, Seeking to Sop Up Eurodollars, Offers
New Issue to U„S. Banks Abroad," Wall Street Journal
(July 20, 1971), p. 6 ; Gaines, "Public Policy Issues,"
l o c . c i t .• "Treasury Slates...," l o c . ci t . These issues
were allowed to mature in late 1971 during the floating
exchange rates period that existed then.
5 2 "New York Reserve Experiment," l o c . c i t .

by these institutions.

Previously, all these groups

had influenced the system, but in a haphazard manner.
Each had its own motives and goals and these frequently
conflicted with the goals of the others.

As with the

operation of the present international monetary
standard, cooperation is essential to the operation of
any effective controls on the Euro-dollar system.

The

Federal Reserve does not follow the goal of yield maxi
mization and the official institut i.ons that are
attempting to affect the Euro-dollar system will have
to do likewise.

They must subordinate their desire to

maximize income in order to develop effective stabili
zation or credit creation control policies for the
Euro-dollar system.
The United States has provided alternative
investment vehicles to alleviate the loss of income this
subordination entails and to moderate returning dollar
flows to the Euro-dollar system from U.S. banks.

Further,

the dollars gained by the Treasury through the sale of
bonds to the European central banks has had the side
effect of reducing the demands made on the U.S. money
markets by Treasury deficit financing.

This, of
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course, has had the effect of reducing interest rates
in U.S. money markets and driving more funds into the
Euro-dollar system, reducing rates there.
It appears that the situation created by central
bank investment and recycling activities in the Euro
dollar system may be brought under control through the
coordinated efforts of the various official
institutions involved.

Direct controls, such as the

institution of uniform reserve requirements are also
under consideration . 5 3

They will probably be necessary

in order to domesticate the Euro-dollar system fully.
These measures may well be less than completely
effective in controlling the market, however, since the
Euro-dollar system is not tied to a particular
country or area.

As one U.S. banker said, in response

to the contemplated regulation of the Euro-dollar system,
"If they start regulating the Eurodollar market, we'll

53

"Drive for Eurodollar Curbs Called Aided,...,"
l o c . c i t . 7 "Common Market Panel...," lo c . c i t .; "Central
Banks Ponder...," loc. c i t .
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just open a branch in Kinshasa and call them Congo
d o l l a r s . C o o p e r a t i o n or coordination of policies,
thus, is a primary requirement for any effective control
of the system5 ^
control.

but may not be sufficient for such

Capital controls may also be necessary to gain

complete control.

"Central Banks Ponder...," o p . c i t ., p. 13.
55

Such coordination was suggested by former
Federal Reserve Board chairman, William M. Martin, in
September, 1970.
See "International Control of Euro
dollar Market Suggested by Former Reserve Board Chief,"
Wall Street Journal (September 15, 1970), p. 5. Some
form of open market operations utilizing the BIS as
an international central bank was suggested by
Kindleberger, loc. c i t . The foresight of this
suggestion was a rare insight in an otherwise super
ficial article.
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To the extent that the major European central
banks control a significant part of the reserves of
the system, however, open market operations may be
effective in moderating credit creation by the system
no matter where it is physically located.

Should this

be the case, the destabilizing effects of such creation
on monetary conditions and exchange rate structures may
be lessened appreciably and capital controls may not
be required.
The following chapter is concerned specifically
with the effects of U.S. bank borrowing on the
efficiency of U.S. monetary policy.

Credit creation

as such by the Euro-dollar system will not be important
since reserves rather than deposits are borrowed by
U.S. banks.

However,

flows of new funds into the

system in response to this borrowing will be important.

CHAPTER VI
EURO-DOLLAR BORROWING AND U.S. MONETARY POLICY
I.

Introduction

More has been written about the impact of U.S. bank
Euro-dollar borrowing on U.S. monetary policy than on any
other aspect of the Euro-dollar phenomenon.

This relative

profusion has not, however, been accompanied by any agree
ment on the complex interactions that occur between Euro
dollar borrowing and U.S. monetary policy.

The purpose

of this chapter is to outline the major effects of U.S.
bank Euro-dollar borrowing on the efficiency of U.S.
monetary policy.

In addition, some mention of Federal

Reserve controls on this borrowing will be made and the
future effect of Euro-dollar borrowing on monetary policy
will be postulated.
Basically, this chapter concludes that the
effectiveness, of a given degree of monetary tightness in
the U.S. is influenced both positively and negatively by
Euro-dollar borrowing.

The positive aspects occur

through the transmission of monetary policy to all the
banks in the system more rapidly than was the case prior
to the existence of Euro-dollar borrowing.
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Additionally,
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a more even impact on the various classes of banks of a
given monetary policy is postulated.

The availability

of Euro-dollars to U.S. banks has apparently reduced the
discriminatory impact of monetary policy on certain U.S.
money market banks.
Negatively, Euro-dollar borrowing has offset, to
some unquantifiable degree, the impact of a given amount
of monetary tightness.

It has also added an additional

factor to those that the Federal Reserve must take into
consideration when implementing monetary policy.

Finally,

it may have promoted a feeling of loan availability during
tight money periods, an atmosphere directly contrary to
that being fostered by the Federal Reserve.'*'

Thus,

Euro-dollar availability has introduced a leakage
an additional variable)

(and

into U.S. monetary policy.

In the

absence of the positive effects postulated above, these
factors may require a greater effort by the Federal Reserve
than was previously necessary in order to achieve a given
level of tightness in the U.S. monetary system.

Further,

the variation in the results attained by a given Federal
Reserve action may have been increased.
This chapter will explore in some detail these
positive and negative effects of U.S. bank Euro-dollar
borrowing and will attempt to reach some conclusions on the

^Brimmer, Euro-Dollar Flows..., o p . ci t . , p. 4.
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net effect of these influences on the efficiency of U.S.
monetary policy.
II.

Reserves, Credit Creation, and Euro-Dollar
Borrowing

Euro-dollar borrowing is undertaken by U.S. banks
primarily to offset reserve stringencies imposed by the
Federal Reserve in its implementation of tight money.
As noted in Chapters 3 and 4, Euro-dollar borrowing is a
direct response to tight money conditions and is rela2
tively unimportant m times of easy money.
Euro-dollars
represent an expensive alternative source of funds and,
as such, U.S. banks have turned to the Euro-dollar system

'‘However, m 1967, during an easy money period,
Euro-dollar liabilities of U.S. banks continued to grow and
exceeded the levels attained during the short 1966 tight
money experience.
This appeared to indicate; that U.S.
banks had come to view the Euro-dollar system as a per
manent addition to their sources of liquidity.
Further
experience and increased borrowing costs, however, caused
a decline in Euro-dollar borrowings and verified the
marginal nature of the system to U.S. banks, as did the
analysis undertaken in Chapter 4. Also, the use of Euro
dollar borrowings to reduce required reserves via the cash
items in process of collection method, and tacit agree
ments among banks on one day trades to effect this result,
may explain the increased borrowing levels experienced in
these years.
See, on this subject, Federal Reserve Bank
of New York Office Correspondence, "Revision of Money
Supply," 0 £. c i t ., pp. 787-789; Little, o p . cit., p. 13;
Kvasnicka, o£. c i t . , pp. 14-15; Wallich, op. cit., p. 13;
and Leimone, 0 £. c i t ., p. 3.
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for funds primarily when domestic funds were either not
available or were more expensive than Euro-dollars.

When

money has become available, the banks have deserted the
Euro-dollar market in spite of the erosion of their reserve
free base that occurs when they do so.3
Euro-dollar borrowing allows individual banks to
increase their loan portfolios during times when the
Federal Reserve is pursuing tight money policies.

This

is accomplished, as noted in Chapter 2, by obtaining a
claim on a deposit in another U.S. bank, converting the
claim into reserves at the Federal Reserve, and ex
changing a created demand deposit in the amount of the
reserves gained for a debt instrument.

Thus, one bank

loses reserves, loans, and demand deposits and another
gains reserves, loans, and demand deposits.

The net

result, then, is a redistribution of assets and liabilities
between the gaining and losing >banks.

-^While the Federal Reserve originally instituted
the 1 0 % reserve requirement on all liabilities outstanding
above a given base to moderate the banks' borrowing of
Euro-dollars, it subsequently attempted to use this tool
to reduce the reflows of funds to Europe.
This was under
taken in order to alleviate the effects of these repayments
on the U.S. balance of payments.
By raising to 20%
(in January 1971) the reserves required on all liabilities
outstanding above the base and specifying that the compu
tation of the reserve-free base would be based on the
current level of Euro-dollar liabilities outstanding, the
Federal Reserve hoped to induce the banks to maintain
their Euro-dollar borrowing levels, and thus their bases,
even though the immediate comparative costs of so doing
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However, in addition to the redistribution that
occurs, the use of the Euro-dollar vehicle creates a
liability to foreign branches on the borrowing bank's
balance sheet.

This liability represents a net addition

to the gaining bank's balance sheet and is offset by the
increased reserves it temporarily holds.

After the bank

creates a demand deposit and lists the debtor's IOU as an
asset, and after the demand deposit so created is used and
clears against the bank, the bank is left with a loan
asset and a liability to foreign branch.

Succeeding banks

gain reserves and demand deposits and in turn create
additional demand deposits by lending out their excess
reserves.

The net result, as shown in Table 1, is an

increase in loan assets and total liabilities of the
banking system but no increase in the money supply.

The

money supply has remained constant because the deposit
expansion generated by the lending activities of the gaining
were high.
The Federal Reserve was spectacularly unsuccessful in its attempt.
See "Change in Discount Rate,"
Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 56, No. 12 (December,1970)
pi 963; '‘Banking and Monetary Developments in the Fourth
Quarter of 1970," Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Monthly Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 (February, 1971), p. 33;
"Recent Monetary and Bank Credit Developments," Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Monthly Review, Vol. 53, No. 5
(May, 1971), p. 101.
The Federal Reserve also wished to
halt the reduction in required reserves that short-term
Euro-dollar borrowing allowed (through the cash items in
process of collection vehicle) and amended Regulation D
in September 1969 to do so.
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Table 1.

The Effect of Euro-dollar Borrowing
Gaining Banks

Losing Banks

Step 1. The Euro-dollar Borrowing
Bank A
+100 Claim on
Bank B

Step 2.

+100

Liability to
foreign
branch

Bank B
20 Reserves
80 Loans

100 Demand
Deposit due
Eurobank
and then
Bank A

Collection of Claim and Use of Reserves
Bank B

Bank A.
- 1 0 0 Claim on
Bank B
+ 1 0 0 Reserves
+ 1 0 0 Loans

100 Liability
to foreign
branch
+100 Demand
Deposit

-20 Reserves
to bank A
-80 Loans
+80 Reserves
from other
banks
-80 Reserves
to Bank A

-100 Demand
Deposit

Other Banks
-80 Reserves
to Bank B
-320 Loans
Step 3.

-400 Demand
Deposits

Use of Loan Proceeds and Clearing and Relending
Bank A

100 Reserves
100 Loans
-100 Reserves

100 Liability to
foreign branch
100 Demand Deposit
-100 Demand Deposit

Other Gaining Banks
+100 Reserves
+400 Loans
Step 4.

+500 Demand Deposits

Net Results

All Gaining Banks
+100 Reserves
+500 Loans

+100 Liability
to Foreign Branch
+500 Demand Deps.

All Losing Banks
-100 Reserves >500 Demand
Deposits
-400 Loans
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Table 1.

Continued.

Reserve ratio is 20%.
Assumes Losing Banks are fully
loaned up and no reserves required on Pliabilities to
Foreign Branches.

banks is exactly offset by the contraction caused by the
loss of reserves of the losing bank(s).

To obtain the

necessary reserves, the losing banks must contract their
reserves by the amount due Bank A.

In so doing, a con

traction of loans and deposits occurs.
The results of the simple case outlined above may
differ in several ways, depending on the conditions pre
vailing at the time.

For instance, the type of deposit

that is extinguished may influence the final results.
Should the Euro-dollar borrowing involve a claim on a. time
deposit, the transfer of reserves will involve a greater
contraction by the losing banks.

This will occur because

the reserves held on time deposits are much smaller than
those held on demand deposits.

Thus, should the $100

deposit that Bank B loses be a time deposit with 5%

re

serves, $95 of loans will be retired instead of the $80 as
shown in Table 1.

This means that a $475 demand deposit

contraction (versus $400) will occur in the other losing
banks.

Presuming all other deposits are of the demand

variety, a greater reduction in loans by the losing banks
or a smaller net increase in loans of the entire banking
system will result.

However, while total deposits will
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also decline/ the money supply will rise since the lost
time deposits were not included in the money supply but
the newly created demand deposits are.
decline by $475 but rise by $500.

Table 2.

Demand deposits

(See Table 2.)

The Effect of a Loss of Time Deposits
Losing Banks

Gaining Banks

Bank B
-100 Time
-5 Reserves
Deposits
-95 Loans

Net Results-Same as
in Table 1 i.e.,
+100 Reserves
+500 Loans

+100 Lia
bility to
Foreign
Branch

Other Banks
-475 Demand
-95 Reserves
Deposits
-380 Loans

+500 Demand
Deposits

A second variation of the basic case occurs when
monetary policy forces a change in the composition of
total deposits.

Thus, Regulation Q restrictions cause

the conversion of many low reserve time deposits to higher
reserve demand deposits.

This change requires additional

reserves and, while the money supply rises due to this
conversion,

total deposits and loans are reduced through

the multiple contraction of demand or time deposits.
Euro-dollar borrowing in this case may offset the loan
decline but will, as in the simple case, have no further
impact on the money supply.

(See Table 3.)

Table 3.

The Effect of Changed Composition of Deposits
Bank A
5 Reserves
95 Loans

100 Time Deposits
which becomes

20 Reserves
80 Loans

100 Demand Deposits
Oth<ar Banks

-15 Reserves to
Bank A
-60 Loans

-75 Demand Deposits

Net Re.sults-All Banks
-75 Loans

-100 Time Deposits
+ 25 Demand Deposits

Reserve ratios:

5% on Time Deposits
20% on Demand Deposits

Generally speaking, Regulation Q and a restric
tion on reserve growth in 1969 and 1966 brought about a
change from time to demand deposits, a reduction in the
lending capabilities of the banks and in total deposits,
and a slight increase in the money supply.

Euro-dollar

borrowing offset the loan declines that were taking place
and, to the extent that such borrowing caused further
shifts from time to demand deposits, caused some rise in
the money supply.

Reserve stringencies, however, held
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money supply growth to quite low levels during these
periods.^
To conclude, it appears that access to the Euro
dollar market allows banks to at least offset loan declines
brought about by tight money policies but is incapable of
having any large scale effect on the money supply.

Since

monetary policy is geared to interest rates, money supply,
and reserve levels, Euro-dollar borrowing does not im
pinge to an appreciable degree on the effectiveness of such
policies.

However, since lending activity may be main

tained through Euro-dollar borrowing, it seems evident
that in a broader sense Euro-dollar accessibility does
interfere with the goals of monetary policy.

Further,

this accessibility adds another dimension to the environ
ment in which the Federal Reserve must operate.
The introduction of marginal reserve requirements
on Euro-dollar borrowings, first of 10% in September
1969 and then of 20% in January 1971,creates an interest
ing variation on the cases outlined above.

As Table 4

indicates, a 20% reserve requirement on Euro-dollar
borrowings of

$100

effectively destroys the credit crea

tion (loan) increases previously possible.

Not only does

the money supply actually decline, but loans remain at the
same levels previously existing.

The 10% marginal reserve

^"The Money and Bond Markets," Federal Reserve Bank
of New York Monthly Review, various months, 1966 and 1969.
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requirement partly destroys the lending ability of the
banks.

However, since the reserve requirement applies

only on borrowings above a base amount

(assumed in

Table 4), the impact of the reserve requirements is
substantially reduced.

Table 4.

The Effect of a 20% Marginal Reserve Requirement
Gaining Banks

Losing Banks

Bank A
Reserves
+ 80 Loans

+20

Net Results

+100 Liability
to foreign
branch

-100 Reserves
-400 Loans

(as before)
-500 Demand
Deposits

Other Banks
+ 80 Reserves
+ 320 Loans

+400 Demand
Deposits
All Banks-Net Results
-100 Demand Deposits
+100 Liability to foreign
branch

The original 10% marginal reserve requirement was
instituted to reduce the advantages gained from borrowing
in the Euro-dollar market.

The increase to a 20% marginal

reserve requirement, however, was not imposed to reinforce
tight money implementation.

Rather, the reserves required
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above the base amount were increased in an attempt to
slow the repayment by U.S. banks of their Euro-dollar
liabilities.

By encouraging banks to maintain their Euro

dollar borrowing levels and thus the reserve-free base,
it was hoped that the negative effect of these massive
repayments on the U.S. balance of payments would be re
duced.

Given the enormous decline in Euro-dollar liabili

ties both prior to and after the increase in marginal
reserve requirements, it is doubtful that any significant
amount of borrowing was ever subject to either the
the 20% reserve requirements.

10%

or

While future tight money

periods might see a resurgence in U.S. bank borrowing, it
is unlikely that this case of reserve absorption has
5
yet occurred.
The initiation of the 10% reserve requirement had
a definite impact on U.S. banks and altered their
borrowing activities.

Euro-dollars borrowed reached a

peak prior to the effective date of marginal reserve re
quirements, remained at a high level for the rest of 1969,
and began to decline in 1970.

While renewal borrowing

within the reserve-free base could continue, increased

5The Federal Reserve has promised that this higher
reserve requirement will be maintained.
If it were not,
the "good” banks that maintained their bases would be
penalized while the "bad” banks would gain.
Gaines, "The
Dollar?" b p . cit. , p. 1; Gaines, "Public Policy Issues,"
o p . c i t ., pp. 3-4.
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borrowing levels were subject to the marginal reserve
requirements.
The source of the borrowed Euro-dollar may affect
the impact of Euro-dollar borrowing.

If the source is

private or officially held U.S. bank deposits, no additional
analysis is necessary.

However, should the source of the

Euro-dollars be officially held

(i.e., foreign govern

ment and central bank) dollar reserves at the Federal
Reserve,^

then an expansionary effect may occur and

Federal Reserve actions will have to be of a greater
magnitude in order to achieve a given degree of tightness.
The process may be simply illustrated.
borrow Euro-dollars in the market.

U.S. banks

These funds may be

supplied by a European central bank for any of the
several reasons noted in Chapter 3.

The central bank

transfers its funds from its account at the Federal Reserve
Bank to a commercial bank and ownership of the funds to
the borrowing bank.

The reserves of the particular

borrowing U.S. bank and of the U.S. banking system are
thereby increased by the amount of the borrowing and
credit creation within the U.S., based upon these new

g

Or, should the source be special non-marketable
Treasury securities issued to the central banks and
redeemed by them at the Treasury in return for Federal
Reserve balances, such an expansionary effect may also
occur.
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reserves, can occur.

To offset this increase in reserves,

the Federal Reserve must enter the bond markets, selling
bonds to soak up (neutralize) the newly acquired reserves.
This action must be supplemental to the normal actions
being undertaken to restrict reserve availability.
It should be noted that, as far as U.S. bank re
serves are concerned, the source of the privately or
officially held bank deposits that supply Euro-dollar
borrowers is unimportant, except in the case outlined
above.

Thus, a central bank may hold U.S. money market

instruments and sell them in order to obtain the necesr
sary funds to deliver to the Euro-dollar borrower.

The

sale of the instrument does not, however, create more
U.S. bank reserves.

Rather, it merely redistributes

the ownership of assets and reserves among all the par
ticipants in the U.S. markets.

Only if foreign held

Treasury debt or Federal Reserve deposits are monetized
will there be an effect on reserve levels in the U.S.
system.?
Finally, the treatment of Euro-dollar borrowings

?The sa^e °f gold or drawings on the swap network by
foreign central banks have been ignored here as sources
of Euro-dollar funds.
Both may certainly oc,cur and may
have the same expansionary effect on U.S. bank reserves as
does the shifting of foreign held Federal Reserve balances.
See H. Mayer, o p . c i t ., p. 28; Leimone, 0 £. cit., p. 5.
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as cash items in process of collection when the drafts
evidencing the borrowing are placed in the clearing
mechanism tend to increase the banks' ability to lend and
create demand deposits.

To the extent that swap arrange

ments between banks existed, the possibility of increased
lending and reduced required reserve levels was further
increased.

This avenue of evasion was closed in 1969 and

no longer presents a problem to analysis.
The following section reports the results* of a re
gression analysis devised to determine the actual in
fluences affecting average reserve levels of U.S. banks
in general and New York banks in particular.

As such, it

attempts to verify empirically the impacts theorized in
this section.
III.

Average Reserves and Euro-dollars

Average required reserves held by U.S. banks may
be influenced by many factors.

It was noted above that

Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks reduced required
reserves only to the extent that the evidence of such
borrowing

(a draft on the deposit-losing b a nk), when

placed in the clearing mechanism, became part of the
gaining bank's cash items in process of collection.
cash items were subtracted

These

from deposits subject to

reserve requirements under Regulation D provisions.

In

September, 1969, the regulation was amended to exclude
the drafts arising from Euro-dollar borrowing from
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consideration as cash items in process.

Prior to

September, 1969, there was at least one force acting to
reduce required reserve levels.

Other forces, such as the

conversion of time deposits to demand deposits and the
imposition of marginal reserve requirements on Euro
dollar borrowings tended to increase required reserve
levels.
To test whether these forces actually did influence
average reserve levels, resort may be made to regression
analysis.

The dependent variable, the average percentage

of required reserves held by U.S. banks

( X ^ ) , is stated.

q

Possible influences on this variable include those noted
above, i.e., access to Euro-dollar funds

(XED q ),9 the

amount of such funds actually borrowed ( X ^ ) , and the
imposition of marginal reserve requirements on Euro
dollar borrowings and the amendment of Regulation D
(Xr r e )*^®

Other possible influences include the actual

^The average was obtained by adding gross demand
deposits, unadjusted for cash items in process of col
lection, and time deposits.
This total deposit value was
then divided into the amount of required reserves held by
the banks in the same time period.
The resulting per
centage represents the proportion of total deposits held
as reserves.
9a dummy variable, coded 0 for 1962 through 1965 and
1 for 1966 through 1970, indicates the discovery of the
Euro-dollar source by U.S. banks in the 1966 tight money
period.
10A dummy variable, coded 0 for 1962 through August,
1969 and 1 for the months thereafter, indicates the
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required reserve ratio on deposits

(Xr r r ) , ^

portion of time deposits to total deposits
free reserve levels

the pro

(Xijp) , and

(Sr r ) .

Taken together, these factors might reasonably
be expected to explain the variation observed in the per
centage of required reserves held by U.S. banks.

Should

the Euro-dollar factors prove to assist in the explana
tion of this variation (with the correct coefficient
signs), empirical proof of the value of Euro-dollar
borrowing to U.S. banks and of the impact of such borrowing
on U.S. monetary policy will be obtained.

That is,

should the proportion of required reserves be indirectly
(negatively) related to the Euro-dollar borrowing vari
ables, cash items will be shown to have been a signifi
cant factor in determining the impact of Euro-dollar
availability on the U.S. banking system.
$ho«*v-arJL3 tion in average reserves may also be
explained by monetary policy.

The proportion of time

presence or absence of marginal reserve requirements on
Euro-dollar borrowings and changes in Regulation D.
■^The ratio used was the percentage required on
demand deposits.
While a weighted ratio including time
deposit requirements could have been used, there seemed no
reason to undertake these essentially sterile calculations.
It is the change in the ratio that affects the average
reserves percentage and time and demand required reserve
ratios changed at the same times and by like amounts.
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deposits to total deposits will indicate Regulation Q
influences

(among others)

and the changes in required

reserve ratios and the imposition of Euro-dollar
marginal reserve requirements

(and changes in Regulation

D) will also indicate monetary policy.

Open market opera

tions designed to augment or reduce reserve levels should
not be reflected in average required reserve proportions
but free reserves, used as a measure by the Federal
Reserve of the impact of monetary policy, may serve as
a proxy for this type of monetary policy.
The time period chosen was 1962 through 1970.
Monthly data for each year was collected and a test of
both the U.S. member bank average reserves proportion and
New York City banks required reserves proportion was
undertaken.
The results of these tests are shown in Table 5.
Unless otherwise noted the included variables were signifi
cant at the .05 level or better.

First difference analysis

proved generally useless and those results are not re
ported here.
The following points may be noted.

With regard to

all member banks, the most important explanatory variable
was the proportion of time deposits to total deposits, a
not unexpected result.

This proportion was negatively

related to required reserves.
deposits declines

As the proportion of time

(and demand deposits proportion increases),
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Table 5.

Average Required Reserves Equations

All Member Banks

X^p

=.0 65 -

,14lXrjip +

(-10.5)
[-1.09]
R 2 = .937

.004XjjjQQ

(3.6)
[.50]

*^-^®xRRR
(2.3)
[.46]

SEE = .001

New York Banks

XARNY = .109 - .012X e d d - .020X*Tp
(-6 .6 )
(-1.4)
[-.16]
[-.80]
R2 = .620

SEE = .004

*significant at . 1 0 level
t values in parentheses
Beta values in brackets
XT p :

Proportion of time to total deposits

XE D D : Euro-dollar access dummy
XpRRi Required Reserve Ratio on Demand Deposits

the average required reserves proportion increases
(decreases).

Similarly, as the required reserve ratio

increases, so also does average required reserves.

The

discovery of Euro-dollars as a source of funds in 1966
generated a very slight positive effect on the average
required reserve ratio.

This result may support the hypo

thesis that Euro-dollar borrowing by the large money
market banks drew time deposits from other U.S. banks,
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increasing average required reserve levels for all banks
taken together.

It does not support the hypothesis that

Euro-dollar borrowing generally affected average required
reserve levels.

The explanatory power of the equation is

quite high.
Of greater interest are the results obtained for the
New York banks.

Here, only the time deposit proportion

and Euro-dollar access dummy variables were at all signifi
cant.

In this case, as in the case for all member banks,

the proportion of time deposits was the most important
explanatory variable and was negatively related to the
dependent variable.

However, the decline in time deposits

as a percentage of total deposits had less impact on
average required reserves than the same variable had on
all member b a n k s . (.02 for New York as opposed to .141 for
all members).
Secondly, the Euro-dollar discovery or access dummy
acted as expected.

The discovery of Euro-dollars and

their use by the large New York banks acted to reduce by
over

1%

the average required reserve proportion for the

New York banks.

These two variables explained 62% of the

variation in the dependent variable.

The existence of

massive and diverse pressures acting on the New York banks
explains the relatively low R 2 that this equation gene
rates .
The conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis
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are several.

First, Euro-dollar availability had little

impact on total reserves of all U.S. banks.

However, this

availability did influence required reserve levels for
New York money market banks.

Second, monetary policy, in

the form of free reserves and marginal reserve requirements
on Euro-dollar liabilities had no appreciable impact on
average reserve proportions.

However, time deposits as

a percent of total deposits did affect reserve levels.
While part of this effect may be ascribed to the fact that
required reserve ratios are lower for time than they are
for demand deposits, it is nonetheless possible to note
that monetary policy aimed at reducing time deposit levels
(via Regulation Q ceilings) did affect the percentage of
required reserves held.
Euro-dollar availability reduced average required
reserves for the borrowers of Euro-dollars.
ers were primarily New York banks.

These borrow

The availability of

Euro-dollars had little impact on the entire banking
system or, at least, the contradictory forces put in motion
by the development of Euro-dollar borrowing

(and perhaps

Federal Reserve responses to this development) had a
minimal impact.

Nonetheless, the results do indicate

that the treatment of Euro-dollar borrowing claims as cash
items did significantly affect average reserve levels.
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IV.

Euro-dollar Borrowing and U.S. Interest Rates

Monetary policy works through several channels.
Reserve levels, money supply, and loan creation were dis
cussed above.

The adjustment of interest rate levels is

also used by the Federal Reserve in its attempts to in
fluence the economy.

Generally, it is only in periods of

tight money that U.S. bank Euro-dollar borrowing has any
significant impact on the implementation of interest rate
policy.
In tight money periods, interest rates are pushed
up by the Federal Reserve through the sale of government
securities and the resultant restriction of reserve
availability.

The rise in interest rates is designed to

reduce the quantity demanded of loanable funds

(the demand

being determined in part by the price of such funds).
demand for funds declines, investment also declines.

As
This

slows the growth of national income and reduces price
pressures.

Whether this chain of events occurs in fact is

open to question.

However, interest rate levels are used

by the Federal Reserve to implement its policies.

To the

extent that Euro-dollar borrowing affects these levels,
such borrowing may be said to interfere with monetary
policy.
The direct effect of Euro-dollar borrowing on interest
rate levels in the United States has been to keep rates
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lower than they would be in the absence of such borrow
ing. 12

The availability of Euro-dollars to banks has

meant that final borrowers have been able to obtain
greater amounts of funds
wise have

been possible.

from the banks than would other
The greater availability of loans

tends to hold down interest rate levels in the money and
bond markets, contradicting Federal Reserve intentions.
Further, the psychological effects to which Andrew Brimmer
has referred ^-3 have tended to offset Federal Reserve goals.
As Brimmer has noted, Euro-dollar borrowing banks
. . . have found it less urgent to adopt more
restrictive. . . lending standards or to limit
their new (loan) commitments. . . (in the
face of tight money.
They thus) transmit to
the (money) market and to their own customers
an impression that the degree of monetary
riestraint in general is less substantial
than the monetary authorities say (it is)
•
■
•
• ^
The transmission of a general feeling of ease, or at

1 2 H. Mayer, o p . Cit., pp. 26-28 obliquely refers to
the various interest rate effects.
Leimone, o£. cit., p. 4
is concerned primarily with the interest differentials that
exist between countries and the resultant flows of capital.
The increased interest sensitivity of international capital
that the Euro-dollar market has brought about means that
the balance of payments effects must be dealt with by the
Federal Reserve.
1 3 Brimmer,

14Ibid.

Euro-Dollar Flows..., o p . ci t . , p. 4.
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least of lessened tightness, to business borrowers tends
to frustrate the Federal Reserve's aims.

High interest

rates and a restricted availability of funds are used by
the Federal Reserve as a signal to business that invest
ment should be curtailed.

The goal, of course, is the

reduction of investment expenditures and thereby the
reduction of price and demand pressures.

Euro-dollar

borrowing, however, reduces the effectiveness of this
signal.
The indirect effects of U.S. Euro-dollar borrowing
may offset the direct effects noted above.

While the

direct effect of such borrowing reduces the upward pres
sures on interest rates in the United States by making a
greater amount of loans available, the source of the Euro
dollar funds determines the magnitude of the impact of the
borrowing on interest rate levels.

In some cases, the net

result of Euro-dollar borrowing is to leave interest rate
structures unaffected.

If the funds lent by the Euro

dollar suppliers are on deposit in U.S. commercial banks,
there is a redistribution of loanable funds among the banks
and a net increase in loans.

Interest rate levels, thus,

decline or rise by less than they would in the absence of
Euro-dollar borrowing.

If the Euro-dollar supplier

con

verts U.S. money market instruments into loanable funds,

15Ibid.
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the sale of these securities will tend to drive money
market prices down and interest rates u p .!-6

The net

effect in this case will be less than if the source of
funds were commercial bank deposits since opposing forces
will be at work.

The increased availability of loans will

tend to reduce interest rates but the sale of securities
will tend to raise them.
Euro-dollar suppliers may be official institutions.
If they draw on their balances in commercial banks or sell
their U.S. money market securities, the net result on
interest levels in the United States will be similar to
the cases outlined above.

If they redeem the special

non-marketable debt issues sold to them by the Treasury
for their "excess" dollar reserves, their action will
draw down Treasury balances at the Federal Reserve,
pumping reserves into the banking system.

This will tend

to increase the availability of loanable funds and reduce
interest levels.

However, if U.S. government expendi

tures remain constant and receipts do not increase, the
Treasury will be required to sell additional bonds or
bills in the U.S. money market.

Such sales will tend to

drive up interest rates, offsetting the negative influence
the Euro-dollar borrowing and increased reserve availability
will have on these rates.
While the majority of foreign central bank assets

1 6 H.

Mayer,

0 £.

ci t ., p. 27.
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are held in U.S. Treasury b i l l s b o t h

private and

official conversion of other market instruments may also
occur.

For instance, should the source of Euro-dollar

funds b§ the sale or attrition of U.S. commercial paper
holdings, the commercial paper issuer would, ceterus
paribus, be required to increase his bank borrowing or
reduce his expenditures.

This increased borrowing would

tend to increase interest rates, offsetting to some degree
the impact of Euro-dollar borrowing.
Finally, should the official Euro-dollar supplier
draw on his balances at the Federal Reserve, the reserves
of the commercial banking system will be increased.
This will reinforce the downward pressure on interest
rates generated by the Euro-dollar

borrowing.

The Federal

Reserve offsets these reserve changes arising from foreign
official transactions as part of its normal activities.
Nonetheless, the pressures generated in this case will
tend to reinforce the downward movement of interest rates
unless offset by the Federal Reserve.
To conclude, interest rate levels in the U.S. may be
affected by U.S. bank Euro-dollar borrowing in a manner
contrary to Federal Reserve policy.

However, in some cases

offsets to these pressures occur through the sale or

17

Klopstock, "Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity...,"
o p . cit., p. 79.
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disposition of U.S. assets owned by the Euro-dollar
suppliers.

In general, it appears that Euro-dollar

borrowing by U.S. banks will tend to exert downward pres
sures on interest rate levels in the United States.

Thus,

Federal Reserve policy must respond to these pressures if
effective restrictive monetary policies are to be suc
cessfully pursued.
V.

The Money Supply

One of the policy variables that the Federal Reserve
uses in essaying the impact of its actions on the economy
is the rate of growth in the money supply.

In Section II

of this chapter, it was noted that money supply changes
deriving from Euro-dollar borrowing would be nil except to
the extent that restrictive monetary policy forced changes
in the composition of total deposits or in cases where
reserves were increased due to cash items factors or the
movement of official funds into the banking system.

Euro

dollar' borrowing is not the cause of the changing compo
sition of deposits, except minimally, but rather is the
result of such changes.

The effect of Euro-dollar borrowing

on the money supply, then,is relatively insignificant.
However, the actual measurement of the money supply may be
influenced by Euro-dollar borrowing and, if such borrowing
does cause the under- or

overstatement of the money supply

or of changes in it, Federal Reserve policy decisions may
be based on erroneous information.
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It has been said that the borrowing of Euro-dollars
by U.S. banks understates the actual money supply in the
TO

United States and overstates the published money supply.
The proposition is supported as follows.

When Euro-dollars

are first borrowed, the published money stock tends to
fall since foreign branches hold their dollar balances
in U.S. demand deposits until they are "lent" to the
home office and take the form of "liabilities to foreign
branches."

These liabilities are not included in the

money supply but, according to Little, these funds are
included in the published money supply figures when they
are held as demand deposits.19

Thus, to the point where

the funds become "liabilities to foreign branches" the
published money supply overstates the "real" figure
since these funds, unless borrowed by U.S. residents, are
not part of the stock of transactions medium available
to U.S. residents, even though they are counted as such . 2 0
To this point, then,the published money stock has been
overstated.

When the funds are borrowed by U.S. banks,

18

The following is based upon Little,
pp. 26-28.
19Ibid., p. 27
20Ibid.

0 £.

ci t .,
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the published figure falls, approaching the actual or
real money stock values.21
As reserves are released through Euro-dollar
borrowing, according to Little, new loans are made and the
published and real money supply, i.e., demand deposits
plus currency used for investment and consumption in the
United States, increase, approaching the level that the
published data indicated before the borrowing.

But, as

Euro-dollar rates rise, an incentive to substitute U.S.
demand deposits due to a foreign bank or U.S. foreign
branch for previously held CD's appears.

This occurs be

cause asset holders switch from CD's to Euro-dollar

^ T h e following discussion pertains to the long-run
effects of Euro-dollar borrowing on the calculation of
money supply values.
Short-run effects also occur.
When
banks borrow Euro-dollars, they place in the collection
system a draft on the bank giving up the deposit.
This
draft was considered part of cash items in process of col
lection until September, 1969, and as such was a deductable
item from demand deposits upon which reserves had to be .
held.
Since the money supply is calculated from net
deposit values, after cash items in process are subtracted,
Euro-dollar borrowing may be said to reduce the measured
money supply.
The real money supply, as noted below, does
.not change immediately.
The demand deposit previously held
by a foreigner (bank) becomes a liability of a U.S. bank to
its branch.
Both these categories are excluded from con
sideration as part of the real money supply.
However,
since the purpose of borrowing Euro-dollars is to obtain
loanable funds, such borrowing will eventually increase
both the measured and real money supplies.
Should the banks engage in swap arrangements whereby
they borrow Euro-dollars from each other on a daily basis
for the specific purpose of reducing their deposit levels
and thus their reserve requirements, then it may be said
that the published money supply figures understate the real
figures.
The deposits that are offset by the cash item in
process of collection does not change.
It remains part of
the transactions medium of the United States.
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deposits and in so doing, CD's are transformed into U.S.
demand deposits.

Since CD's are not included in the

narrowly defined money supply but these demand deposits
are, the effect of such rises in Euro-dollar rates will
be to generate this substitution by U.S. and foreign
asset holders and thus to increase the published money
supply figures.

In the meantime, the real or effective

money supply will drop to the level existing before the
Euro-dollar borrowing occurred (due to the decline in
money available for consumption and investment use in the
U.S.) .
Finally, the transfer from low reserves CD's to
high reserves demand deposits

(according to Little) will

cause the somewhat overstated published and real money
supplies to fall.

When all these forces have been worked

out, the final published money supply values will likely
be somewhat higher than before the borrowing and the
effective money supply somewhat lower than b e f o r e . ^
Thus, Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks actually
reduces the real money supply in the U.S.

If such were

the case, and assuming that Euro-dollar borrowing occurs
in response to tight money policies in the U.S., it can be
stated that Euro-dollar borrowing reinforces rather than
thwarts these policies.
Unfortunately, there appear to be several flaws in

22Ibid., pp. 27-28.

the above argument.

First, as noted by the Federal Reserve

in its explanation of the latest revision of the money
supply

f i g u r e s ,

23 the basic money stock concept (i.e., the

public's stock of the means of payment)

covers demand

deposits, currency, and coin liabilities of the U.S.
banking system held by all transactors, foreign and do
mestic, except the U.S. government, Federal Reserve, and
U.S. commercial banks.

This system includes U.S. com

mercial banks, the Federal Reserve, and the Treasury but
excludes the liabilities of banks in U.S. territories and
possessions and, most important here, liabilities of
foreign branches and territorial branches of U.S.
It

therefore

b a n k s .

24

appears that demand deposits at

foreign branches of U.S. banks are not included in the
published money stock.

The conversion of CD's for these

deposits then does not overstate the money stock figures.
The substitution of assets occurs completely outside the
money stock.

Further, the conversion, when U.S. banks

borrow their branches' deposits of the funds, from deposits
to liabilities due foreign branches also takes place outside

23"Revision of the Money Stock," Federal Reserve .
Bulletin, Vol. 56, No. 12 (December, 1970), p. 889.
24lbid.
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the money stock calculations and an overstatement of the
published stock does not occur here either.
In addition, Euro-dollar borrowing does not increase,
generally, the total reserves available to the banking
system.

Therefore, as noted earlier, no increase in the

money supply is forthcoming.
The transfer from low reserve certificates of de
posit to high reserve demand deposits at foreign branches
was postulated by Little to cause the published and real
money supplies to fall since more reserves are required
to support a given amount of money.

This is doubtful,

however, since few if any reserves are held on Euro-dollar
deposits by these branches.
In one sense Little's contention is correct, how
ever.

The conversion from CD to Euro-dollar deposit may

involve the deposit by the Euro-dollar account owner of a
U.S. demand deposit.

That is, the asset holder may con

vert his U.S. bank CD to a U.S. bank demand deposit and
exchange this deposit for a Euro-dollar deposit.

In

this case, a greater level of reserves are required and
assuming that the conversion was undertaken due to higher
interest rate incentives in the Euro-dollar market deriving
from U.S. bank borrowing there, the U.S. money supply may
be reduced.

However, the conversion itself will increase

the money supply, narrowly defined.

The net result may

then be some marginal increase in the U.S. money supply
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occasioned by Euro-dollar borrowing.

The magnitude of

the change would appear to be relatively small, however.
Generally, then, the money supply figures published
by the Federal Reserve are more accurate than postulated
by Little.

Nonetheless, some revision of the money supply

figures has been necessary because of an understatement
of demand deposits that occurred prior to September,

1969.

As noted in footnote 21 of this chapter, the cash items in
process of collection that were deducted from demand de
posit levels included Euro-dollar transactions.

Since

actual deposit levels were not affected by Euro-dollar
borrowing, such borrowing tended to understate the true
level of deposits.

Thus, the Federal Reserve adjusted its

money supply measurements to exclude this deduction and
revised Regulation D to exclude Euro-dollar drafts from
inclusion m

cash items.

25

Despite the problem considered above, the original
postulate that Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks makes
the imposition of tight money policies more difficult re
mains valid.

The money supply, as well as "excess" re

serves, both rose as a result of the treatment of Euro
dollar borrowing claims as cash items in process.

The

neutralization of these increases is necessary if a given

^See Ibid., pp. 887-893 and "Revision of Money
Supply Series,H Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 55, No. 10
(October, 1969), pp. Ibi- 789.
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degree of monetary tightness is to be maintained.
Generally, money supply considerations are of limited
importance as far as Euro-dollar borrowing is concerned.
VI.

Foreign Exchange, Balance of Payments,
and Gold Policies

Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks has had some
fairly complex effects on U.S. monetary policy as it
relates to this country's foreign economic

r e l a t i o n s . 26

Basically’, such borrowing has given to the U.S. balance
of payments a healthier prospect than the underlying
position warranted.

By the same token, the repayment of

Euro-dollar liabilities by U.S. banks has given the balance
of payments a more bleak aspect than in reality was the
case.
Euro-dollar borrowing has affected U.S. foreign
exchange operations in several ways.

Upward and down

ward pressures on the par values of several countries'
currencies have been intensified by Euro-dollar borrowing.
The Federal Reserve has, therefore, found it necessary to
supply dollars to European central banks or, more frequently,

26Leimone, o£. c i t ., pp. 5-6 develops a partial out
line of the effects the Euro-dollar market in general has
upon these factors.
The specific impact of U.S. bank Euro
dollar borrowing is not, however, dealt with in any detail.
Scott, o p . cit. , pp. 27-28, 31 has dealt with the impact of
the Euro-dollar market on the U.S. balance of payments as
have other writers, including Kvasnicka, op. cit., pp.16-17;
Williams, o£. c i t ., pp. 40-45? K l o p s t o c k , The Euro-Dollar
Ma r k e t :..., o p . c i t ., pp. 13-17.
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has been required to soak up excess accumulations of
dollars in these central banks.
In addition, Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks
has, in the process of strengthening the (short-term)
position of the dollar internationally, required fewer
gold-dollar redemptions and has thus allowed the United
States to maintain a status quo position vis a vis the
international monetary system and gold values.

The re

payment of Euro-dollar liabilities by the banks h a s , as
noted, worsened the balance of payments, requiring foreign
exchange operations to support the dollar and measures to
protect the gold stock remaining in this

c o u n t r y . 27

Euro-dollar borrowing has had the effect of tempo
rarily improving the U.S. balance of payments because
such borrowing represents an inflow of capital into the
United States.

In addition, the demand for Euro-dollar

funds has drawn dollars out of foreign central bank reserves.
This has improved the balance of payments on the official

27

The unsettled conditions that have prevailed in
the foreign exchange markets since the suspension of the
gold convertibility of the dollar in August, 1971, have
presented difficulties to the foreign central banks and,
to a lesser degree, to the Federal Reserve.
Obviously,
While the fundamental weakness of the dollar is not attrib*utable to Euro-dollar borrowing, such borrowing and more
important, the repayment of these liabilities, in conjunc
tion with a severely eroding balance of trade position,
have made these conditions inevitable.
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settlements basis because this balance counts as deficit
items only those dollars held by official institutions.
The reversal of these flows causes a capital outflow and,
further, increases dollar balances in official hands.
When Euro-dollar borrowings are repaid, the U.S. balance
of payments is forced into a (more severe) deficit position.
Federal Reserve balance of payments policy has
generally had as its goal the reduction of the U.S. deficit.
High interest rates

(especially on short-term debt instru

ments) have been used to encourage foreign flows of capital
into the United States.

High interest rates are normally

associated with tight money policies aimed at slowing down
an overheated economy.

In such periods, the balance of

payments tends to weaken (move into a deficit position or
move into a deeper deficit position)

since greater amounts

of imports are pulled into the country due to the boom
conditions.

Thus, high interest rates are used not only

to dampen an overactive economy but also to improve the
balance of payments.

In this case, the two goals may be

obtained through the use of only one policy tool, i.e.,
monetary policy.28

28

See Robert Mundell, "The Appropriate Use of Mone
tary and Fiscal Policy for Internal and External Stability,"
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. 9 (March,
1962), pp. 70-79, for a discussion of the difficulties in
herent in attempting to use one policy tool to achieve two
goals.
Mundell concludes that monetary policy is best
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As noted, Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks gener—
ally

occurs in response to the imposition of tight money

in the U.S.

Since this borrowing also benefits the

balance of payments, Euro-dollar borrowing tends to re
inforce Federal Reserve balance of payments policy.
However, to the extent that such borrowing prolongs boom
conditions

(and thus high import levels) in the U.S., the

benefit derived from capital inflows to the balance of
payments is offset to some degree by the continued high
levels of imports.

In addition, Euro-dollar borrowing

tends to push up interest rates in the Euro-dollar market,
offsetting the attraction to foreign asset holders of high
rates in the United States.

A Federal Reserve policy of

high interest rates may therefore be neutralized by high
interest rates in the Euro-dollar market, at least with
respect to international capital flows.

However, if the

high rates in the market arise from the demand by U.S.
banks for funds

(as they have in the past), the same re

sults are forthcoming.

That is, capital flows into the

suited for international equilibrium and fiscal policy for domestic stability.
In the happy event that one tool
solves two problems, the other tool may be used to re
inforce the effects of the first or it may play a neutral
role.
This presumes, of course, that these tools are
truly controllable.
Leland Yeager in o£. cit., pp. 109-110
notes some of the problems in utilizing Mundell's policy
prescriptions.
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United States directly, due to the attraction of high
interest rates here, or it flows in indirectly, through
the intermediation of U.S. banks.
In summary, the effectiveness of Federal Reserve
balance of payments policy may be reinforced by U.S. bank
borrowing of Euro-dollars.

High interest rates attract

capital into the country either directly or through the
agency of the banks.

However, the leakage in domestic

monetary policy implied by U.S. bank induced flows means
that the restriction of reserve availability and credit
that monetary policy intends is not fully effective.

The

beneficial results accruing from Euro-dollar borrowing on
the balance of payments are offset to some extent by a
continued high level of economic activity and the con
sequent high level of imports.

The net effect of Euro

dollar borrowing is a smaller assist to the balance of
payments than might otherwise, be the case.
Finally, the reverse flow of funds that occurs when
Euro-dollar liabilities are repaid worsens the balance of
payments.

Since this reflow occurs at a time of easy

money, when the Federal Reserve is attempting, to stimulate
the economy with low interest rates and unrestricted re
serve availability, the repayment of Euro-dollar liabilities
worsens the balance of payments and reinforces the outflow
of capital that low interest rates involve

Generally, then,

Euro-dollar borrowing and repayment tends to offset some
of the positive balance of payments effects of high interest
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rates and reinforces the negative effects of low interest
rates.
With respect to foreign exchange policies of the
Federal Reserve, Euro-dollar borrowing lessens the need
for intervention by the Federal Reserve or its foreign
central bank agents to support the value of the dollar.

29

Rather, the borrowing tends to put pressure on foreign
currencies and merely requires the lending of dollars by
the Federal Reserve to other central b anks.

When Euro

dollar borrowings are repaid, however, during easy

money

periods, the Federal Reserve must draw on its swap lines
in order to support the dollar.

This support becomes

necessary because the dollar comes under pressure due to
the influx of the repaid dollars on the foreign exchange
markets.

Thus, the Federal Reserve goal of stability in

the foreign exchange markets is strained by the effects of
Euro-dollar borrowing and repayments but, with the
mechanisms set up to promote international financial sta
bility, Euro-dollar activity does not appear to have added
an unbearable burden to the implementation of this policy.

2^See Coombs, 0 £. cit. (especially March and
September 1969-71), various pages, for a fairly detailed
description of the support operations undertaken by the
Federal Reserve, Treasury, and foreign central banks.
Kvasnicka, o p . cit., pp. 17-18 discusses the effect of the
Euro-dollar system on exchange rates generally.
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With respect to gold flows, the

borrowing of Euro

dollars has tended to. .lessen the outflow of gold reserves
from the United States and their repayment has tended to
increase these outflows.

However, given the weakness of

the international payments system prior to the suspension
of gold convertibility of the dollar, only small gold flows
were possible.

Any sizeable outflows threatened the

viability of the entire system.

T h u s , gold policy

basically was aimed at maintaining the status quo and
searching for temporary palliatives for the problem.^0
To conclude, the Federal Reserve's international
policies have been challenged by Euro-dollar borrowing by
U.S. banks, but since these policies were developed to
meet the growing strains on the international monetary
system generally, the development of Euro-dollar borrowing
has merely added some incremental strains to the system.
The difference has been one of degree, not of kind and,
indeed, the borrowing, itself tended to ease the strains,
temporarily.
VII.

Equity Among Banks

One of the primary concerns voiced by several

3°0ne solution may be the creation of SDR*s.
See
Williams, o p . cit., pp. 46-48 for a discussion of the
relationship between the gold market and the Euro-dollar
market.
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writers, beyond the monetary policy leakage aspect of
Euro-dollar borrowing, has be'en the effect that the access
to Euro-dollar funds by a few large U.S. banks may have
had on the equal impact of monetary policy on various
classes of banks and on the distribution of reserves
among the b a n k s . A n d r e w Brimmer has noted that since
the few large banks with access to the Euro-dollar market
have been able to sustain their lending activities,'the
Federal Reserve has had to exert a greater degree of
pressure to achieve a given amount of restraint on the
banking system than it otherwise would have found neces
sary.

A disproportionate share of this pressure has fallen

on the banks without access to the Euro-dollar market be
cause these banks are not as able to deflect the impact of
tight money as are the large banks.

Eventually, all banks

must reduce their expansion of credit but in order to
obtain this reduction, the Federal Reserve must press
harder on reserve availability than it otherwise would
have had to.3^

31Brimmer, Euro-Dollar Flows..., o p . ci t ., pp. 4-6;
Klopstock, "Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity...,,r 0 £. cit.,
pp. 79-80; Klopstock, The Euro-Dollar Market;..., op. cit.,
pp. 11-12.
33Brimmer, Euro-Dollar Flows...,op I cit., p. 4.
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Additionally, Klopstock has noted that access to
the Euro-dollar market tends to concentrate the dollar
reserves of foreign central banks in these large U.S.
banks.

Without the Euro-dollar market, these central banks

would have invested their funds in U.S. money market in
struments and the resulting reserves would have been widely
dispersed throughout the U.S. banking system.

But, with

the advent of the Euro-dollar deposit, central banks have
placed their reserves in this investment vehicle.

These

funds are then borrowed by the few large U.S. banks with
access to the market and the concentration of these funds
at these banks occurs.^3
While both Brimmer's and Klopstock's analyses may
be true, there exist offsets and explanations that tend
to reduce the seriousness of the problems raised.
Klopstock himself notes that to the extent that foreign
central banks place a proportion of their dollar reserves
in time deposits in U.S. banks

(which they did prior to

the development of the Euro-dollar system), the same banks
that now gain these funds through Euro-dollar borrowing
would have been

(were) the depositories for these time

deposits before the Euro-dollar system came to prominence.34

33

Klopstock, "Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity...,"
o p . c i t ., pp. 79-80.
34Ibid., p. 80.
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Thus, at least some proportion of the funds now being
borrowed by the U.S. banks with foreign branches were
previously held in these same banks anyway.

Further,

foreign reserves were also placed in Treasury bills,
purchased in New York.

At least some of these funds,

also, wound up in the large New York banks that are now
active in the Euro-dollar market.35

This is not to deny

that prior to the development of the Euro-dollar market
the central bank reserves were probably more widely dis
persed, ultimately, than since its development.

How

ever, given the increase in these foreign dollar holdings
and the general concentration of them even before the
Euro-dollar system evolved, it is likely that this par
ticular portion of the problem has not had a significant
impact on U.S. bank equity.
Brimmer's thesis that Euro-dollar borrowing has
a discriminatory impact is a more involved argument than
Klopstock's.

Whether it is correct or not, however, is

not important since, if it is correct, the effects may
not be what they seem and, if it is incorrect, little
damage results from Euro-dollar borrowing per se.

In

deed, it is the thesis of this section that the existence
of the Euro-dollar system and the availability of funds from
it has provided a positive influence on the impact of
U.S. monetary policy.

35Ibid., p. 79

246

If it is true that a discriminatory impact does
indeed occur, a good case can be made that this impact
merely offsets the previous discriminatory impact of
monetary policy that operated in the other direction,
i.e., against the large banks.

And, further, such an

impact hastens the transmission of monetary pressures
throughout the economy.
may be incorrect.

In addition, Brimmer's thesis

That is, there may not be a discrimina

tory impact of Euro-dollar borrowing.

In this event, this

particular aspect of monetary policy is not of concern
vis a vis Euro-dollars, although it may be in a more
general context.
Taking first the view that Brimmer's thesis is in
correct, several writers have indicated that there is no
discriminatory impact with Euro-dollar borrowing.36
The basis of this statement is that the borrowing of Euro-:
dollars by large banks in reality merely transfers reserves
among the big banks themselves.

That is, the dollar

balances that foreigners hold are kept primarily at large
international-type banks in the major money markets in the
United States.

When one of these banks borrows Euro

dollars , it more than likely obtains a claim on another
large U.S. bank.

The losing bank then can protect itself

from such losses by itself borrowing in the Euro-dollar

JOSee, for instance, Little,

0 £.

c i t ., pp. 28-30.
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market (defensive borrowing).

As Carl Beige has n o t e d ,

Euro-dollar borrowing is similar to the gasoline contest
games.

When one company starts such a game, all the

others begin their own in self-defense.

It is not the

hope of increased sales that motivates these entrants but
rather the fear of sales losses if they do not participate
that impels them to enter the competition.

Thus, in the

Euro-dollar borrowing situation, when one bank enters the
market, the others must as well, to protect themselves
from reserve losses.
The main point here is that the dollar deposits
that are the reserves of the Euro-dollar system are kept
primarily at the large money market banks in the U.S.
When a large U.S. bank borrows these reserves, it may
not obtain a claim on a smaller bank but rather on another
large bank in the U.S.

Thus, there is no discriminatory

impact of Euro-dollar borrowing but merely a reshuffling
or churning of reserves between the large banks.
If this is the case, some difficulty is encountered
in explaining how these large banks can continue to make
loans in tight money periods when they are merely pro
tecting the reserves they own rather than gaining new
reserves.

Certainly, the fact that required reserves

37in a speech to the Boston Economic Club, April 30,
1969, as quoted in Ibid., p. 28.
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decrease due to the cash items factor when Euro-dollars
are borrowed explains some of the continued lending.

In

addition, the earlier analysis in this chapter indicates
that loans may be increased by Euro-dollar borrowing even
though the total reserves and deposits of the banking
system remain constant.

Thus, Euro-dollar borrowing in

volves both an increase in available reserves due to the
cash items factor (which allows an increase in loans)
and an increase in loans due to increased liabilities to
foreign branches.
Finally, Brimmer's thesis may be at least partly
correct.

There may well be some redistribution of re

serves to the large banks.

This is indicated by the in

crease in the number of foreign branches established by
banks outside the large financial centers

(usually con

sidered to be New York, Chicago, and San Francisco).^®
The establishment of these branches indicates that the
reserve losses being experienced by these banks were of
sufficient magnitude to encourage the placing of branches
in the European countries.

Were these banks insulated

from the effects of Euro-dollar borrowing, there would
have been much less pressure on them to establish costly
foreign branches

(although certainly the access to funds

must play some role in these decisions).

It is also

38See Chapter 3 and Williams, op. cit., p. 11.
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indicated by the uses to which large and small banks put
their available funds in the tight money periods.

Large

banks increased their business loans in these periods
(19 66 and 1969) while smaller banks did not.

These

large international banks also increased their percentage
share of such loans.

Since they were experiencing heavy

CD attrition rates, it seems evident that some reserves
were being gained at the expense of the smaller b a n k s ,
especially since their use of the Federal Funds market de
creased in these periods.39

For these reasons, it appears

that some redistribution of reserves did indeed occur.
Assuming that redistribution did occur, the question
of the equity of impact among banks of tight monetary
policy must be faced.

However, the explanation of the

equity problem contains hints of the answer to the problem.
Presuming that it is the desire of the Federal Reserve that
monetary pressures hit all banks equally and, further, that
such pressures be distributed throughout the economy as
rapidly as possible, it can be argued that the large
banks' access to the Euro-dollar market has actually
worked in favor of equality of pressure and in favor of a
more rapid dissemination of the pressures throughout the
country and the economy.

39Brimmer, 0 £. cit., pp. 8, 10-15.
The decrease
arose from the decline in lendable reserves, brought
about by Federal Reserve imposed reserve stringencies.
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The imposition of tight money, it has often been
argued, hits the large money market banks first and
hardest.^

Since open market operations take place in

New York, the large banks here are the first to feel
reserve stringencies.41

in addition, these large banks

have come to rely on CD's for large quantities of loanable
funds.
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The use of Regulation Q to restrict the com

petitiveness of the banks in bidding for interest sensi
tive funds has meant that the large banks have faced high

^ W h i l e the literature on the subject is limited,
some analysis of this impact has been undertaken.
See, for
instance, Tilford Gaines, "Financial Innovations and the
Efficiency of Federal Reserve Policy," in George Horwich,
e d . , Monetary Process and Policy;
A Symposium, Purdue
University Monograph Series (Homewood, Illinois: Richard
Irwin, 1967), pp. 99-118; T. Mayer, 0 £. cit., pp. 29; Ira
Scott, "The Regional Impact of Monetary Policy," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 69 (May, 1955), pp. 269-284
(this is the classic article on the problem); Ray Ruffin,
"An Econometric Model of the Impact of Open Market Opera
tions on Various Bank Classes,"
Journal of Finance, Vol.
23 (September, 1968), pp. 625-637; Warren Smith, "The In
struments of General Monetary Control," National Banking
R eview, Vol. 1 (September, 1963) , pp. 47-76; Sam Petzman,
"The Banking Structure and the Transmission of Monetary
Policy," Journal of Finance, Vol. 24 (June, 1969), pp. 387411; Vittorio Bonomo and Charles Schotta, The Regional Im
pact of Monetary Policy (Blacksburg, Virginia: Virginia
Polytechnic Institute, Department of Economics, 1970);
William Yohe, Comments on Bonomo and Schotta "The Regional
Impact of Monetary Policy" presented at the Southern Economic Association's convention November, 1970.
^ T . Mayer, loc. cit.; Scott, "The Regional Impact
loc» cit. But Bonomo and Schotta, 0 £. cit., p. 21,
have found that there is no differential impact.
Their work
has been questioned by Yohe, loc. cit. and the subject
appears to require further analysis.

42

Brimmer, loc. cit.

attrition of their outstanding CD's as interest rates
rose above the rates they were allowed to pay on such
deposits.

As Brimmer has noted, the large banks depended

more heavily on CD's for loanable funds than did the
smaller banks and, tending to draw on more interest sen
sitive

fund sources, lost large amounts of CD's more

quickly than smaller banks as interest rates r o s e . ^
Further, the increased proportion of demand deposits at
these large banks tended to increase average required
reserves.
Given the situation described above, it is perhaps
not incorrect to state that there is a discriminatory
impact of tight monetary policy on large money market
banks.

Thus, any activities which they undertake that

may offset some of this impact would, assuming the de
sirability of equality of impact, be acceptable.

Euro

dollar borrowing has provided an outlet whereby these
large banks may deflect some of the pressures bearing on
them.

This deflection, by neutralizing some of the dis

criminatory pressures, leads to a more equal impact of
monetary tightness.
In addition, to the extent that Euro-dollar borrowing
generates a redistribution of reserves away from the
smaller banks, there may be a tendency for a more rapid

43Ibid.
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transmission to the entire banking system of Federal
Reserve pressures.

When the larger banks begin to feel

these pressures, they normally enter the Federal Funds
market to bid for reserves.

Their increased demand causes

interest rates in the market to rise and these higher
rates draw funds from reserve suppliers.

However, the

smaller banks that traditionally supply these funds are
not forced to do so.

Thus, they can maintain their reserve

positions even while the larger banks are feeling the
impact of tight money policies.

However, while the surplus

banks may or may not participate in the Federal Funds
market, they must relinquish reserves when the larger banks
borrow Euro-dollars.

They have no choice in this case

since they are presented with drafts on their reserves
which they must honor.

Therefore, to the extent that

reserves do flow from the smaller banks to the larger
banks as a result of Euro-dollar borrowing, tight money,
which motivates Euro-dollar borrowing, affects the smaller
banks sooner than it would otherwise.
Concluding, it appears that the monetary policy
problem of discrimination or equity of policy impact may
not be worsened by Euro-dollar borrowing.

As Klopstock

has noted, the funds previously held in the larger banks by
foreign central banks still wind up in these depositories.44

44Klopstock,
o p . cit. , p. 80.

"Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity...,"

253

The only difference is that the route taken is a bit more
indirect (and perhaps more expensive to the receiving
bank).

Brimmer's thesis that a discriminatory impact of

Euro-dollar borrowing harms the smaller banks appears to be
generally incorrect.

If there is such an impact, it may

merely offset the more stringent impact of monetary policy
on large banks that results from open market operations.
If there is not such an impact, i.e., if Brimmer's thesis
is incorrect and reserves are merely transferred back and
forth between the big banks, then there is no discrimina
tion problem attributable to Euro-dollar borrowing.
It appears that there may be, on balance, some
shifting of reserves between small and large U.S. banks
as a result of the latters' Euro-dollar borrowing.

How

ever, this redistribution may merely make less severe the
discriminatory impact of Federal Reserve actions.

Finally,

the redistribution that does occur communicates more quickly
Federal Reserve policy throughout the banking system and
thus, hopefully, throughout the economy.
VIII.

Summary

Monetary policy is concerned with reserve avail
ability, interest rates, money supply, international
financial relations, and the equity of policy impact.
noted in the

As

preceding sections, Euro-dollar borrowing has

affected reserve availability, making it necessary for the
Federal Reserve to apply a greater degree of contractionary
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pressure to the money markets than would have been neces
sary without this leakage.
However, the direct effect appears to be confined
to the New York money market banks rather than applying
to the entire banking system.

Further, the increased

loans made possible by Euro-dollar borrowing means that
monetary policy must take into account this change.
Bank borrowing of Euro-dollars has also added an
extra dimension to the atmosphere in which the Federal
Reserve operates.

This factor means that the Federal

Reserve must contend with additional
variation in the money markets.

(and often unknown)

Thus, not only must the

Federal Reserve frequently apply a greater degree of
pressure to obtain its goals but it must be prepared to
face a greater variation in the results it obtains.
Euro-dollar borrowing affects interest rate levels
in several ways.

While this borrowing may hold interest

rates down due to the greater supply of loans that Euro
dollar availability allows, it is probable that the sup
pliers of such funds obtain them, at least in part, through
the sale of U.S. assets, reinforcing the upward movement
of interest rates.
Euro-dollar borrowing affects the money supply
through facilitating credit creation by the borrowers.
The possible mismeasurement of the money supply and thus the
misdirection of policy, is not, contrary to some views,
particularly aggravated by Euro-dollar borrowing.

With
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regard to international financial relations, Euro
dollar borrowing has had the effect of requiring swap
transactions of various kinds between the U.S. and
European central banks.

Euro-dollar borrowing and re

payment has temporarily

alleviated and worsened the U.S.

balance of payments and

has required offsetting actions in

the foreign exchange markets and among central banks.
Finally, the equality of the impact of monetary
policy and the redistribution of reserves that may re
sult from Euro-dollar borrowing does not appear to be a
major problem.

Indeed,

inforce monetary policy

any such redistribution may re
and hasten its transmission to the

economy.
Thus, Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks has created
difficulties for monetary policy mainly in the sphere
of loan availability.

This difficulty can be offset by a

greater degree of pressure applied by the Federal Reserve.
Whether this is necessary, given the postulated more rapid
dissemination of pressures throughout the system which
Euro-dollar borrowing facilitates, is open to question.
In any event, the leakage that Euro-dollar borrowing intro
duced into the operations of U.S. monetary policy has
been partially alleviated by the imposition of marginal
reserve requirements on Euro-dollar liabilities.

The

computation of the reserve-free base and the rapid and
near total repayment of the 1969-incurred Euro-dollar
liabilities of U.S. banks means that in the next tight
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money period, all or nearly all Euro-dollars borrowed
will be subject to reserve requirements.

While the

leakage from monetary policy may not be entirely halted,
the reserve requirement will increase the cost of such
funds to the point that Euro-dollar borrowing will, in all
probability, never again approach the magnitude that it
did in 1969-70.

Thus, the challenge to monetary policy

presented by Euro-dollar borrowing appears to be past.
However, changes in the reserve requirements and, more
broadly, in the monetary system, may again bring such
borrowing to prominence.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
I. Recapitulation
The purposes of this study were several.
embraced, first, a description

They

of the Euro-dollar system,

including both its development and its operations.

Second,

emphasis was placed on the similarity between the Euro
dollar system and the U.S. monetary system and on the
development of policies akin to open market operations by
the European central banks.

Third, the determinants of

Euro-dollar borrowing by U.S. banks were investigated and,
finally, the possibilities of multiple credit creation and
the effects of U.S. bank Euro-dollar borrowing on U.S.
monetary policy effectiveness were analyzed.

As noted

in the introductory chapter, the overriding concern of this
study has been the various effects generated by the
borrowing by U.S. banks of Euro-dollars.

In order to

analyze this successfully, however, some coverage of the
history and mechanisms of the system was required.

A

secondary emphasis throughout the study was the fact that
Euro-dollars were the product of a unique monetary system.
This product has taken on many of the characteristics of
money and was dealt with in these terms.
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The Euro-dollar system developed in three basic
stages.

It began as a result of the political tensions

existing between East and West in the post-World War II
years.

Following the return to general convertibility in

1958/ a considerable expansion of the system occurred.
Tight money in the United States in 196 6 and again in
1969 brought U.S. banks into the market for Euro-dollar
funds, adding a further dimension to the system.

A

fourth stage, which was preceded by the repayment of a
significant portion of the previous borrowings of U.S.
banks, began in 1970.

This stage may be dated either

from the turn to easy money in the U.S. in 1970 or may be
considered as starting with the withdrawal of the gold
convertibility of the dollar in August, 1971.

It is

marked by the withdrawal of U.S. banks from the system
(as borrowers)

and by the decline in the vehicle currency

status of the dollar.
As noted in Chapter 2, Euro-dollars may be considered
a medium of exchange.

They are, thus, money.

This money

is produced by a monetary system that, is unique, for it
is supranational in scope and essentially unregulated by
any particular national central bank.

The money is based

upon commercial bank deposits in the United States but the
creation of these reserves is not controlled by the system
or by the Federal Reserve, except tangentially.

The Euro

dollar is one of the currencies utilized in the international
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payments system and may also be utilized within a country
as a payments medium.
Euro-dollars are dollar denominated deposits in
non-U.S. banks.

Their issuance is not restricted to

European banks, although these banks do produce the
bulk of such deposits.
monetary system.

These deposits are the money of a

To call the entire complex of trans

actions and activities that take place using the Euro
dollar a market is highly misleading.
dollar market

(the trading of deposits)

While the Euro
does bulk large

within the complex of transactions, the Euro-dollar monetary
system, including all the various activities that a system
implies, has been the subject of this dissertation.
The mechanisms of the system were also discussed in
Chapter 2.

In essence, the explanation of the Euro-dollar

system parallels closely the explanation of the U.S. mone
tary system, with several important differences.
is no central bank in the Euro-dollar system.

There

Rather, the

reserves of the system are produced and held by another
monetary system.'

Trading of these reserves, creation and

lending of deposits based on these reserves, and multiple
credit creation based upon the redeposit of these deposits
are all parts of the system's operations.

Leakages from

the system have been substantial, unlike the U.S. monetary
system.

The leakages have occurred as a result of low re

deposit ra.tios and as a result of U.S. bank borrowing.
In both cases, the reserves of the system filter out of it
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and enter another monetary system.

But, beyond the

leakages and the absence of a central bank to provide re
serves

(and to act as a lender of last resort), the dif

ferences in the basic operation

of the Euro-dollar system

and of the U.S. monetary system

are minimal.

Only the inter

national character of the system and the consequent lack
of regulation of the system really
Supply and demand factors

set it apart.

in the Euro-dollar market,

i.e., those influences operating on or in the system
which find their expression in the market for Euro-dollar
funds, were delineated in Chapter 3.

These influences

proved to be quite diverse and the participants in the
market were motivated by a significant number of factors.
Of particular interest were the causes of U.S. bank Euro
dollar borrowing.

Chapter 4 attempted a determination of

the major influences on this bank borrowing, concluding
that, basically, the restriction of reserves by the
Federal Reserve, as mirrored in CD levels outstanding,
motivated U.S. banks to enter the Euro-dollar markets.

It

was further concluded that the Euro-dollar system was a
marginal or alternative source of funds to the b a n k s , and
one which was abandoned when U.S. fund sources again became
plentiful.

Finally, the regression analysis indicated that

the availability of Euro-dollars to some U.S. banks did
create a leakage from the effectiveness of U.S. monetary
policy.
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Chapters 5 and 6 dealt with credit creation by the
Euro-dollar system and with the effects of Euro-dollar
borrowing on U.S. monetary policy.

These subjects are

best summarized in the following section, since they
involve more tentative analyses and might best be indicated
as conclusions based on the more institutional arid factual
coverage of the earlier chapters.
II.

Conclusions

The basic conclusions deriving from this study were
that multiple credit creation by the Euro-dollar system
was not only theoretically possible but also quite probable
in a real sense.

U.S. bank borrowing of Euro-dollars in

hibits such creation by draining reserves from the system.
But various actions taken by the European central banks in
pursuit of profit and stabilization have funneled large
amounts of funds into the system and have offset to some
degree the leakage deriving from U.S. bank borrowing.
The redeposit of Euro-dollar funds into the system,
either directly or through the agency of central banks,
gives rise to multiple credit creation by the Euro-dollar
system.

A multiplier can be postulated, taking into

account the redeposit ratio and, also, the degree of inter
mediation

(and reserve base sterilization) that occurs.

Should the reserves held to back created deposits rise, or
intermediation increase, or the redeposit ratio fall, or
should

such factors act in combination, Euro-dollar
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credit creation will be restricted.

Should these factors

operate in the opposite fashion, Euro-dollar credit
creation may expand.

As the Euro-dollar system has

developed, it appears that the multiplier has increased.
The negative influence of U.S. bank Euro-dollar borrowing
has been offset by the deposit by the central banks of
their dollar reserves, both for stabilization and in
vestment purposes.

Further, the growth of the system and

of the acceptability of its money has reduced leakages
from the system.

Thus, given the magnitudes reported by

Friedman, Klopstock, Machlup, and the BIS, one conclusion
of this study is that multiple credit creation has
occurred in the Euro-dollar system, despite the significant
leakages that can occur from the system.
A second conclusion of the study is that the credit
creation of the system can be affected by coordinated
central bank action akin to that taken by the Federal
Reserve in the U.S. money markets.

By withholding deposits

from the Euro-dollar system, or withdrawing already placed
deposits, Euro-dollar system reserves can be reduced, thus
affecting a multiple reduction of Euro-dollar deposits
Euro-dollar money supply).

(the

As noted, these operations have

begun to be undertaken.
The goals of this intervention in the Euro-dollar
market are not exactly similar to those of the Federal
Reserve.

While the Federal Reserve attempts through open
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market operations

(and other actions)

to influence the

U.S. economy, the operations of the central banks in the
Euro-dollar market are aimed more at controlling flows of
funds into and out of their systems from the Euro-dollar
system.

These flows have had the effect of offsetting to

a serious degree the monetary policies being pursued in
some of the countries.

In addition, these flows have

tended to put pressure on exchange rates which then re
quired central bank intervention.

While the ultimate

goals of the European central banks and of the Federal
Reserve are the same, i.e., influencing the course of the
domestic economy, the operations in the Euro-dollar market
have as their immediate purpose the reduction of credit
creation by the system. This reduction will be associated
with less disruption of domestic credit markets and
foreign exchange markets and thus domestic monetary policy
may be more effective.
A third set of conclusions deal with the effects of
the existence of the Euro-dollar system on the U.S.
monetary system and on U.S. monetary policy efficiency.
Generally, the Euro-dollar system can affect the U.S.
system and the effectiveness of U.S. monetary policy only
through U.S. bank Euro-dollar borrowing.

While the Euro

dollar system's emergence has introduced a greater degree
of competition into the lending of dollar denominated funds,
the only major effect on the U.S. has been through this
borrowing.

As noted in Chapter 6, it appears that loan
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creation by the banks has been facilitated by Euro-dollar
borrowing.

Equity among banks, interest rate structures,

and the international aspects of U.S. monetary policy
have not been adversely affected to any great degree.
However, prior to September 1969, U.S. bank Euro-dollar
borrowing freed reserves

(through the cash items vehicle),

allowed a rise in loans by banks and some expansion of the
money supply, and created a leakage in the impact of tight
money policies of the Federal Reserve, at least as they
impinged on the New York banks.

In addition, this borrowing

broadened the variability of impact of a given degree of
monetary policy.

The Federal Reserve, thus, faced an

additional destabilizing factor that increased its area
of uncertainty with respect to the magnitude of impact of
a particular policy action.

However, the imposition of

marginal reserve requirements on Euro-dollar borrowing
has reduced the leakage from monetary policy and the
variability of its impact.

Indeed, it appears that should

Euro-dollar borrowing reoccur in the next tight money
period, such borrowing will actually augment rather than
offset the impact of tight money.
The equity among banks issue has been of some con
cern to Andrew Brimmer, among others.

As Chapter 6 indi

cated, this issue is not as significant as it first appeared
to be.

Whether the view that Euro-dollar borrowing merely

represented a reshuffling of reserves among the large
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money market banks or whether it implied some transfer of
reserves from smaller to large banks, the force with
which monetary policy strikes each class of bank is not
really important (with respect to Euro-dollars).

If

there is some transfer of reserves, Euro-dollar borrowing
merely transmits monetary pressures more quickly to all
banks and, in addition, offsets the greater impact of
open market operations on the large banks.
To conclude, the development of the Euro-dollar
system has involved credit creation on a fairly sizable
scale.

It has brought interferences to the implementation

of monetary policy both in the U.S. and abroad.

However,

it may have made more equitable the incidence of U.S.
monetary policy.

Further, with the new reserve requirements,

such borrowing may reinforce U.S. monetary policy.
The future of the Euro-dollar system has been brought
into question by recent U.S. actions designed to cope with
the undervaluation of several other countries' currencies.
These actions have, however, merely reaffirmed a fact
which has been obscured -in the last decade.

That is, the

U.S. dollar represents purchasing power in the most powerful
economy of the world.

When persuasion fails, U.S. action

can obtain by force the desired goals.

There is only one

major currency, as the London Times is reported to have
said, and that is the dollar.

Given this situation, the

vehicle currency status of the dollar may have been reduced
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over the short terra by the recent actions.

But/ in the

longer term, based on the power of the dollar, the vehicle
currency status of the dollar will be generally undiminished.
As a component of the dollar payments system, the Euro
dollar system will undoubtedly survive the present period
of uncertainty, barring extensive capital controls and
the like.
While Euro-dollars may never again play a major role
in U.S. bank liquidity, it seems certain that, in the ab
sence of the complete collapse of the international financial system, the Euro-dollar system will continue to play
a central and perhaps disruptive role in the financial
relations of the nations of the world.

The system's

existence presents the possibility of good as well as ill.
The development of open market operations in the system
by the central banks presents opportunities similar to
those that result from Federal Reserve operations in the
U.S. money markets.

Properly executed, such operations may

solve many problems currently besetting the international
financial system while, at the same time, allowing the con
tinued flow of capital between countries.

The Euro-dollar

system will continue to deserve careful scrutiny in the
future.
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